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


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
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
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
APPLIED SOCIALISM

**A STUDY OF THE APPLI-
CATION OF SOCIALISTIC
PRINCIPLES TO THE STATE**

**BY
JOHN SPARGO**

**NEW YORK
B. W. HUEBSCH**


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**WITH ADMIRATION FOR THE WISDOM, COURAGE,
LOYALTY AND ZEAL WITH WHICH HE SERVES THE
SOCIALIST CAUSE, AND GRATITUDE FOR HIS
UNFAILING FRIENDSHIP
THIS BOOK IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED**

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PREFACE

DURING the winter of 1908-1909, by invitation of my Colleagues of the Board of Directors of the Rand School of Social Science, New York City, I delivered two courses of lectures to a large number of students in that institution. The first course consisted of twelve lectures devoted to an exposition of the elements of Socialism and covered substantially the same ground as that covered by my *Socialism, a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles*. The second course consisted of fourteen lectures,¹ the substance of which is reproduced in the following pages, largely in response to the earnest solicitation of many of the students who attended the course.

When my colleagues asked me to deliver this course of lectures on *Applied Socialism*, they understood that I would not undertake to build a new Utopia, to invent a perfect social system, or, as Marx would scornfully say, to "write the kitchen recipes of the future." In part at least, the

¹ As planned the course was to consist of sixteen lectures, but illness compelled the omission of two of them, hence the discrepancy between this statement and the printed syllabus.

avowed purpose of the lectures was to make the futility of such Utopia-designing clear, and to emphasize the importance of the evolutionary method of Marxian Socialism.

But my colleagues in suggesting the subject had in mind a larger purpose also. Recognizing the fact that there are certain principles which are essential to a Socialist society, and the fact that there are discernible tendencies of social and economic evolution which Socialists universally regard as evidences of the evolution of society toward Socialism, they felt that it was possible to correlate the principles of Socialism and the Socialist estimate of economic and social tendencies into a helpful and suggestive outline of the Socialist society of the future, without departure from the method of science, or wandering into the Elysian Fields of Utopia.

Granted this possibility, such an outline has many advantages. A very large proportion of the anti-Socialist arguments are directed against Utopian schemes like those of More, Owen, Fourier and Bellamy, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, against concepts of the future society which the opponents of Socialism put forward as concrete illustrations of the practical outcome of the principles of Socialism. That no Socialist whose word is entitled to the slightest consideration accepts either the schemes of the old Utopists or the

fantasies imagined by the critics of Socialism as illustrations of the Socialist ideal, or of what is implied by the Socialist philosophy, does not trouble the average opponent of Socialism, especially those who have found it a profitable occupation to oppose and misrepresent Socialism and the Socialist movement. Such attacks are best met, not by mere denial, but by the frankest and fullest statement that can be made of what we believe the main features of the Socialist society must be.

Then, too, there are many earnest and sincere persons, now lingering in the Valley of Indecision, who might become active participants in the Socialist movement as a result of the attempt to make such a statement. There are many such persons who agree fully with the Socialist indictment of existing society, and with the philosophical and economic theories of Socialism, who do not identify themselves with the Socialist movement because they are troubled by such practical difficulties as the question of incentive, the equal reward of efficient and inefficient labor, the preservation of the family, and the like. The frank discussion of such problems as these in connection with the attempt to forecast the main outlines of their probable solution ought to prove exceedingly helpful to all such persons.

There are many Socialists to whom such a study must give a deeper insight into the great move-

ment to which they belong. Socialism gathers its strength to a considerable extent by means of a popular propaganda which is of necessity limited to generalizations. The first thing which the average recruit to the Socialist ranks does is to begin propaganda work among his acquaintances. In every country, therefore, the organized Socialist movement supplements its propaganda by educational work, especially by promoting the careful study of those practical and theoretical problems which have to be encountered in the intellectual battle for Socialism. Quite irrespective of the conclusions reached, the mere fact of considering candidly the problems dealt with in the present study must have a salutary effect and tend to stimulate that spirit of investigation which is the best antidote for impotent intellectual superficiality and crude dogmatism.

How far I have succeeded in meeting the obligation imposed upon me by my colleagues is not for me to judge. I can only say that it gave me great pleasure to meet so many earnest and thoughtful men and women, week after week, and to discuss with them as a comrade and fellow student, rather than as a teacher, problems of such surpassing interest to every Socialist. For the generous appreciation shown by my class I shall always be grateful, and I trust that those who listened to the lectures and discussed them were benefited to the

same extent as the lecturer. The question period after each lecture was at least of as much benefit to me as to any of those who were for the time being my students. Thus our work together was of mutual advantage, as befits all work for Socialism.

It is perhaps a duty I owe the reader to warn him that, although the substance of the following pages was delivered as a series of lectures in connection with the regular work of the Rand School of Social Science, neither that institution nor the men who were my colleagues upon the Board of Directors of that institution are to be held responsible for any of the views expressed. My colleagues knew that there could be no "authoritative" statement of the nature of the Socialist State and the manner in which it will deal with the various questions discussed. Their invitation to me to deliver the lectures meant no more than that they invited one Socialist who they believed had earned a right to such an audience to express his views upon certain subjects of interest and importance in the presence of his comrades. While I believe that the views that I have set forth in these pages are in accord with the fundamental principles of Marxian Socialism, and coincide, in the main, with the views of all the most authoritative spokesmen of the international Socialist movement, I must assume personal responsibility for

them. The reader must not hold the movement responsible. He is simply a listener to one Socialist "thinking aloud."

My thanks are due to my good friend, Mr. W. J. Ghent, formerly secretary of the Rand School, for many friendly services and suggestions.

JOHN SPARGO.

"NESTLEDOWN,"

OLD BENNINGTON, VT.

End of November, 1911.

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APPLIED SOCIALISM

I

INTRODUCTION

AS the term "Applied Socialism" is rather new and unfamiliar, it may be advantageous to begin this study with a definition of the term itself: an attempt to compress our theme into the compass of a concise, convenient and easily comprehensible formula.

Naturally, "Applied Socialism" at once suggests the more familiar term, "Applied Sociology," and advantage may be taken of that fact by making our definition a comparative one. This is the more desirable because of the fact that it was the use of the adjective "applied" to distinguish a branch, or department, of sociology which suggested the desirability of its similar use in connection with the study of Socialism.

Professor Lester F. Ward divides the study of sociology into two main divisions. The first, which he calls "pure" sociology, relates to the origin, nature and genetic or spontaneous develop-

ment of society. That is, it concerns all social phenomena which are not directly affected by the conscious, purposive efforts of man and society. The second division, which he calls "applied" sociology, relates to the conscious, intelligent action of man and society directed toward the changing of social conditions.¹ The first seeks to establish the principles of the science itself, while the second is concerned only with the application of those principles.

Such a distinction is of necessity an arbitrary one, as Professor Ward himself observes. It is altogether impossible to separate completely the spontaneous from the artificial in social phenomena, the *genetic* from the *telic*. Nevertheless, the classification is no more arbitrary than are most other classifications, and, wisely used, it is of great value to the student.

It is self evident that the directive faculties of the human mind do not and could not exist independently; that they are rooted in the great underlying social dynamic forces as a tree is rooted in its soil. It is a fundamental postulate of the Socialist philosophy, a cardinal principle of that materialistic interpretation of history upon which the philosophy of modern Socialism rests, that economic conditions form the basis of human prog-

¹ WARD, *Pure Sociology*. Preface.

ress, at once making conscious direction of that progress possible, and calling the requisite directive forces of mind and will into being.

The rational faculty of man is not a negligible factor in human progress, as some mistaken and over zealous interpreters of Marx would have us believe, but it is dependent upon conditions which are the product of an unconscious, genetic evolutionary process. That is why all the Utopias, from Plato to Bellamy, have failed of realization. They were splendid creations of the directive mind, bound to be abortive because the economic conditions which alone could make possible their realization did not exist. To borrow an apt simile from Professor Ward, the Utopian inventor and dreamer is like the mariner at the ship's helm; no matter how skilled a helmsman he may be, if the ship is becalmed he is helpless. In the absence of the propelling agent, the wind, the man at the helm is powerless and all his skill of no avail.

The term "Applied Socialism," then, is to be used in the same general sense as that in which we use the term "Applied Sociology," but with some limitation. It has to do, not with that unconscious, genetic, irresistible evolutionary process which we can trace in the strata of economic ideas and institutions, but with the exercise of human di-

rective energies; not with abstract philosophy, but with the concrete problems of directing social movement. Its sphere is the telic, not the genetic, factor of the social evolution.

In tracing the evolution of mankind through various forms of social organization we can constantly discern the interplay of the genetic and telic agencies in that evolution. We see the economic forces which made feudalism impossible and capitalism necessary, and we see, also, human directive energy applied to the destruction of feudal laws and institutions and the development of new laws and institutions. Representative government, trial by jury, freedom of movement, police systems, standing armies — these and many other features of capitalist civilization display man's directive share in its development.

Socialism is sometimes declared to be "inevitable" by its advocates, but it cannot be so in any absolute sense, without regard to the factor of conscious human direction. At most, it can only be contended that certain conditions are inevitable, and that these conditions must, in accordance with the great law of self-preservation which rules the universe, call forth certain directive energies upon the part of human beings.

We are not concerned here and now with the theory of Socialism: we take for granted its general acceptance. Assuming that certain conditions

are developing which will make the maintenance of a capitalistic economy impossible, and the transition to a Socialistic economy imperative, Applied Socialism deals with the manner in which the transition is to be effected; how in the polity of the State the principles of Socialism are to be concretely expressed, and, ultimately, Socialist ideals fully realized. It is a broad and inviting field of study which is thus opened before us.

Reducing this definition to a brief formula, we may say that by Applied Socialism is meant *the concrete expression of Socialist principles and the realization of Socialist ideals in the polity of the State.*

It will at once be seen that this involves the creation of a certain picture of the Socialist State, a mental concept of the main characteristic features of a Socialist society as distinguished from all other stages of social development. Obviously, we cannot consider how the principles and ideals of Socialism are to be expressed in the polity of the State of some future period without picturing that future and contrasting it with the present. Immediately the question arises: Can we do this without forsaking the methods of Marxian, or scientific, Socialism and resorting to those of the Utopians?

This question must be answered in the affirmative; otherwise our present study would be im-

possible. Kautsky, whose eminence as a Marxian scholar lends value to his opinion, has very cleverly and clearly shown, in his *Das Erfurter Programm*, that, while the scientific Socialist may not draw up a prospectus or plan of the Socialist State of the future, he is by no means debarred from all thought concerning it. While we may not formulate schemes for the organization of the Socialist Republic, the Coöperative Commonwealth, we may very well, and with considerable profit, seek to ascertain the tendencies of economic development, the direction which the evolution of society is following. The clearer our understanding of these tendencies, the better shall we be able to shape our policy. When we clearly visualize the tendencies which lead to the new social order we are thereby enabled to direct our own actions with greater intelligence than would otherwise be possible. Instead of blind, instinctive effort, we can give intelligent service; we can coöperate with the forces of economic development.

It is well to get this point thoroughly in mind: when the scientific Socialist is asked to give detailed specifications of the Socialist State, to draw pictures of the Coöperative Commonwealth for which he yearns and labors, he is prompt to reply that he cannot do anything of the sort, and to ridicule all attempts to do so as "Utopian"—which is to the average Marxian Socialist the most

effective and terrible of all curses. He is apt to become rather intolerable in his pride and his contempt for Utopianism. He is especially prone to forget that *the essence of Utopianism lies, not so much in the attempt to forecast the future, as in the manner in which the attempt is made.*

In a purely scientific temper and method, it is quite possible to study the tendencies of economic development so as to forecast, within limits, the probable manner of the realization of our ideal. The essence of Utopianism lies in its disregard of the tendencies of economic development. The true Utopian develops his forecast as a deduction from some abstract principle or principles, not from the facts of economic and social development. Laying down a foundation of abstract principle, he proceeds to erect a superstructure of imagination. He is an architect of dream castles.

In general Utopia-building is the harmless occupation of very amiable persons. Productive of no great amount of harm, they are occasionally productive of some trifling amount of good. But occasionally there arises an unusually gifted social inventor, who, by reason of his possession of the genius which captures the public mind, works positive injury. A great book like Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, for example, while it awakens the interest of many thousands of people in Socialism, and to that extent does good, works positive injury

in the long run and obstructs the real Socialist movement by creating the impression that Socialism is a scheme, and inviting critical attention to the details of the author's imaginings. The pioneers of the modern Socialist movement for whom Marx and Engels wrote the *Communist Manifesto* understood this perfectly. When Etienne Cabet visited the London Communistische Arbeiter Bildungsverein in September, 1847, to enlist the sympathy and support of the members for his scheme to establish communistic colonies in North America, the members, who had already been influenced by Marx, spurned his plea and vigorously condemned his efforts. They realized that to give encouragement to Cabet's attempt to persuade masses of workers to leave Europe for the purpose of establishing communistic colonies in America would be to divert their attention from the real issues.

Therefore, while, if we would pursue our study of the manner in which Socialist principles are to be realized in the State, we must create a certain mental picture of society as it will then be, we must not create *Utopian* pictures. Such forecasts as we may make must be logical deductions from the facts of economic and social development, of present economic and social conditions and tendencies historically considered and evaluated. Such forecasts must of necessity be limited to broad general-

izations: they cannot contain the wealth of detail that is commonly found in Utopian pictures of the future society. And, even so, careful as we may be in our efforts to determine the direction of social progress, the best forecasts we may make will be uncertain.

The term "Socialist State" which we have so freely used is in some respects a misnomer and scientific Socialists have very generally avoided its use. One important reason for this avoidance, rooted in the conception of the State as an agent of class rule and repression, we need not consider until a later chapter. For the present, we are concerned with that reason for the avoidance of the term which has influenced most scientific Socialists, but as scientists rather than as Socialists.

There can be no sharp, efficient division of the existing State from the future State of Socialism. Few things are more difficult than completely to divest our minds of the notion that a sharp dividing line can be drawn between the capitalistic state of society and the Socialistic state of society which must succeed it. Just as we cannot bound historical epochs by exact dates, and must therefore use such terms as "the end of feudalism" and "the rise of capitalism" in a very loose and general sense, so we cannot with strict accuracy speak of the Socialist State as an entity separate and distinct from the existing State. We may use such terms

in our discussion with advantage, provided there is mutual understanding that they are not to be interpreted too literally.

That which is commonly spoken of as the Socialist State cannot exist wholly independent of the existing State. It can only be a modification of the existing State, a development rather than a departure. In those wonderfully sane and illuminating fragments, posthumously published in the Berlin *Vorwärts*, of his unfortunately never completed answer to the question, How Shall Socialism be Put Into Practice? Wilhelm Liebknecht, the greatest political leader of the modern Socialist movement, wrote:

"But we are not going to attain Socialism at one bound. The transformation is going on all the time, and the important thing for us . . . is not to paint a picture of the future — which in any case would be useless labor — but to forecast a practical programme for the intermediate period, to formulate and justify measures that shall be applicable at once, and that will serve as aids to the new Socialist birth."

In view of the conflict of ideas and tendencies within the Socialist movement, dividing it into two fairly well-defined schools, the "Opportunists" and the strict "Revolutionists," the intransigents, it will be well to pay special attention to Liebknecht's declaration that "we are not going to at-

tain Socialism at one bound," and that the transition to Socialism "is going on all the time." It is very evident that Liebknecht's profoundest thought rejected the idea of sudden transformations of society.

Liebknecht's attitude upon this question faithfully reflects the thought of Marx, his great teacher and friend. A few passages from his writings might be cited to prove that Marx rejected the idea of a gradual transformation of society, and believed that the change must come as a result of a great cataclysm. To deny the existence of such passages is impossible, but they cannot be said to represent his mature judgment. At times Marx lapsed into the Utopian thought of his time, against which his life and thought as a whole were directed. These passages which indicate a belief in a sudden transformation of society are the product of those occasional lapses. Against them must be set the contrary logic of his entire philosophy, and the consistency of his example as a political leader. He never failed to rebuke those who sought to persuade the proletariat that a sudden transformation was possible. When Liebknecht wrote that the transition to Socialism "is going on all the time" he faithfully expressed a cardinal principle of Marxism.

Recent developments in biology, particularly the "mutation" theory of Hugo de Vries and the re-

discovery of the Mendelian law, have done much to remove the one great difficulty inherent in Darwinism. The immense periods of time required for evolution by natural selection have always baffled the imagination. To a very large extent, that difficulty has been removed, by the theory of evolution by mutation, of the sudden development of new species.

The importance of the new theories is not confined to biological science. To sociology they are equally important. Just as the Darwinian theory of natural selection baffled the imagination because of the immense periods of time required, so, in every application of the biological theory to the evolution of society there has been an inherent element of pessimism. The theory seemed at least to imply the necessity of vast periods of time for relatively slight changes. The recent developments of biology have done much to relieve sociology from this pessimism. Socialist writers have not missed the opportunity afforded by the work of Mendel and De Vries and their followers to add to the strength of their position.

So far, good and well. But the new biological developments have had the unexpected — though not unnatural — result of reviving in no small degree the old and outworn Utopian belief in sudden social transformations. This is more than a too literal application of the laws of biology to

sociology; in their sociological application the biological laws are so stretched as to lose nearly all semblance to their true forms and functions.

The fact that a new plant or animal species may be developed by mutation in nowise justifies belief in the sudden and simultaneous transformation of all the species in, say, the vegetable kingdom. Still less does it justify belief in the possibility of a sudden and simultaneous transformation of all the mass of customs, laws, conventions and social and political institutions which comprise our present social system. A new species of primrose is developed by mutation, but the old species remain. If the entire primrose family had been transformed by a single mutation, that fact would not justify the inference which a few enthusiasts have made from the mutation of single plants, namely, that all society can likewise be transformed by a sudden revolution, or mutation.

The true application of the theory would seem rather to lead to the conclusion that society can be transformed, in the sense of a change from capitalism to Socialism, by means of a *series* of mutations. History records many instances of sudden transformations, such as from absolutism to constitutionalism, or even republicanism. That is a very different thing, however, from the sudden transformation of the whole social and political life of a nation by a single mutation, of which there is

not an instance in history. For such a result no single revolution or mutation will suffice, but only a series.

There is nothing in the theory of evolution by mutations that is incompatible with the Marxian theory of social evolution. But we must reject the catastrophic theory of sudden transformations of the social organism as being not only incompatible with the fundamental philosophy of Marxian Socialism, but contrary to the whole movement of history.

Early in his career, as one of the "Young Hegelians," Marx became imbued with the idea of the continuity and fluidity of human progress. While he abandoned the Hegelian idea that spirit is the essence of all things, and insisted that the material factors in progress are the decisive ones, he retained the fundamental idea of development as a *mors immortalis*. Unlike its parent in many respects, the Marxian theory of historical development was born out of the Hegelian womb. Unquestionably, Liebknecht was right: the fundamental idea of Marxism is that the Socialist State is being developed within the existing social system.

But, it may be asked, how does this evolutionary idea conform to the concept of a Social Revolution, so long considered as a tenet of Socialist faith? Are not these antithetical concepts?

We must answer such questions as these with en-

tire frankness. But first, as a preliminary condition, let us understand what is meant — what Marx meant, if you like — by the term “Social Revolution.” Does it mean a *method* or a *result*? Most people seem to think that by social revolution we Socialists mean a method of bringing about the transformation of society, whereas, on the contrary, we mean the *result*, regardless of the *method*. The transformation of the machinery of production and distribution from capitalistic to social property is the Social Revolution, no matter what means are used to bring it about, as Kautsky,¹ among others, has explained. This — the result — is not more or less revolutionary whether attained by violent or peaceful methods, by legal enactment or civil war, by confiscation or the payment of indemnity to the present owners.

This revolution is prepared in the necessary and inevitable development of capitalist society, and is itself inevitable and irresistible. By this it is not meant that it will come automatically, or spontaneously; that men and women are mere puppets. As we have already seen, the Socialist philosophy does not rest upon the assumption that men are mere automatons. We are dealing with human beings, subject to passions, desires, impulses and needs. What is inevitable and irresistible is the

¹ KAUTSKY, *Das Erfurter Programm*. Also, *The Social Revolution*.

constant development of conditions culminating in crises which compel men to struggle for relief from exploitation and misery and for a larger measure of happiness.

It is by no means essential that such changes be attended with violence and bloodshed. Nor is it necessary that they take the form of sudden upheavals. They may be decades or generations in developing, and accomplished only within the span of further decades or generations, but they are not the less revolutionary upon that account. Unless we thus interpret the term "Social Revolution," how are we to understand what Marx meant when he used the phrase "revolutionary evolution" in his rebuke to the would-be makers of revolution by conspiracies and insurrections?

It is not too much to claim that the pregnant phrase, "revolutionary evolution," is one of the best guides that we have to the thought of Marx. Taken in conjunction with the circumstances in which it was used by him, and the fact that during many years he courageously and consistently opposed all who attempted to incite the workers to violent insurrections—"mouthers of revolutionary phrases," as he contemptuously dubbed them—the term may safely be regarded as an index of his maturest thought. Marx understood social revolution in the sense here described.¹

¹ The reader is referred to my *Karl Marx: His Life and Work* for a more thorough discussion of this point.

So we come to Liebknecht's other thought, that the transition is "going on all the time," and that our present labor is to "forecast a practical programme for the intermediate period, to formulate and justify measures that shall be applicable at once, and that will serve as aids to the new Socialist birth." If we accept Liebknecht's position — which is a logical deduction from Marxian principles — we must, it is evident, make some forecast of the future State. If our programme is to be for an "intermediate period," a means to an end, how can we formulate it without some idea of the end it is designed to reach?

Professor Ward has shown that there is no such thing in reality as the abolition of social institutions.¹ All social institutions change their character to adapt themselves to the time and its peculiar needs, and the successive forms may take different names and be so different as to appear wholly new and entirely unrelated to the older forms. But the relationship is there, nevertheless, and the apparently new institution is in reality a development or a modification of the old. Thus, the idea of the Socialist State growing out of the present capitalistic State conforms to a great universal law of development. The law of social evolution is an eternal *becoming*.

Like its predecessors, the capitalist State, as a

¹ WARD, *Pure Sociology*, p. 31.

condition of its own existence, is constantly enlarging its functions, constantly assuming new and extensive social responsibilities and obligations. Thus it is undergoing a great and far reaching modification, amounting to an almost complete transformation. In the course of this transformation there is prepared the framework, the structural skeleton of the Socialist State.

But we must be careful to distinguish between the *form* and the *thing*. The structural framework of a new social order must not be confounded with the new social order itself. Contemplating the extension of social functions and responsibilities which goes on within the present State, many persons have hastily concluded that every such extension is a manifestation of practical Socialism. Thus, municipal ownership of waterworks and other public utilities is called an illustration of practical Socialism, quite regardless of the fact that the vital elements of Socialism may be entirely absent. Government ownership and control of railways and telegraphs, public education, hospital service, and a multitude of similar forms of social activity and service undertaken by the State, are deemed to be illustrations of Socialism in actual practice. Naturally, whatever virtues or defects may be manifested by these activities are at once attributed to Socialism. It is this fact which constitutes the chief evil of all such reasoning.

If, within the present State, it is found to be necessary to transform some community service, such as the supply of water or gas, from private or capitalistic ownership to public ownership, and the publicly owned enterprise is seized upon by a horde of corrupt officials, that is at once held to be an essential condition of Socialism, notwithstanding the fact that all the corruption of the public service may be in the interest of predatory capitalist enterprises. The inference is entirely unwarranted, of course. The publicly owned water supply or lighting service, corrupted in the interest of parasitic and predatory capital, is not an illustration of applied Socialism. It lacks the essential characteristics of Socialism. It is not permeated by the spirit of social interest, but retains essentially, though in disguise, the central principle of capitalistic economy, the exploitation of social needs and opportunities in private or quasi-private interests.

Russia's imperial monopolies, Germany's State-owned railways, and all similar undertakings, are not bits of Socialism actually realized. They are social forms which capitalism has been forced to adopt, forms essential to the Socialist State it is true, but within which capitalism continues to work, adapting itself to the needs imposed upon it by the terms of its own development. Not until capitalism has exhausted itself within those forms and

ceased to work in them, and they are possessed by the genius, the spirit, of the new social order, will it be right to regard them as examples of Socialism in actual practice.

In other words, they belong to the transitional stage which is characterized by the modification of the structural forms of the capitalist State into forms which will of necessity become the framework of the new social order. Within these new forms, capitalism can only continue to exist for a period. Sooner or later, it must fail and give place to the system better adapted to the forms. That period will be long or short according to conditions partly within and partly without the directive capacity and will of mankind. It may be accelerated by the urge of blind, irresistible forces, as the great mechanical inventions hastened the dissolution of feudalism, or it may be either hastened or retarded by the wisdom or unwisdom, the activity or inactivity, of the citizens.

To sum up: Capitalism is not introducing Socialism piecemeal, but it is bringing about changes which in their totality make up a large part of the necessary structural framework of the Socialist State. This process is not something that is distinct and apart from the Social Revolution to which so much of our Socialist writing is devoted. It is part of it. Marx had this in mind when he said that Capitalism is always "producing its own grave-diggers."

II

SOCIALISM AND THE STATE

FOR a modern man, with his conception and experience of the State as it is in the twentieth century, to attempt to sketch the probable course of the development of the State, by *a priori* speculation, without reference to or dependence upon the mass of facts which has been accumulated, would be a sure way to ludicrous results. How ludicrous can best be imagined when we remember how, speculating in like spirit, without the evidences of geology, men have attempted to account for the origin and development of the earth itself. We need only think of the mysterious cosmogonies and cosmographies of some of the primitive religions, and the theory of a special creation, in six days, believed by millions of people right into our own generation, to realize how futile and abortive such *a priori* speculations must be.

We must depend upon facts if we would understand the State. Yet, for all that, imagination cannot be entirely dispensed with. Indeed, imagination must of necessity play a large part in our

understanding, and nothing could well be more foolish than the common demand for the total repression of imagination in all scientific and philosophical study. No one is more completely dependent upon facts than the historian. His record must be true and trustworthy, so that we may regard it as a mirror in which the image of the past is truly reflected. Yet imagination is as much a part of the equipment of the historian as the capacity for collecting and compiling facts. It requires imagination of a very high order rightly to relate the facts to each other. In the work of a great historian, such as Motley, Mommson, Green or McMaster, we marvel no less at the splendid imagination which visualizes the facts and recreates past epochs for us, so that we seem to live in them, than at the patient and plodding labor which gathered the facts and so deftly wove them into narrative pictures.

So it is with the scientist. In biology the name of Darwin shines out like a resplendent beacon, a marvelous example of patient, painstaking gathering and massing of facts. But, surely, the genius of Darwin was not less remarkable for its superb imagination than for the care and assiduity with which he gathered his data. It required imaginative gifts equal to any that ever inspired song or story, witchery of poet or painter, to produce *The Origin of Species*, to build fact upon fact into

the great pyramid of scientific theory which bears his name.

It was said of Cuvier that from a single bone he could mentally construct a whole skeleton, and naturalists to-day frequently picture the animal life of untold ages past with nothing to guide them but a few fossilized bones. In this they display imaginative genius equal to any in the whole scope of human achievement. While we recognize that these pictures cannot be regarded as being absolutely true, that they may and do fail in detail, we know that they bring us much nearer to actual reality than the most ingenious or learned *a priori* speculation could have done. The popular notion that science is fatal to the imagination is grotesquely untrue.

A heap of bones found at Trinil, on the island of Java, pointing to the coexistence with animals long since extinct of a creature half brute and half human, makes possible a picture of life in the tertiary period; a cave is broken into by unsuspecting workmen and the Neander Valley man steps out from the ice age, as it were. And by a like welding of fact and imagination the sociologist is enabled to reconstruct the past, and to unfold before our modern gaze the great drama of life in ages remotely past. Just as the rocks have preserved the footprints of men who lived countless ages ago, and fossilized their skulls and

limbs, their weapons and tools and the vegetable and animal life with which they were contemporaneous, making it possible for the geologist and the biologist to unite in picturing their life and environment for us, so there have been preserved in the strata of history materials which the sociologist and the historian may use to picture social conditions, customs and institutions long since extinct.

Fossilized in legends and traditions, and in the customs and organizations of savage tribes living right into our own time, are found the fragments of those social conditions, customs and institutions which, added to the picture of primitive man created by the biologist, enable the sociologist to construct a picture of his life and environment. With here a fact and there an inference from legend or tradition or custom, almost as certain as the fact and fitting into it as one bone fits into another, the great skeleton of the past is restored by the genius of the present.

Numerous and vast as the gaps must be, the outline is nevertheless reasonably firm and certain. To convince ourselves that this scientific method is infinitely superior to *a priori* reasoning, we need only compare the results of both. Let us take, by way of example, the ideas of the origin of the State contained in the Theocracy of the ancient

Hebrew and the Social Contract theory of Rousseau:

The idea that God wrote the first laws upon tablets of stone, thus instituting the State and laying its obligations upon Man, has dominated the thought of the world in strange ways. It was the basic idea of feudalism and the "divine right of kings"; it nurtured the doctrines of Papal infallibility and temporal sovereignty. As Moses received the Law from God amidst the thunderings of Sinai, so king and pope derived their authority from God and were His vice regents — an idea surviving in the grotesque heroics of the German Kaiser and President Baer's famous boast that the coal mine owners of America are God's specially chosen and inspired trustees.

A modification of the Theocratic idea is that of an original genius as lawgiver, the "great man" idea which runs like a thread through the whole fabric of the history of human thought. This idea can be traced in the traditions and philosophies of every race and nation. It simply removes God from the top of Sinai and leaves Moses there inspired as the great original lawgiver. It makes Solon responsible for the Attic State, Lycurgus for the Spartan State, and Alfred the Great for the English State.

This conception of the origin of the State marks a great advance over the Theocratic idea from

whence it was derived, in so far as it developed the notion that the State is the result of conscious human effort. It stimulated that individualism of initiative and daring which alone could break down the fatalism and resignation that paralyzed mankind so long as it was believed that the State was created by God. So long as men believed that the State and all other human institutions came from the omniscience and omnipotence of God, they were utterly helpless, but to regard them as the creations of a Moses or a Solon made it possible for men to dream of changing them to suit their desires, and to dare the attempt. It was possible to dream that other and greater leaders might arise to improve upon the work of a Moses or a Solon. It was, of course, a purely Utopian concept in that it regarded the State and all other human institutions as things created according to plan, rather than as developing in accordance with the needs and experience of the race.

Just as the theory of a great human genius arising as the first lawgiver and creator of the State is a modification of the Theocratic idea, so the theory of the social contract, which Locke in the seventeenth century and Rousseau in the eighteenth, among others, so well developed, is in its turn a modification of the great man theory. This theory of the social contract is of special interest and importance for us because of the influence it

has exerted upon radical thought and radical movements. Its fundamental principle of a "law of nature" entered largely into the propaganda of the French Revolution and has been the philosophical creed of many radical movements since then. The concept of "natural rights" is expressed in the Declaration of Independence and has long been regarded as sacred by the great mass of the American people.

According to this theory, there exists, outside of and transcending all the laws of men, a great law of nature. Nowhere very clearly defined, even by its most illustrious exponents, this "law" may be said to be the sum of the cardinal virtues, forming an abstract standard to which all human laws should be made to conform, and by which they may be judged. Thus Hobbes, in his *Leviathan*, describes it as including justice, mercy, equity and modesty, and likens it to the Golden Rule. As the violation and disregard of the "natural" and "inalienable" rights of men formed the chief count in the indictment of British misrule which Jefferson penned in the Declaration of Independence, so in general the philosophers of eighteenth-century radicalism judged all institutions by the same abstract standard.

This law reigns in a "state of nature." It is only abrogated when evil passions and desires overwhelm men. Born subject to its rule, man-

kind proved too wicked to obey it. If all men were perfect, this law of nature would have sufficed to regulate their conduct toward each other and no State would have been necessary. But, since men have never yet attained to a state of perfect conduct, the nonsocial parts of their nature — pride, greed, ambition and passion — proved too strong to be subordinated completely to this law, and so the "state of nature" became one of constant warfare. To avoid mutual extermination, the state of warfare was brought to an end by men "agreeing together mutually to enter into one community and make one body politic," as Locke expresses it.¹ Thus arose the State with its common authority and magistracies to judge between man and man.

Like the great man theory and that of the divine institution of the State, this theory of the social contract rests altogether upon *a priori* speculation. The definite and deliberate creation of the State is common to all three theories. According to the first, the Theocratic theory, God made the State; according to the second, the inspired genius theory, a great human master mind conceived and planned it; according to the third, the theory of the social contract, men in mutual action, by contractual means, made it.

Now, this social agreement, or contract, in-

¹ LOCKE, *On Civil Government*,

volved the surrender by the individual of his natural rights to the State. And as the State came into existence originally by the free and deliberate agreement of its members, its present members by continuing within it and sharing its advantages are assumed voluntarily to acquiesce in and agree to its authority.

We need not consider at any length the obvious weakness of this once generally accepted, but now discredited theory. It is sufficient for our present purpose to bear in mind its fundamental defect, namely, that it presupposes a considerably advanced stage of intellectual development before the State could appear, whereas the institution exists, more or less clearly defined, among very savage peoples. Judged as a theory of the origin of the State, the social contract theory has little merit. It is only when we judge it as the philosophical basis of the propaganda which discredited the divine right of kings, and made possible the assertion of popular sovereignty in the State, that it assumes importance as marking a great advance in political science.

That the State came into existence through conquest, the subjugation of one set of people by another, is now generally believed by sociologists of all schools. But the State did not come into existence spontaneously and fully developed. It is a growth with roots that lie far deeper than the

subjugation of tribe by tribe or race by race. With striking and convincing unanimity sociologists agree that government had its origin in family customs and discipline. It seems reasonably certain also that the form of the family from which the first organized government was developed was that known as the *patriarchate*, the family in which the father was the ruler, his authority being accepted by all the members of the family. The patriarchate was a late development of the family, the result of a long process of evolution. We are not concerned, however, with the theories of the evolution of marriage and family relations which have given rise to so much controversy.

It is, perhaps, well to insist with some emphasis that there is no Socialist theory of the evolution of marriage and the family. Marx and Engels — particularly the latter — accepted, almost without reserve, the views of Lewis H. Morgan, that great American so little honored by his own countrymen. Engels, as is well known, made Morgan's views the basis of his monograph, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. In his preface to the fourth edition of this work, published in 1891, Engels notes that Morgan criticizes capitalist society with its production for profit rather than for use "in a manner savoring of Fourier," and that he "speaks of a future reorganization of society in language that Karl

Marx might have used." It is at least possible that this leaning toward Socialism displayed in Morgan's great work influenced Marx and Engels, and that it accounts in some degree for their enthusiasm over his theories.

Be that how it may, it is — in view of certain tendencies in the Socialist movement in the United States and elsewhere — well to emphasize the fact that the philosophy of Socialism does not involve acceptance of Morgan's theories, even though they were so unreservedly accepted by the greatest of Socialist philosophers. It would be most unfortunate if there should be added to the crippling restraints of an "orthodox" Marxism, which so many of our ablest and best minds are trying to break, a new orthodoxy in this sphere of sociological study. There is much in Morgan's *Ancient Society* and in the little monograph by Engels which is profoundly true and important, but they must not be regarded as inspired and infallible scriptures. Marx's *Das Kapital* has so often been called "the Bible of the working class" that we are prone to forget that its influence for good ceases when it is so regarded by the workers. Neither *Das Kapital* nor *Ancient Society* is to be regarded as a sacred book.

Morgan traces the development of the family out of a state of unrestricted sex relationships, through consanguinity, to the stage where bar-

riers against incest are raised, and the maternal *gentes* appear with important restrictions upon inbreeding and the development of well-regulated group marriage takes place. The *matriarchate* weakens as monogamous marriage develops, and the economic supremacy of the male sex rapidly increases its power and authority. With this development of a monogamous basis for marriage and the family the patriarchate is attained. Side by side with these developments there was the evolution of the *gentes* into *phratries*, and, later, *tribes*.

Back of this process of evolution was the great economic urge, so clearly shown by both Morgan and Engels. Probably the greatest force leading to the establishment of the patriarchal family based upon monogamous marriage was the development of slavery and other forms of private property, and the resulting desire for a system of inheritance resting upon undisputed parentage. Here we have a probable explanation of the fact that, universally in civilized states, monogamous relations are much more rigidly imposed upon women than upon men. The inheritance of accumulated wealth gave to the family an individuality it had never before possessed, and a power of its own distinct and separate from that of the gentile organizations. It also gave rise to the first rudiments of a hereditary ruling class. More

than this, it seized upon the power of the gentile and tribal organizations to make war upon wealthier tribes. War was waged, not as formerly from motives of fear, hatred or revenge merely, but for plunder, for the acquisition of more property — more slaves and more territory.

Out of these general conditions two great and pressing problems arose. First, the tribal and gentile conception of property as a communal thing, an idea thousands of years old, came into conflict with the new conception of property as a private, personal thing. Second, the capture of large numbers of slaves gave rise to the need of some coercive power to keep them in subjection. To protect private property against the assaults of those who held to the traditional concept of communal property and refused to respect the newly asserted private property rights, and to provide a means of keeping the captured slaves as a subject class, the State was necessary.

The new institution was developed partly by transforming the gentile and tribal organizations, easily accomplished through the most powerful and wealthy families whose interests demanded it, and partly through the development of new organs, such as the armed public power in the hands of the authorities of the State, a power doubtless originally intended for use against neighboring tribes, a means of defense and aggression, but soon used

against the mass of the people for the protection of the property interests of a ruling class. Such, in brief outline, is the probable course of the development of the State.

We are now in a position to understand clearly what the founders of modern Socialist philosophy meant when they referred so constantly to the "class nature" of the State. The first essential condition of the State is a public power of coercion divorced from the immediate control of the people, and that power invariably becomes the means whereby a ruling class imposes its will upon society. While the State has always been in a sense the official representative of all the citizens, it has been in a very special and emphatic sense the power by which class rule has been maintained.

This is, of course, only another way of saying that government has always existed primarily to protect and preserve property rights. In the early State the dominant interest was that of the slave-owning class; in the mediæval State the dominant interest was that of the feudal lords; to-day, despite our theoretical democracy, the interests of the capitalist class are the chief concern of the State. Macaulay's aphorism that "Law was made for property alone" expresses a profound truth to which every page of human history bears witness. Only when we read history in the light

of the theory that it is essentially a history of class struggles can we understand its movement.

The State of to-day is a class-serving institution, as the State of every epoch in history has been. In the great world-struggle, progress is attained through the overthrow of old dominant classes and the rise of new ones. Whenever a new class challenges the power and supremacy of the existing ruling class it seeks to capture the State. There are two principal reasons for this: the first is that the new class seeks to acquire the coercive powers of the State in order that it may use them to defend its particular interests; the second is that it seeks to legalize its own acts to give the sanction of Law and the State to its claims. As the capitalist class wrested the control of the State from the feudal nobility, so the proletariat in its turn is seeking to capture the State to serve its special interests.

At this point we come to a rather startling proposition in the classic literature of Socialism, one that has caused many difficulties to honest minds and provoked a vast amount of discussion. Engels states it with characteristic force in the third section of his *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*. The proposition is that the proletariat "seizes political power and turns the means of production into State property. But, in doing this, it abolishes itself as proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions,

abolishes also the State as State." Later Engels qualifies this somewhat by saying, "The State is not 'abolished.' *It dies out.*"

Now, what is meant here by the *abolition* of the State, or by the State *dying out*? When Bebel was asked in the Reichstag on one occasion to give some idea of the Socialist State, he replied, "In the future we do not want any State at all!" It is not surprising that many persons conceived the idea that he meant to convey the impression of a state of anarchy; that organized government would have no place in the society of the future. In much the same way, the unfortunate phrase "the abolition of capital," so frequently occurring in Socialist literature, has bewildered many and made necessary innumerable explanations that Socialists have no intention to destroy the *things* which we call "capital," but only the peculiar social relations expressed through them, the *social quality in them*, which in their own technical vocabulary the Socialists call "capital."

It is certain that when Engels spoke of the State being abolished or dying out, he had in mind the disappearance of its special quality as an instrument of class rule, and not the disappearance of organized government itself. He regarded the use of its coercive functions by a ruling class as the very essence of a State. His reasoning is very simple: The essential quality of the State is the

coercive power in the hands of a ruling class, by which it keeps the proletariat in subjection. When the proletariat seizes upon this power and wrests it from the grasp of the class which uses it to maintain its power to exploit the workers it will at once cease to be used for that purpose. The State will be given a new function by its proletarian conquerors, namely, the ownership and management of the great social forces of production. When these are used for the common good of all, there ceases to be a class division in society. The proletariat itself is no longer a proletariat, and there is no exploiting class. The essential principle of the State, the coercive power in the hands of a ruling class, no longer exists. The State, in the special sense defined by Engels, ceases to exist.

That this is what Engels meant is made abundantly clear by the context. It is obvious that when he says that the proletariat, having secured control of the State, "abolishes itself as proletariat," he does not contemplate wholesale *felo de se* on the part of millions of wage-workers. It is clear that he refers to the abolition of a certain social status or relation. And just as it is clear that he does not mean wholesale *felo de se*, so it is likewise clear that when he speaks of the proletariat abolishing the State, or of the State dying out, he is far from contemplating the disappearance of

organized government and the triumph of political Nihilism.

He speaks, for example, of the diminishing of State interference with social relations which must follow when the State ceases to be the representative of class interests, saying: "the government of persons is *replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of the processes of production.*" Evidently he contemplates the existence of an organized government to carry on the "administration of things" for social well-being, and to conduct the "processes of production." Even here, however, his language is unfortunately quite obscure. How can there be an "administration of things" by the government, and how can there be government "conduct of the processes of production" without some "government of persons"? How can things be administered without government of persons? What is meant by the "administration of things," if not the regulation of human relations established through the medium of the things? It is impossible to conceive of any government of production which does not involve some government of the producers.

It can scarcely be questioned by anyone who has given the subject serious consideration that the State to-day has to interfere with individual liberty to a much greater extent than would be necessary in a Socialist régime, popular notions to

the contrary notwithstanding. "Government of persons" in this sense would, we are justified in believing, be greatly reduced. But it is hardly conceivable that it would wholly disappear, as might be inferred from the prediction by Engels that it would be "replaced" by something else, namely, the government of things.

In spite of the obscurities of his language, the essential thought of Engels is manifestly that expressed in the foregoing paragraphs. He regarded many of the coercive features of the present State as being rendered necessary by the fundamental nature of the capitalist system, production for profit. The triumph of Socialism, he reasoned, would of necessity greatly extend the scope of personal freedom. With that general conclusion every Socialist will readily agree.

The cardinal defect in the conception of the State upon which Engels based his conclusions — a defect that is emphasized in the case of M. Gabriel Deville¹ and some other Socialist writers — lies in the fact that the definition of the State is too narrow to be true. It is incomplete and, therefore, misleading. It is perfectly true that one of the leading characteristics of the State in all

¹ I refer here to M. DEVILLE, because his pamphlet, *Socialism, Internationalism and the State*, is very well known to English and American students of Socialism. It must, however, be added that M. DEVILLE is not now in any manner connected with the Socialist movement.

ages has been the use of its coercive powers by a ruling class to protect its special interests, but that is not the *only* characteristic. In all ages the State has exercised non-coercive and non-repressive functions, the scope and importance of which have constantly expanded.

If the State in feudal times kept the serfs in subjection, even if that became its *principal* function, it is nevertheless true that, at the same time, it rendered the serf some service, as, for example, protecting him and his family from the assaults of the lawless and violent robber hordes which infested the country. Unquestionably, one of the principal objects of the State to-day is the preservation of capitalistic property. The State is a class instrument, and maintenance of class rule is its manifest and avowed purpose. At the same time, however, we must not forget that it serves many other functions. While it does maintain the subjection of the workers to the capitalist class, it does much else which is quite distinct from and independent of that. In the large body of social legislation, much of it restrictive of the exploiting powers of the capitalist class, as, for instance, a great deal of our factory legislation, we see the State assuming functions which cannot be regarded as coercing or repressing the wage-workers, even by the utmost stretch of the imagination of the most prejudiced Anarchist.

While carefully refraining from indulgence in that too literal application of biological laws and analogies which has brought so much discredit to the so-called "biological sociology,"¹ we may safely assert that the biologic law of adaptation to its environment has its sociological counterpart. It is not only in biology that "the organism must conform to the mold established for it by its environment." In the case of social and political institutions, as well as in the domain of biology, there is a force or law which compels the organism to undergo such modifications and transformations as will secure its conformity to the conditions which make its environment. Marx and Engels, and their followers generally, have recognized this fact; indeed, that recognition is fundamental to their philosophy.

It is in conformity with this law that we see the modern State continually passing through a process of transformation through the enlargement of its functions. Herbert Spencer long ago pointed out the fact that the State has assumed many of the functions formerly belonging to the individual or to the family.² We see the State of to-day charging itself with a multitude of social respon-

¹ Cf. ALBION W. SMALL, *General Sociology*, pp. 74-80, for a suggestive discussion of this.

² See, e. g., *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Part III, pp. 709-712.

sibilities and services which formerly were left to the family or to individual enterprise. It assumes responsibility for educating the child, for safeguarding its health and morals, for nursing it in sickness and for providing it with facilities and opportunities for play. Without losing its special-class characteristics, the modern State becomes impregnated with a social spirit and purpose, and is continually extending its functions in response to that spirit and to serve that purpose.

Mr. John Martin, a keen observer, has, without recognizing the vital distinction between Socialism and mere public ownership emphasized in the preceding chapter, given an interesting summary of what he conceives to be the Communistic accomplishments of the United States Government, in an article entitled *Socialism in Action in America*.¹ He instances among other examples, the work of the Department of Agriculture and the aid it renders to farmers by the introduction of new crops, experiments with seeds, fertilizers, methods of cultivation and so on, as well as by instructions to farmers upon all these and many other matters, organized warfare upon parasitic pests, plant and animal diseases and the like. He points also to the immense irrigation works carried on under the Reclamation Act — canals which would

¹ In *The Socialist Review* (London), Vol. II, No. 9, November, 1908.

stretch across Europe, with dams comparable with the great dams of the Nile Valley. Millions of acres of land have been reclaimed and irrigated, providing homes and sustenance for millions of people. Hundreds of miles of roadways have been constructed, tunnels excavated and other stupendous works undertaken. To these great enterprises must be added the reservation of immense forest areas, coal and oil lands, water power, and other natural resources, in the interest of future generations.

To resort once more to biological analogy, the modern State develops new organs to meet its new needs. In place of the old *laissez faire* spirit we have an increasing recognition and acceptance of social responsibility. The State which cares for the hygiene of the homes of its citizens, provides them with free education, libraries, art galleries, museums, parks, and a multitude of other opportunities for richer life and thought; which places restrictions upon its capitalists in the interest of its wage-workers, and even looks ahead and recognizes an obligation to posterity, legislating for the conservation of natural resources and so restraining the capitalist of to-day in the interest of the citizen of to-morrow, is no mere instrument of class rule. It is rapidly developing the necessary organism for the realization of Socialism.

To sum up: What we are witnessing is not

the decay of the State, but its development to increased usefulness, its adaptation to the requirements of society as a whole. It is becoming more and more social in its nature, assuming larger control than ever before over the economic forces, the great primary sources of life. The essentials of the Socialist State are thus being developed within the existing capitalist State. What we have to look forward to, therefore, is not the disappearance of the State, either through its forcible abolition, its dissolution or decay, but the complete disappearance of its special function as an instrument of class rule and oppression. That is what Engels meant by the abolition or death of the State, and it will result, as he wisely predicted, from the conquest of the State by the proletariat.

But the State itself will remain.

III

THE SOCIALIST STATE

THE view of the State outlined in the last chapter is essentially the one held by that great Socialist, Wilhelm Liebknecht. Speaking at the Erfurt convention of the German Social Democracy, in October, 1891, introducing the programme which was then unanimously adopted, he referred to the controversies concerning the use of the word "State" to designate the Socialist form of society as "a pure strife of words." He emphasized the thought that oppression and exploitation are not necessarily involved in the concept of a State. There is, therefore, good authority for disregarding the odium attached to the term in the classic literature of Socialism, and speaking freely of the "Socialist State."

Objections may be raised by those pedantic more-Marxist-than-Marx "Marxists" to be found in the Socialist movement of every country, who think the use of the word "State" a denial of Socialism. Objection may also be made by those latter day Utopians, the "Syndicalists" of the

Latin countries, who manage somehow to believe that the State will soon become obsolete, and that the proletariat will secure control of the means of wealth production without the intervention of the State or parliamentarianism, but solely through the agency of the labor unions. In this study we need not pay any attention to these objectors. The former class is vociferous, but numerically weak and insignificant, while "Syndicalism" is, even in Europe, little more than a brilliant and daring literary interpretation of the old labor unionism.

So, instead of saying that Socialism presupposes the abolition of the State, or its dissolution, we shall disregard the example of Engels and his numerous followers and say that Socialism presupposes the continuance of the State and its further development; the disappearance of its special characteristics as an agency of class rule, and the development of its social character to the point where it becomes thoroughly democratized and socialized, the representative of all the people.

At first sight this appears to be a violently contradictory proposition, but it is not so in reality. As we have seen, the present State is very different from the simple machine of class oppression which Engels had in mind when he spoke of the State as doomed to extinction as a result of the conquest of its powers by the proletariat. The State is continually extending its functions in other

directions, and becoming more and more the servant and representative of society as a whole. The process of democratization, or, what is a better name for the same thing, socialization, is not something which we fondly imagine will take place at some future time. It is a movement which is going on now, before our eyes. We are living in an age of transition, and blind indeed must one be who cannot discern the movement toward a completely socialized State.

This reasoning forces us to the creation of some mental picture of the Socialist State. Avoiding the temptation to paint Utopian pictures, and keeping ourselves strictly within the boundaries of scientific method, we must summarize the fundamental requirements of the Socialist State. In other words, we reach the point where we must face the fact that certain conditions must be fulfilled before it will be possible to speak of Socialism in the present tense, as a goal attained. What, then, are those conditions?

Let us take some of the numerous definitions of Socialism, and see how far, if at all, they help us to outline the fundamental requirements of the Socialist State, and wherein they fail. When Proudhon was asked, in 1848, "What is Socialism?" he replied, "Every aspiration towards the amelioration of society." That was not, it must be confessed, a very helpful or illuminating definition.

The same may be said of Adolf Held's famous definition of Socialism as "Every tendency which demands any kind of subordination of the individual will to the community"—a very curious definition!

The great Dictionary of the *Académie Française* defines Socialism as "The doctrine of men who pretend to change the State, and to reform it, on an altogether new plan." Littré's definition is no better than this, for he defines it as "A system which, regarding political reforms as of subordinate importance, offers a plan of social reform." Leroux, often erroneously credited with being the inventor of the word, but certainly one of the first to make it popular, declares Socialism to be "A political organization in which the individual is sacrificed to society." Professor Flint, in a ponderous critique¹ remarkable mainly on account of its obliquity and bias, from which the foregoing definitions are quoted, gives this queer definition: "Any theory of social organization which sacrifices the legitimate liberties of the individual to the will or interests of the community." Professor Flint's animus and consequent disqualification to be seriously considered is clearly manifested by his use of the word "legitimate." His "definition" is not an attempt to describe impartially and accurately the meaning of the word,

¹ FLINT, *Socialism*, Chap. I.

but an epitome of his own unfavorable opinion of the thing itself. Twenty years' association with Socialists in various lands has failed to bring me into contact with a single one who would accept that stupid definition as an approximately correct description of his belief.

In a famous debate with Charles Bradlaugh, H. M. Hyndman, the English Socialist leader, gave a definition of Socialism which has been extensively quoted. He said: "Socialism is an endeavor to substitute for the anarchical struggle or fight for existence an organized coöperation for existence." While this may be accepted as a fairly accurate description of the purpose which inspires every Socialist, it does not materially aid us in our present inquiry. It defines for us the spirit in which the Socialists are laboring, but it does not create for us even the suggestion of a picture of the social and economic organization of the Socialist State.

Mr. Bradlaugh, in that memorable debate, gave a very definite picture of the Socialist State as he conceived it. He said: "Socialism denies private property and affirms that society organized as the State should own all wealth, direct all labor and compel the equal distribution of all produce." This definition has the great merit of being very positive. It sketches with a few bold strokes a well-defined picture. But the picture has this

grave defect: Not one Socialist in a million would acknowledge it as bearing any semblance to the ideal at which all Socialists aim. The principles outlined by Mr. Bradlaugh bear little or no relation to the principles in which so many millions of Socialists believe. Mr. Bradlaugh's definition contains the following concrete propositions:

- (1) Under Socialism private property will be forbidden;
- (2) Under Socialism the State will own all wealth and direct all labor;
- (3) Under Socialism the State will compel the equal distribution of all produce.

While there may have been some among the early Utopian Socialists who believed in an infinite and perfect State, such as Mr. Bradlaugh describes, it is safe to say that no representative Socialist anywhere in the world would accept this definition.

Much better, though far from perfect, is John Stuart Mill's famous definition: "Socialism is any system which requires that the land and the instruments of production should be the property, not of individuals, but of communities or associations, or of the government." Its chief merit lies in the fact that it includes ownership of the means of production by voluntary coöperative associations, as well as government ownership, in its conception of the socialization of industry. Its gravest defect lies in the fact that it conveys the idea that government ownership is synonymous with Social-

ism; that the ownership of the land and the means of production by the government constitutes Socialism, quite irrespective of the nature of the government.

Many years ago the English Social Democratic Federation adopted a brief statement of its object, which has ever since been used as a definition of Socialism. It has been quoted in innumerable Socialist pamphlets and leaflets, and the tacit approval implied thereby has made it in a sense a historic official definition of Socialism. It reads as follows: "The social ownership and control of all the means of production, distribution and exchange." The importance of this definition centers around that little word "all." If we are to accept it literally, the definition means that the private ownership of anything which might be used as a means of production, distribution or exchange would be impossible in the Socialist State.

But the members of the Social Democratic Federation never took that statement of their object literally. Jack-knives and needles are, under certain conditions, means of production as surely as are the costliest and most powerful machines in a modern factory. A market basket is, under certain conditions, a means of transportation as surely as a railroad train is. The difference is a difference in the degree of efficiency, not in the kind of service performed. Social or collective owner-

ship and management of jack-knives, needles and market baskets is beyond the pale of serious discussion. Realizing this, the speakers of the Social Democratic Federation used to devote a considerable part of their propaganda to the task of assuring their hearers that nothing of the sort was contemplated. Obviously, the formal statement of their object was misleading. It said that they were aiming at the collective ownership of *all* means of production, distribution and exchange, but in lectures and addresses it was explained that, although the formal statement said *all*, only the collective ownership and control of *some* was meant.

After thus criticizing the several definitions of Socialism quoted, we are naturally expected to provide a more satisfactory one. But, easy as it is to criticize definitions that are obviously defective, it is not an easy matter to formulate a perfectly satisfactory substitute. Socialism seems too big, too inclusive, for definition. No definition of Socialism can be satisfactory which does not treat of it as (1) a theory of social evolution; (2) a social ideal, or forecast; (3) a conscious movement aimed at the realization of that ideal.

So we may define Socialism as "A theory of social evolution, according to which the rate and manner of social progress are mainly conditioned by the development of the methods of production;

an ideal of society, believed to be the next stage in social evolution, in which the present exploitation of class by class has no place, the production and distribution of wealth being carried on for the common good; a practical movement, largely but not wholly confined to the members of the exploited class in present society, which seeks to obtain control of the machinery of government to bring about the ideal social State."

This definition is far more satisfactory than any of the others quoted, but it leaves much unsaid, many important questions unanswered. Will the Socialist State be democratic, oligarchic, or bureaucratic? Will it be monarchical or republican in its form? How will industry be organized to serve the common interest, instead of the interest of the few as at present? How will the remuneration of labor be determined? These and a multitude of similar questions crowd the brain when we contemplate this definition.

Most of us recognize in a general way that democracy and Socialism are inseparably linked together. There cannot be a Socialist despotism any more than there can be a light darkness or a white blackness. But suppose that someone should tell us that the Socialist State might be a monarchy; that a descendant of King Edward VII may some day occupy the throne of a *Socialist* kingdom of Great Britain? Probably most So-

cialists would regard the suggestion as grotesquely impossible. We have somehow regarded it as axiomatic that the Socialist State must be a republic. But it was not so to the Socialists of an earlier generation. As Mr. Hillquit reminds us, both Saint Simon and Fourier regarded a constitutional monarchy as quite compatible with Socialism, as also did Karl Rodbertus and Ferdinand Lassalle.¹

Twenty-five or thirty years ago practically all the Socialists of Europe held the view, so well expressed by Benoit Malon, that, "since the republic is the political form of human dignity, the states which will be founded by emancipated nations can only be republican."² It was generally believed that the overthrow of monarchical government and the establishment of republican government in its stead would be the first important step towards the realization of the Socialist State. The present writer remembers well that, less than twenty years ago, it was the rule for Socialists in England to attack the monarchy in their propaganda, to circulate anti-monarchical tracts and pamphlets and proclaim the necessity of a social republic.

But, while practically all Socialists are still re-

¹ Cf. HILLQUIT, *Socialism in Theory and Practice*, p. 137.

² MALON, *Précis de Socialisme*, p. 297.

publicans at heart, not much importance is attached to the form of government nowadays; at least, not in those countries where the constitutional limitations upon the sovereignty have robbed it of all its despotic powers and made the sovereign simply a political figurehead. Neither in England nor in Germany do the Socialists of to-day seriously concern themselves with attacks upon the monarchy or attempts to create a republic. When M. Jean Jaurès, the French Socialist leader, at the International Socialist Congress at Amsterdam, in 1904, boasted of the superior progressiveness of the French people, and instanced in support of his boast the fact that France has long been a republic, he was replied to by Herr Bebel, the German Socialist leader.

"As much as we envy you Frenchmen your republic," said Bebel, "and as much as we wish it for ourselves, we will not allow our skulls to be broken for it: it does not deserve it. A capitalist monarchy or a capitalist republic,—both are class states, both are necessarily and from their very nature made to maintain the capitalist régime. Both direct their entire strength in the effort to preserve for the capitalist class all the powers of the legislature." ¹

¹ Quoted by HILLQUIT, *Socialism in Theory and Practice*, p. 138.

English Socialists generally share Bebel's indifference. There is no serious agitation to do away with the monarchy on the part of any considerable number of Socialists in England. Just how they regard the reigning monarch is well illustrated by a resolution adopted by the Tunbridge Wells Branch of the Social Democratic Party, and published in the official organ of that party, demanding "That the King, *as figurehead of the nation*, be requested to issue a proclamation dissenting from the present anti-German attitude exhibited in the English press."¹ The frank recognition of the power and influence of the monarch as "the figurehead of the nation," and the idea of requesting him to act, by proclamation, on behalf of the nation, mark a state of mind far removed from the passionate republicanism of a few years ago.

Even in Italy the same general indifference upon this question is manifested by the Socialists, and that by the most extreme section of all, the Syndicalists, equally with the more moderate sections. Arturo Labriola, one of the leaders of the Syndicalists, writes: "Class rule does not express itself in a monarchical form of government or in a republican form of government, but in the fact that one group of men exercise the political powers in their own interests. *We must learn to understand*

¹ *Justice* (London), August 21, 1909.

*that there are no political forms which exclude class rule, nor such which make it inevitable."*¹

We may say, then, that (1) the Socialist State must be a political democracy, and (2) that, while it is probable that the republican form of government will be the form most generally adopted, there is nothing to prevent the continuance, for long periods, of constitutional monarchies.²

When once we have denied that Socialism presupposes the abolition of private property and the centralization of all property and means of production in the hands of the State, and have affirmed that some things would remain subject to private ownership and control, this question immediately arises: How will it be determined which things may safely be permitted to remain in private hands, and which must be made subject to ownership and control by the State? The question is fundamental, inevitable and imperative. It must be answered with candor.

Two methods by which an answer can be arrived

¹ LABRIOLA, *Riforme e Rivoluzione Sociale*, p. 99. Quoted by HILLQUIT, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

² For fuller treatment of this subject, the reader is referred to HILLQUIT's *Socialism in Theory and Practice*, pp. 131-143; ANTON MENDER'S *Neue Staatslehre*, 2d edition, pp. 170-200; and the present writer's *Socialism, a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles* (New and Revised Edition, 1909), Chap. IX.

at suggest themselves to the thoughtful mind. The first is by inventory. It might be possible to make a list of the things which we believe would be left subject to private ownership and control. We could begin with toothpicks and toothbrushes and ladies' side combs and go on until we had compiled a complete catalogue of the things which would be included in the category of private property under Socialism.

The impracticability of this method is so obvious that it needs no demonstration. The difficulties inherent in it are multitudinous and insuperable. The catalogue would be long and practically endless, unless some means could be devised to prevent the invention of new things — and that would be undesirable if possible. The compilation of such a catalogue would of necessity involve so many contradictions and mistakes as to make even the United States tariff schedules and Customs House decisions seem almost the perfection of wisdom.

The inventory method, then, is impossible. The other method is to lay down some principle as the rule governing the matter. Instead of attempting to make a list of the things which are to be privately owned and another list of the things which are to be collectively owned, we can lay down the governing principle and say that when certain conditions prevail, public ownership will be the rule; when certain other conditions prevail,

private ownership will be the rule. Such a method has the great merit of being in full accord with the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence.

Before attempting to formulate our governing principle, let us see how it must be arrived at. It cannot be arbitrarily laid down, simply the product of desire. It is useless to say, "Because it *ought* to be so, therefore it *must* be so: let us lay down this or that as our principle." That would simply be the old Utopian method over again. We must be guided by and rest entirely upon the facts of social evolution.

Let us first of all ask and answer the question, "What is the end and aim of Socialism?" Is it to realize a certain plan, to organize production and distribution according to a carefully considered scheme? Evidently, this question can only be answered in the negative, for whenever Socialists are asked to describe the plan or system they are seeking to realize they at once reply that Socialism has nothing in common with such schemes for the reconstruction of society. "Socialism is not a plan or scheme," they say, "but a method, a principle of action."

As Engels has finely demonstrated, the law of social evolution is not that men consciously strive to establish new systems, new arrangements of society, carefully thought out in advance, but that subject, oppressed and exploited classes revolt

against subjection and exploitation and seek to overthrow the dominant, ruling classes. And the real aim of Socialism is to overthrow class domination, rather than to realize a certain form of economic organization. The impelling force in the Socialist movement is the class struggle. As I have elsewhere¹ shown, the proposal to socialize production and exchange is a means to an end, not an end in itself. "The wealth producers are exploited by a class whose source of income is the surplus value extracted from the workers. Instinctively, the workers struggle against that exploitation, to reduce the amount of surplus value taken by the capitalists to a minimum. To do away with that exploitation, social ownership and control is proposed. If the end could be attained more speedily by other methods, those methods would be adopted. It follows, therefore, that to make collective property of things not used as a means of exploiting labor does not necessarily form part of the Socialist programme."²

Here, then, we have the principle for which we have been looking. Wealth, whether consisting of goods for consumption, or of means of production

¹ *Socialism, a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles* (New and Revised Edition, 1909), Chap. IX; *The Substance of Socialism* (1909), Part. II. See also, my article on the subject in the *North American Review*, June, 1909.

² *Socialism, a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles* (New and Revised Edition, 1909), p. 298.

not used to exploit the labor of others than its owners, would probably remain subject to private ownership. Generally speaking, there would be no reason for attempting to socialize it. On the other hand, wealth used as means of exploitation by its owners would be socialized as rapidly as possible. It is easy enough to see that, according to this principle of differentiation, no attempt would be made to socialize the market basket, but that the railway system, as a superior agent of transportation, would perforce have to be socialized; that while it would be necessary perhaps to socialize such a means of production as a clothing factory, it would not be necessary to interfere with the private ownership and operation of a domestic sewing machine.

In view of the fact that numerous critics have professed to find in this principle of differentiation a serious departure from the revolutionary principles of Marx and Engels and their immediate followers, it may be well to emphasize the fact that both Marx and Engels fully accepted the principle, which has never been denied or questioned by any Marxist of standing. For example, in the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels wrote, more than sixty years ago: "*Communism*¹ *deprives no*

¹ In the *Communist Manifesto* the word "Communism" is used to describe what we now call "Socialism," and the latter word to describe what we nowadays call "Communism."

man of the power to appropriate the products of society: all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation."

Writers like Kautsky,¹ in Germany, Vandervelde,² in Belgium, Lafargue,³ in France, and Hillquit,⁴ in America, have pointed out with equal clearness that Socialism is not incompatible with private property, but only with private property used as a means of exploitation. All these writers agree that there is no foundation in fact for those fantastic criticisms of Socialism which assume that the Socialist State would have to forbid and suppress all private initiative and enterprise; that it would have to take over every small farm, every milliner's shop and every small workshop.

It is important to bear in mind that wealth and productive enterprise to-day may be regarded as being divided into two great and distinct cate-

¹ KAUTSKY, *The Social Revolution*, especially pp. 117, 159; *Agrarfrage*, pp. 443-444; *Das Erfurter Programm*.

² VANDERVELDE, *Collectivism*, p. 46. Also the address by the same writer, quoted by ENSOR in *Modern Socialism*, pp. 198-228.

³ LAFARGUE, article in *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, October, 1898, p. 70.

⁴ HILLQUIT, *Socialism in Theory and Practice*, p. 113. See also, JAURÈS, *Studies in Socialism*, pp. 36-40; SIMONS, *The American Farmer*, and the present writer's *Substance of Socialism*, and *Socialism, a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles*.

gories. To the first, which we will call the category of personal property and enterprise, belongs the wealth which individuals have earned by their own labor, without exploiting the labor of others, either in the form of rent, interest or profit. To this category also belongs all that productive enterprise which is carried on by individuals without recourse to the exploitation of wage-laborers. We may instance as examples of this kind of enterprise, the small farmer cultivating his land by his own labor, earning a good living for himself and family, but without exploiting the labor of others, and the village blacksmith, who likewise makes a good living by meeting a local need, without exploiting the labor of others. We might add to these examples that of coöperative effort, where a number of workers join together for mutual advantage, sharing alike the work and the benefits to be derived from it.

In such cases as these — and they are very numerous — there is, as Vandervelde has so well pointed out, “a wedlock of Property and Labor,” with which Socialism has no quarrel, since its *raison d’être* is the union of property and labor in the same hands.¹ There is no exaction of surplus value from the toil of the workers engaged; no “sleeping partner” can appropriate the fruits of their toil. Of course, if the methods of production

¹ Quoted by ENSOR, *Modern Socialism*, p. 206.

pursued by these petty producers should prove to be slow, cumbersome, inefficient and uneconomical, they might be competed out of existence, either by the State or by industrial organizations which the State would have to take over ultimately. But whatever might be done for the sake of efficiency, it is very evident that, in the case of property and enterprise belonging to this category, the great incentive to socialization, the desire of the workers to rid themselves of the exploiter's throttling grasp, does not exist. Such personal labor as that described never amassed colossal fortunes, dangerous to society by reason of their magnitude, nor centralized social and political power in the hands of the few. Therefore, the incentives to socialization — the main incentives, that is — are lacking in such cases.

To the second category, which we will call the category of social property and enterprise, belongs the great mass of wealth, in the shape of private fortunes which individuals have amassed, not by their own labor, but from the labor of others, through the channels of rent, interest and profit — the three main divisions of surplus value, the unpaid labor of the actual producers. To this category also belongs all that large productive enterprise — by far the larger part of present day production — which is social in the sense that it is carried on by means of social labor, the labor of

large bodies of workers, but is unsocial in the sense that its fruits are appropriated by a relatively small number of persons, and those not the workers themselves. We may use as an example of this kind of enterprise a modern factory, employing hundreds, or even thousands, of hands. Its product is designed to supply some social need, clothing, for instance. Such an enterprise is made possible only by social effort. It depends upon the maintenance of a system of distribution — railways and so on — and upon the maintenance of a system of law and order, both of which are creations of society. The actual work is done, as already observed, by a large number of workers organized. Their tasks are subdivided, so that no man can say "I made this coat." Each article of clothing represents the associated labor of many workers. By far the greatest part of the wealth produced to-day under ordinary capitalistic conditions is thus produced. It is easy to understand why such production should be called "social."

Now, let us see why the distribution of this wealth is called "unsocial," or even "anti-social": Whereas it is possible for the individual producer to appropriate for himself and those dependent upon him the full value created by his labor, that is not possible for the worker engaged in social production. To begin with, it would be impos-

sible to determine the exact share of each worker in the creation of the value of a coat over and above the value of the raw material contained in it. The individual contribution is lost to view, completely blended in the whole.

Any attempt to trace the share of the individual worker in the sum of associated production would be futile, so thoroughly socialized is the system of production. If we desired to give the individual worker the value of his labor-product, we could not do it. The nearest approximation to that possible under the circumstances would be an equal division among all the workers of the difference between the value of the raw materials used and the value of the finished product, charging the cost of depreciation against each in the same *pro rata* manner. The objections to such a plan are obvious enough: it is only mentioned here to indicate the reality of the socialized character of modern capitalistic production.

But the objective of all such capitalistic production is profit. A few individuals, who do not care at all for the kind of clothing to be produced, provide the buildings, machinery, raw material, and other requisites, in a word, the capital which enables the workers to manufacture the clothing. Each worker receives, not a proportionate share of the total values created, but wages, a certain payment for his labor-power, provided by the same

group of persons as that which provides the raw materials, the machinery and other requisites of production. Only for the sake of obtaining a labor product of greater value than the capital they invest do capitalists engage in business enterprise of any kind.

The difference between the value of the labor product and the wages paid to the producers thereof constitutes the surplus value which is at once the objective of capitalist enterprise, and the cause of that class warfare which is the most striking fact in present society. The whole struggle of employers and employed centers upon this one pivotal fact that the former class is constantly endeavoring to increase its harvest of surplus-value, while the latter class as constantly endeavors to obtain an increased proportion of its labor product and to surrender to its natural enemy as little surplus-value as possible.

This fact is by no means a discovery of Socialist thinkers, as many persons believe. Long before the rise of the modern Socialist school of economists, Adam Smith called attention to it in language as unequivocal and clear as Marx ever used to the same end. The following passage, from *The Wealth of Nations*, is, despite certain antiquated phases, a remarkably clear and concise statement of the fundamental facts in the modern struggle:

"What are the common wages of labor, depends everywhere upon the contract usually made between these two parties [*i. e.*, the worker and the employer], whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the master to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower, the wages of labor.

"It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, authorizes, or at least does not prohibit, their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of Parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it. In all such disputes the masters can hold out much longer. A landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the stocks which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the long-run the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate.

"We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters; though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination, not to raise the wages of labor above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbors and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too, sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labor even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of

execution, and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. Such combinations, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive combination of the workmen; who sometimes, too, without any provocation of this kind, combine of their own accord to raise the price of their labor. Their usual pretenses are, sometimes the high price of provisions, sometimes the great profit which their masters make by their work. But whether their combinations be offensive or defensive, they are always abundantly heard of. In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they have always recourse to the loudest clamor, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands. The masters upon these occasions are just as clamorous upon the other side, and never cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil magistrate, and the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much severity against the combinations of servants, laborers and journeymen. The workmen, accordingly, very seldom derive any advantage from the violence of these tumultuous combinations, which, partly from the interposition of the magistrate, partly from the superior steadiness of the masters, partly from the necessity which the greater part of the workmen are under of submitting for the sake of present subsistence, generally end in nothing but the punishment or ruin of the ringleaders."¹

The Socialist movement, then, is a phase of this class struggle. It is the political counterpart of the struggle in the workshop, represented by strikes and lockouts, by trades unions and employers' associations. Its aim is the elimination of the exploiter, and it contemplates the public

¹ ADAM SMITH, *The Wealth of Nations*, edited by Ernest Belfort Bax, Vol. I, Chap. VIII, pp. 67-68.

ownership and control of the agencies of production and distribution only just so far as may be necessary in order to secure that result. Not public ownership of all wealth and means of production, but public ownership of all such means of production as may be necessary to prevent the exploitation of the producers by mere investors is the programme of modern Socialism.

We need not, therefore, seriously contemplate the possibility of the good housewife, in a Socialist régime, going to a bureau of the city government to make application for the use of a communal sewing machine or chafing dish, having it checked against her account. Nor need we fear that an all-powerful State will be the sole owner of property, and the only source of industrial enterprise, compelled, by the very nature of its task, to assign to their respective positions gravediggers and artists, farmers and poets.

All such conceptions of the Socialist State belong to the domain of vaudeville.

IV

PROPERTY AND THE STATE

PIERRE JOSEPH PROUDHON, the Anarchist philosopher, who was born in the same year as Lincoln and Darwin, is chiefly remembered by the world at large for the striking aphorism, "*La propriété c'est vol*" (Property is robbery), with which he pretends to answer his own question, "What is Property?" As usual, Proudhon was rather unoriginal in making that aphorism. He simply repeated what had been said a generation earlier, in 1780, by the brilliant but ill-starred Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville.¹ It was Proudhon's good fortune to be remembered.

But although Brissot de Warville managed to antedate Proudhon by half a century, his claim to originality is hardly superior to Proudhon's. Substantially the same thing had been said many centuries before by some of the greatest and holiest of the Christian Fathers, and said so often that

¹ BRISSOT DE WARVILLE, *Recherches philosophiques, sur le droit de propriété et sur le vol considérés dans la nature et dans la société.*

it became commonplace. There is not much choice between Proudhon's aphorism and the celebrated saying of Saint Augustine, that "private property originated in usurpation"; Saint Clement's that "private property is the fruit of iniquity"; Saint Jerome's that "opulence is always the result of theft"; or of Ambrose's dictum that "Nature gave all things in common for the use of all; usurpation created private right."

Indeed, the early Christian Fathers, Brissot de Warville and Proudhon had much in common. They all believed implicitly in a doctrine of "natural right," according to which the inequalities which divide men into rich and poor, bringing some into the world saddled and bridled, and others wearing spurs and ready to ride the saddled ones — to use Heine's famous simile — are due to man's disobedience of natural law, and his departure from the "state of nature." It was thus, with Rousseau's teachings for his mental background, Saint Just voiced the spirit of the French Revolution by declaring that wealth was *Pinfame*.

If we are really seeking a satisfying answer to the question, "What is property?" neither the Christian Fathers, Brissot de Warville, Proudhon, nor Saint Just can help us very much. Epithet is neither exposition nor definition. To denounce property as theft may suit the preacher hurling

fiery invectives, or the impassioned agitator rousing the mob to revolutionary frenzy, but it does not help the serious student. Proudhon himself, let it be said in justice, fully recognized this. What we need is a definition of property which will afford us a satisfactory guiding principle in our studies.

In this more philosophic spirit, Proudhon defined property as *le droit d'user d'abuser* (the right to use and abuse), but a moment's reflection will show that this studied definition is scarcely more satisfactory or illuminating than his famous epigram. In the first place, it can hardly be said that a "right to abuse" can exist, for the terms are mutually exclusive. *Abuse* is at all times a violation of *right*. In the second place, so much of the law of private right specifically defines and forbids abuse, and provides for its punishment, that if we are to exempt from our conception of property all things subject to such restrictions, we should rob the word property of all meaning.

To take only one very elementary example: I own an animal, a dog, let us say, or a cow. The animal is my *property*. I possess certain rights of proprietorship in it. I can sell it, for instance, give it away, or prevent another person from taking and using it. This is my right to use. But my right to use the cow as a milk provider, or to *use* the dog to guard my home, does not carry with

it a right to *abuse*. I may not abuse the cow by making her a living target, or afford myself the pleasure of torturing the dog. The animal is my "property," but the "right to abuse" it does not exist.

Nor is the right to *use* an absolute right, as the definition of Proudhon implies. This follows as a necessary consequence of the principle just laid down. Laws which define and forbid abuse are in reality limitations of the right to use. They restrict the right to use, and lay down the principle of rightful *usage*, for abuse is, after all, only a name for improper use. But the rightful use of anything may comprehend much more than the personal relation of the owner to his property. Not only am I forbidden to treat my cow with cruelty, but in certain circumstances I may be prevented from keeping the cow under conditions which involve no abuse of the cow, but rather of myself, my family, or my neighbors. I may, for example, elect to keep my cow in my parlor or my bedroom, and to treat it with superlative kindness. What happens? Why, I immediately find that I have no right to do such things. The municipal authorities at once step in and remove the cow, thus denying my right to use either my animal or my home as I please.

If we are to regard the ownership of one's home as a form of property, the fallacious character of

Proudhon's definition is apparent. There is no such a right known to the jurisprudence of any country as the unlimited right to use one's dwelling. Your home may not be used as a brothel, for example, as a theater, as a saloon, or as a gaming-house, except under such restrictions as the State may choose to prescribe. The principle involved is limitation of the right of use, imposed in the interests of others. You may not even build the kind of house your fancy dictates, unless the State approves your fancy, but must build it according to conditions prescribed by the authority granting the permission to build. And after it is built you may not expose in it lewd or obscene pictures. In no sense, therefore, can an unlimited "right to use and abuse" be said to constitute the essence of property.

One eminent authority¹ has defined the right of property as "an extension of the power of a person over portions of the physical world." That is a fair description of primitive property rights, perhaps, for in its primary sense property undoubtedly relates to material things. But in our highly complex civilization this is not the case, and the definition is nearly as unsatisfactory as Proudhon's. We have, for example, laws making it a larceny to abstract electricity belonging to persons other than the abstractors, yet electricity

¹ PROF. HOLLAND, *Jurisprudence*, p. 62.

is not matter, as that term is generally employed and understood, but force — not a tangible thing.

It is not easy to formulate a satisfying definition of property. Most writers on jurisprudence define it as a right *in rem*, that is, a right available against all other persons than the one invested with the right, as distinguished from a right *in personam*, that is, a right available only against some particular individual or individuals. Thus my right to my cow, my dog or my house is a right which enables me to prevent any other person from taking possession of them, or, if I choose, to transfer that power to another. This is the essence of a right *in rem*, to be sharply distinguished from the right *in personam*, or *in personam certam*, that is, against some specific person or persons, as in the case of the right to exact the performance of an obligation arising out of a contract. The right *in rem* imposes a duty upon every other person than the person in whom the right resides, while the right *in personam* imposes a duty only upon specific persons.

Rights *in rem* are by no means confined to material objects. As already observed, such an intangible and indefinable force as electricity is subject to the right *in rem*. So are copyrights, an author being able to defend himself against all persons who would appropriate his work, the ideas and their arrangement, in the same way as

he could defend his right to the printed book itself. On its negative side, then, we may define the right of property as being the right which the State confers upon a certain person to prevent every other person from appropriating or meddling with certain things which it, the State, makes subject to that right. On its positive side, we may say that the right of property includes the rights of possession, enjoyment, disposition and alienation, each subject, however, to such limitations and restrictions as the State may impose. Thus, I may not keep my cow if it suffers from anthrax; I may not enjoy my house if the State declares it to be unfit for habitation; I may even be prevented from disposing of my property except under such conditions as the State may determine.

Without attempting here and now to formulate a more comprehensive definition of property than the foregoing, we observe that the right of property is a creation of the State. The *raison d'être* of the State is property. The first State arose as a necessary condition for the permanent establishment of private property. To say that civilization began with the development of the political institution called the State, is only another way of saying that it began with the development of the economic institution of private property. In a certain very definite sense, the

history of civilization is the history of property, of man's efforts rightly to relate himself to things.

Property, be it observed, is always spoken of as a "right." Now, the term right is etymologically related to *rightness*, and connotes a moral quality. But what is "rightness" as distinguished from "wrongness"? When this question is raised, we are at once confronted by the need of some philosophy of morals, having for its objective the establishment of some standard by which actions may be appraised and classified as either "good" or "bad."

We are not concerned here and now with any moral inquiry. Our present concern is to understand the social and legal significance of the word "right" as related to property. It seems, however, practically impossible to entirely separate the word when used in this connection from its ethical associations. It may help us if we conceive of the State as being the ultimate standard of judgment. The will of the State is the sole basis of right in law. As Professor Holland says, "That which gives validity to a legal right is, in every case, the force which is lent to it by the State."¹ A legal right is, therefore, distinguished from a moral right in this: it is not the power which an individual *ought* to have and exercise, according to some particular philosophy of ethics, but *the*

¹ HOLLAND, *Jurisprudence*, p. 62.

power which the State says he may have and exercise. It is none the less a valid right for being contrary to every ethical code.

But the State is not a fixed and unchangeable thing, removed from the laws and influences of human existence. It is a human institution, and, therefore, its actions and its concepts at any given time are necessarily reflexes of human thought and experience. What the State at one period sets forth as a right, it denies at some other period. The history of our jurisprudence is the record of affirmations by the State of one epoch nullified by the denials of the State in some other epoch. What it proclaims as a right in one age, the State forbids and penalizes in another age.

It follows, therefore, that there is no constant and invariable right to property, except, indeed, that ultimate right resident in the State, from which it invests individuals with such powers as it may from time to time choose to convey with the validity of rights. It follows, likewise, that there is not at any time an *absolute* right to property, except that which is inherent in the State. That is to say, no individual can at any time be said to enjoy an absolute right of property. This is obvious, because the right itself is a creature of the State, and the State never ceases to control it. At any rate, it never ceases to hold the power to control it or to revoke it. By the same

power which created the right, the State can at any time destroy it. We need only refer here to the institution of chattel slavery. The right of property in slaves was created by the State at one period and destroyed by it at another.

Property, then, is a social institution dependent upon the will of the State. It would not be correct, therefore, to speak of Robinson Crusoe living in solitude upon the island as being the "proprietor" of the island. Nor would it be correct to speak of the island as his "property." A man alone in the world, as Immanuel Kant long ago observed, could not be the proprietor of anything, for there would be nobody to exclude from the possession or use of anything. Property is inconceivable except as a social institution: its essence is a right which is made valid only by the will and power of the State, and which is at all times subject to that will and power.

It is of the utmost importance that we should understand that there are not, and in the nature of things could not be, any absolute private property rights. When we assert the ultimate residence of all property rights in the State, we are not dealing with a mere theory, an interesting fiction of the law. On the contrary, it is one of the most important principles of our law, and we see it exemplified in the life of the nation nearly every day. The laws which give the State eminent

domain over land and other natural resources, afford conspicuous and familiar examples of the sovereign power which lies back of the "private ownership" of these things, narrowly limiting private rights in them. And what is true of land is equally true of all other forms of property, though that fact is not generally remembered.

There is not to-day, and there never has been in any civilized country, such a thing as absolute ownership of land by individuals. It is true that the *dominium directum* of the old Roman law, and the *allodial* title of the old Saxon law, seem to have given practically absolute ownership, and some writers have held that it was only after the Norman Conquest of England that the *dominium directum* of all land was vested in the King; the so-called owner merely enjoying a right of use, the *dominium utile*. It is, however, quite certain that the State, as the only power to give validity to any property rights, at all times had the power to destroy such rights in whole or in part, by withholding its validating sanction and force.

What is the actual position of the State to-day? A man "owns" a piece of land in the heart of the city: it would make an admirable site for a public building, such as a library, a post office, or a hospital, but the owner prefers to use the plot as a depository for rubbish. Along comes the State with its voice of authority and says, "You shall

not use that plot of ground for such a purpose; I forbid it." His ownership is thus subjected to a very real and important limitation imposed upon it by the very authority which alone has the power to sustain his claim to ownership. Or, another man owns a piece of ground in the city, in some central location, and builds upon it a home for himself and his family. They are very happy in the enjoyment of their home, when one day a representative of the State enters the premises and begins to measure the ground. The owner is then informed that the State, or one of its constituent parts, the municipality, needs a plot of ground upon which to erect a court, a hospital, a library, a museum, a police-station, or some other public building.

"But this plot is not for sale," says the owner. "It is my home, and I will not sell it at any price." Does his protest avail him? Not at all! If the State needs the land, and the man refuses to sell it, the State compels him to do so. Thus, his "ownership" of the land is revoked by the State. This process goes on constantly, not merely when the State itself or one of its component parts desires land which is not for sale, but when a quasi private body, a corporation which performs a public service, such as a railroad company, for example, desires such land it appeals to the State, and the State uses its powers of eminent domain

to secure the land compulsorily, for the public good.

As we have already observed, this ultimate, sovereign power of ownership which resides in the State in the case of land, applies equally to all other forms of property, though it is not so commonly exercised. It may be safely laid down as a correct principle that there is no absolute right to property of any kind except that which the State possesses. In time of war, for example, the food in your larder, the ox in the stall, the crops growing in the fields, and the clothing in your wardrobe may all be seized, legally, by the representatives of the State, despite any protest you may make. This may be done, also, in times of peace by military forces merely practicing the game of war.¹ And in case of a great disaster or serious accident of any kind, under the ordinary police powers, the home of any citizen and whatever it contains, even to his pocket-handkerchief, may be lawfully seized and used. Clearly, then, none of these things can be said to be privately owned in any absolute sense. The fact that the State usually, though not always, pays compensation for the property it appropriates in no manner invalidates the principle we are seeking to establish.

¹ Notable examples of the use of this power were reported by the press during the great "mimic war" in Massachusetts, in the summer of 1909.

The same presumption of ultimate ownership underlies every act by which the State confiscates property. Taxation is a familiar form of confiscation. What principle, other than that of its ultimate superior right, justifies the State in taxing incomes or inheritances? A man inherits a large amount of money: he pays all the regular taxes, such as are imposed upon other members of the community, upon the same basis as other citizens. But now, simply because he receives by bequest a considerable sum of money, the State, in lands where inheritances are taxed, as in England, comes forward and compels him to pay a stipulated proportion of that money into the State treasury. Or a man is compelled to pay a tax upon his income, over and above all the ordinary taxes which he pays in common with other citizens. It is perfectly clear that the State does not regard the one man as absolute owner of the money he inherits, nor the other of the money he earns. It imposes a special tax as a means of appropriating a share of the bequest or income, and that tax must be paid or, in the event of refusal, the recalcitrant and defaulting citizen must go to prison. Whenever it decides to do so, the State can increase the amount of that tax, and there is nothing in the theory of taxation by the State to prevent the tax from reaching one hundred per centum.

Take yet another form of confiscation which

the State constantly practices: I own some shares of stock in a corporation that is engaged in brewing and distilling malt liquors for sale. These shares of stock represent my property. I can sell them or otherwise alienate them. They are mine, and the State gives validity to my right as in the case of other kinds of property. I speak of them as my property, and the ordinary practice of the State so regards them. For years I go on, secure in my enjoyment of a right which rests upon the authority of the State, and all my income is derived from that right. Destroy it and I am immediately reduced to beggary. Suddenly, word comes that the State has enacted a law prohibiting the manufacture or sale of malt liquors. Lo! my property is destroyed. Yesterday I was rich; to-day I am a pauper. The State has confiscated my property, and yet it has taken nothing tangible from me. It has simply revoked a right; withdrawn from me its good will. I discover that the essence of my "property" was a mere abstraction, the good will of the State.

In fact, the vast bulk of property to-day consists of nothing more substantial than such good will. Suppose that I owned a hundred shares of stock in the corporation, and that this holding represented just one per cent. of its entire stock. What was it that I really owned, then? Did I own a one-hundredth part of the plant of the cor-

poration? Could I have said: "I will realize my property. The corporation owns one thousand horses, therefore, I will take ten as my just share; it owns a hundred brewing plants of equal value, therefore, I will take one as my just share," and so on? Not at all. My property was a mere abstraction, not at all capable of such concrete realization. I did not own ten horses, but a one-hundredth part of each horse; not one brewery, but a one-hundredth part of each brick and each nail in each brewery. Of course, if I were to attempt to realize my property in any physical sense I could not have done it, for it would have been impossible to take the one-hundredth part of a horse — my property — without killing the horse, and thereby destroying alike my own property and that of all the other stockholders. I really had no property in any tangible form any more than I have as a citizen in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, or in the Congressional Library at Washington. I had a right, granted by the State, and observed by the community, enabling me to receive a certain share of certain sums of money, trade profits, under certain conditions, and that right I could dispose of by sale or gift if I desired to do so. But the State at all times had a superior right, which it finally exercised; a right to curtail or altogether destroy my right, its creature.

Even my fellow stockholders could have de-

stroyed my "property" quite as effectually as the State did though not in the same way. By voting in favor of the adoption of business policies which proved unprofitable and unsuccessful, they could have destroyed all my property together with their own, and, so long as they acted under the forms prescribed by law, I could have no redress, even though I foresaw that the policies adopted would be ruinous, and opposed their adoption.

In almost every criticism of Socialism much stress is laid upon the fact that it would, or at least *might*, involve the confiscation of a great deal of property. It is the general policy of such critics to assume that this confiscatory process is something peculiar to Socialism, whereas it is in fact very commonly employed under the existing system, as we have already seen. It is probable that the realization of the Socialist ideal and programme would involve little or no extension of confiscatory action; that the Socialist State would not have recourse to that principle more frequently than the State of to-day. Indeed, it is not at all improbable that confiscation would be less frequent than it is now. It is strange that many of the critics who most vociferously condemn Socialism as a "wicked scheme of confiscation" should be able to contemplate with perfect equanimity such confiscatory legislation as some of our laws prohibiting the liquor traffic; laws forbidding

such corporations as the Standard Oil Company and some of our great insurance companies from doing business in certain States, and so on.

Just as there can be no absolute property rights in material things, other than that which resides in the State, so the right to one's own person is subordinate to that same great ultimate right, the source of every other civil right. This fact is most clearly shown by the power which the State has, and which it often exercises, to force upon its citizens unpleasant and undesirable tasks, such as military service, jury service, police service in emergencies, and so on. Under the so-called Dick Militia Act, the President of the United States has to-day the power to compel any male citizen above the age of twenty-one years and under the age of forty-five years to do militia duty.¹ All that is required is for the President to issue an executive order to that effect. This is a form of conscription, at variance with the spirit of our laws, which was virtually smuggled into the statutes of the United States, and of the existence of which not one citizen in ten thousand is aware.

To sum up: The essence of property is the good will of the State, and the State is a constantly changing force. When the State is despotic, when

¹ Certain classes of citizens are exempted from duty under this act.

a personal despot can say, as did Louis XIV, "I am the State," there is tyranny and all property rights are subject to that tyranny. In such a State property can only exist by virtue of having its roots deep in the soil of oppression and injustice. When in place of a personal despotism a constitutional government is formed, property is relieved from its dependence upon a despot. It may, however, be still subject to class rule, which is only a degree less oppressive than personal despotism. When the State is the instrument of a class the right of property in it is still of necessity rooted in oppression and injustice.

But as the State gradually approaches democratic ideals, becoming representative of all the people, it ceases to be the expression of tyranny, privilege and oppression. It becomes, instead, the expression of the will of a fraternal coöperation, aiming only at the common good. The State still exists, but it has outgrown and cast off its oppressive features, and under it the institution of property partakes of the new nature. With the State thus democratized property likewise becomes democratized; as the State no longer represents injustice and oppression, but justice and solidarity, so property, ever responsive to the temper of the State, becomes likewise the embodiment of justice and solidarity.

This, then, is the aim of Socialism: to democra-

tize the State, and that to the end that property may also be democratized. Political democracy plus industrial democracy — these are the twin principles of modern Socialism.

V

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND INDUSTRY UNDER SOCIALISM

WE are now in a position to sketch, with some degree of certainty, the main features of the economic structure of the Socialist State, and, especially, the place therein of individual industrial enterprise and private property. The materials for such a sketch are largely contained in the preceding chapters and require only to be properly assembled.

As we have already observed,¹ there is nothing in the Socialist programme, or in the principles on which that programme is based, to justify the belief that private property would be incompatible with a Socialist régime. Such fair-minded critics as Schaffle and Gonner admit this.² Of course, the early Utopian Socialists believed otherwise, and the admission of private property would have been fatal to many of the most ingeniously contrived Utopias. Most of the Utopian Socialists

¹ Chapter III.

² SCHAFFLE, *The Quintessence of Socialism*; GONNER, *The Socialist State*.

were actuated by a spirit very similar to that which inspired the early Christian Fathers. They regarded private property as being essentially evil, the taproot of all the world's miseries. Therefore, they argued, the happiness of mankind depended upon removing selfishness, the desire for possession, and substituting communal for private ownership.

It is true that private property was rarely ever absolutely eliminated from their schemes, but it was generally strictly limited to the possession of wearing apparel, toothbrushes, handkerchiefs, and similar articles of a personal and intimate nature. Some, indeed, refused to make even this small concession and boldly made "all things common to all," even to wives, husbands and children. The modern Socialist school, however, has nothing whatever in common with those ancient Utopias.

Dating the rise of the modern Socialist school of thought from 1848, the year in which the *Communist Manifesto* appeared, it must be said that, despite the crude and confused mass of propaganda literature which assailed all forms of private property in the same spirit as that of the older Utopians, through its more serious literature there runs consistently, like the main line of a pattern that is woven into a fabric, the thought that only wealth that is used as a means of ex-

exploiting the wealth-producers for the benefit of non-producers need be taken out of private hands and made social property.

The *Manifesto* itself struck this keynote by the fine declaration that the workers sought to deprive no man of "the power to appropriate the products of society," but only to deprive him of "the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation." The context to which these words belong makes it perfectly clear that Marx and Engels never contemplated the possibility or the desirability of the State becoming the sole owner of property; that they saw no objection to private property *per se*, but only to the private ownership of such means of production and such stores of wealth as would enable the owners thereof to oppress others by exploiting their labor. They had no desire to forbid private initiative or thrift, but only a passionate desire to destroy class rule and privilege.

In the same spirit, Kautsky, universally regarded as the most correct and "orthodox" of Marx's interpreters, has repeatedly shown that the Socialist State would not interfere with the private ownership of non-productive wealth. In his admirable exposition of the *Erfurter Programm* of the German Social Democracy, Kautsky declares:

"Even though the course of events should force the transition from capitalist to Socialist

production *via* the road of confiscation, the economic development that has preceded us would render necessary the confiscation of only a *part* of existing property. The economic development demands social ownership in the *implements of labor only*; it does not concern itself with, nor does it touch, that part of property that is devoted to *personal and private uses*. Let us take one illustration, furnished by capitalism itself. What are savings banks? They are the means whereby the private property of non-capitalist classes is rendered accessible to the capitalists; the deposits of every single depositor are, taken separately, too insignificant to be applied to a capitalist industry; not until many deposits have been gathered together are they in a condition to fulfill the function of 'capital.' In the same measure in which capitalist undertakings shall pass from private into social concerns, the opportunities will be lessened for would-be patrons of savings banks to receive interest upon their deposits: these will cease to be capital and will become purely non-interest-drawing funds. That, assuredly, is not confiscation."¹

If we suppose, for the sake of the argument merely, that it would be necessary for the Socialist State to suppress all private industrial enter-

¹ *Das Erfurter Programm.*

prise, and to establish an absolute monopoly of production and distribution, private property would not necessarily be abolished. Even if all citizens were housed in barracks, like soldiers, fed at communal tables and clothed in uniforms, as some critics have imagined would be the case, it would be practically impossible to do away with the private ownership of the uniforms, tooth-brushes, and many similar articles.

With all production and distribution absolutely monopolized by the State it would be necessary to devise some method of remuneration, some distribution of the necessities of life and such luxuries as the State might produce. Subject only to the ultimate superior right of the State which is a fundamental principle of all civilized society, the products so distributed would belong to those who received them from the State. That the State could by any possibility so adjust the income of every individual, whether measured in money or goods, as to prevent the possibility of a surplus is a palpably absurd proposition. It is equally inconceivable that the most omniscient government would be able to prevent the hoarding of such surplusage by individuals of abnormally developed acquisitiveness. To accomplish that result — to which there could not be any adequate or rational incentive — it would be necessary to

create a vast system of espionage and regulation that would absorb far more labor than the production and distribution of wealth.

A time-worn device of the Utopian Socialists provides for the remuneration of labor by means of labor certificates or checks, based upon time units. Equality of remuneration for all kinds of service is generally provided for in all such schemes. But the device does not remove the inevitability of private property. If the annual income be stated as certificates representing two thousand units, and the absolutely necessary expenditures for A and B be stated as fifteen hundred units, one fourth of their incomes, a balance of five hundred units remains for purposes other than the acquisition of the bare necessities of life. If A chooses to spend his surplus income upon wine, or flowers, or give it away, and B chooses to spend his upon costly books, or a flying machine, or to save it with a view to the ultimate purchase of a yacht, upon what grounds shall the State forbid?

If it were the aim of the Socialist movement to establish and maintain equality of possession it would be necessary to deny the right of the frugal and abstemious B to the books, the flying machine or the yacht. It would not be necessary, however, to deny the spendthrift A the right to gratify his taste for consumable luxuries, like wine

or costly flowers. Unjust as it would undoubtedly be to insist that while A has a right to spend his surplus income upon a rapidly consumable luxury B has not an equal right to spend his surplus income upon a more durable luxury, no other method would suffice to bring about the absolute equalization of property. If the aim of the Socialist movement was the realization of the ideal of absolute equality of possession, therefore, every form of private property would have to be abolished, and everything made subject to collective ownership.

Now, equality of remuneration, regardless of the nature of the service performed, is by no means an essential feature of the economy of Socialism. The principle has been advocated by only a few extremists of the Utopian school. But, granting for the moment its necessity, for the purpose of lending emphasis to our illustration, it is evident that having received exactly equal incomes, neither A nor B could justly complain. A could not complain because, having spent his surplus upon wine, he could not have a flying machine like B, who abstained from the use of wine in order to acquire the flying machine. True, either A or B, or both of them, might complain against the restriction of income which made it impossible to satisfy all their tastes, but there would be no inequality of opportunity and reward of which to complain.

To admit so much is to admit the possibility of considerable inequality of wealth under Socialism. While equality of opportunity, and the elimination of economic class exploitation would naturally tend toward greater equality of possession than the world has known since the development of private property, neither uniformity nor equality of possession would result. Whatever restrictions of the inheritance of property might be imposed by the State, it is scarcely conceivable that any people would tolerate such a repressive measure as the absolute prohibition of inheritance, including the inheritance of personal mementoes and heirlooms, the value of which is more often sentimental than intrinsic.

The most trifling object, wholly without value, and so insignificant that it is impossible to think seriously of any State attempting to deprive its owner of it, may become an object of great interest and almost fabulous value. A lock of mother's hair inherited by an affectionate and worshipful son, an inestimable treasure to its possessor, which he would not sell for an immense fortune, might have no value to another person, or to the community. But should the discovery of an old package of letters identify the woman to whom the hair originally belonged as the subject of a great picture or poem, the heroine of some great romance, or some other discovery rescue her

memory from oblivion and make it famous, the lock of hair might become a greatly coveted object.

Thus the inheritance of an object of no value at the time of the inheritance might easily make the heir richer than his fellow men. One has but to think of the sacrifices men have made, and the sufferings men have endured, to acquire ownership of some object of unique rarity — a black tulip, a rare stamp, or a unique book, for instance — to realize that many a man might be willing to sacrifice a large part of his income, or even endure servitude for years, in order to acquire possession of some unique object which the vendor acquired by inheritance. The illustration may seem forced and extreme, and it may be admitted that such incidents would not be likely to affect profoundly the life of the nation, but the illustration serves admirably to elucidate a principle of great interest and value.

Summarizing this phase of our discussion, we may say that, accepting the class struggle as the central *motif* of modern Socialism, and bearing in mind the uniform insistence of all the recognized leaders of Socialist thought that what is to be destroyed is the power to exploit the labor of others, and not the power to appropriate and enjoy the products of labor, we may regard as axiomatic the following propositions:

- (1) Socialism does not aim at the abolition of private property.
- (2) Socialism is not incompatible with a wide extension of private property.
- (3) Socialism would make private property much more general than now by destroying the power of exploitation which makes a few rich and many poor.
- (4) Socialism would not do away with the private accumulation of surplus income, nor, necessarily, with the inheritance of such accumulations.
- (5) Socialism would not result in absolute equality of wealth, but a greater degree of equalization than has yet been attained would naturally result from the elimination of economic class exploitation.

The second phase of our discussion concerns the industrial organization of the Socialist State, and the place in it of private industrial enterprise. As we have already seen, Socialism does not involve the absolute monopolization of production and distribution, and the total suppression of private initiative and enterprise in these spheres. The economic organization of the Socialist State will undoubtedly include production and distribution by individuals and voluntary coöperative groups, as well as collective production and distribution under the auspices and control of the State itself. I use the word "undoubtedly" because it is unthinkable that a democratic State would attempt to impose upon its citizens a tyranny so odious and intolerable as would certainly result from the suppression of voluntary enterprise.

In all our thought upon this question we must bear in mind that the two principal economic arguments for socialization are: First, the elimination of economic parasitism, the exploitation of the wealth producers by a class of non-producers, and, second, the attainment of greater efficiency through the elimination of the wastefulness inseparable from capitalist production, especially in its competitive stages.

The first of these reasons constitutes the prime motive of the Socialist movement. The second, less frequently urged by the Socialist propagandist than formerly, is the *raison d'être* of the development of monopoly. Every thoughtful Socialist recognizes that capitalist production involves an enormous amount of waste, and that incalculable gains would result from the socialization of industry. But while a few Socialists may be influenced mainly by their hope and belief that in a Socialist régime industry would be much more economically and efficiently conducted than now, the vast majority are influenced by the other reason. The doctrine of the class struggle is the central idea of the movement, and most of its adherents are inspired and urged on by the hope that Socialism will put an end to economic exploitation.

The greater part of the production and distribution of our present economic system is so organ-

ized that the exploitation of the workers engaged in it is inevitable. The work is performed by wage-paid laborers, superintended by salaried officials. The costly equipment is not owned by the workers, but by investors seeking to make profit through the exploitation of the labor-power of the workers they employ.

It is a fundamental condition of Socialism that all such processes and functions be socialized. In other words, it is a *sine qua non* of Socialism that they be so organized as to eliminate profit-making by investors. This does not mean that they must all be taken over by the supreme political organization which we call the State. Nor does it mean that they must all be socialized at once. A few advocates of Socialism, more zealous than intelligent, seem to believe that there will be a grand transformation day upon which all the functions of capitalism will be socialized, but that idea is not held by thoughtful Socialists. It is in fact fundamentally opposed to the philosophical basis of modern Marxian Socialism.

Great organizations like the Steel Trust represent the progress already made in the direction of Socialism through one channel. Measures for the government regulation of monopolies now being advocated by conservative non-Socialists indicate an increasing readiness to make progress in the same direction through another channel, the

channel of political organization. The process of socialization is essentially an evolutionary one.

The incentive which operates to bring about the socialization of industries conducted for profit obtained from the exploitation of the workers, obviously does not exist in the case of petty, individualistic industries which do not depend upon such exploitation. The market gardener who cultivates his own land and sells his produce without exploiting the labor of others, and the individual craftsman who does all his own work, likewise without exploiting the labor of others, illustrate very clearly the distinctive character of enterprises which are not characterized by class exploitation. There is a much larger number of these enterprises, both productive and distributive, than is generally recognized. It is exceedingly probable that a large number of them will continue to exist, as individual enterprises, in the Socialist régime. Others may be organized and socialized. If so, it will be for the sake of obtaining increased efficiency, and not for the purpose of doing away with economic exploitation. The motive for socialization will be social interest, not the interest of a class.

It seems probable, then, that in the Socialist State three forms of economic enterprise will co-exist, namely, (1) production and distribution on a large scale under the auspices of the government

— national, state or municipal; (2) production and distribution by coöperative associations; (3) production and distribution by private individuals. To regulate properly the relation of these three divisions will be the supreme task of the democratic statesmanship of the future.

There are some economic activities which from their very nature require a national organization for their most efficient direction. This is true of railways, telegraphs, postal and express services among distributive agencies, and of mining, oil production, and steel manufacture among the productive functions. There are other economic activities which can be most efficiently directed by the smaller unit, the State or Province, and yet others which can be most efficiently conducted by the still smaller political unit, the city or commune.

It is impossible to make a rigid classification of the economic functions and decide to which political unit each will be entrusted. Moreover, were such a classification possible it would not be of much value. The Socialist State will inherit the economic organization of the capitalist system, and will modify it in the light of its experience and according to the needs of its economic development. The economic functions entrusted at first to municipalities may later be transferred to the larger units, the States and provinces, the citizens

choosing a greater degree of centralization in the interests of efficiency. On the other hand, a certain amount of decentralization may take place.

The important point is that a centralized bureaucracy is not an inevitable condition of the Socialist State. There is not the slightest compromise of Socialist principles in the suggestion of Bebel,¹ Menger,² and Hillquit³ that the functions of the municipality might very well be extended to manufacture. All three writers agree that the largest possible measure of home rule would of necessity be accorded to the municipalities, and they suggest that the larger municipalities may be divided into autonomous districts, each maintaining its own industrial organization.

The State, using the term in its most comprehensive sense to cover the whole political organization of society, thus assumes the functions now performed by the capitalist class in the employment, direction and superintendence of labor. Naturally, the relations of the State to the individual worker will differ materially from those which now exist between employer and employé. The position of the worker will be somewhat analogous to that of the employé who is also a

¹ AUGUST BEBEL, *Woman and Socialism*, p. 130.

² ANTON MENER, *Neue Staatslehre*, pp. 199-200.

³ MORRIS HILLQUIT, *Socialism in Theory and Practice*, pp.

shareholder in the concern for which he works. For while the State will be the employer, the employé will be a citizen, a part of the State. Nevertheless, the State must be superior to the employé, and the employé subordinate to the State. Misunderstandings and conflicts between them are, therefore, not only possible but highly probable — perhaps inevitable.

The organization of this relationship constitutes the most obvious and the most difficult problem which we must confront. How will the superintendents be chosen, and by whom? How will wages, hours of labor, and other terms of employment be determined? Will there be labor unions, strikes and lockouts? These and many similar questions must be met and answered with candor.

The attempts of Socialist writers to forecast the solution of this problem of the relation of the State as employer to the citizen as employé may be sharply divided into two classes. The forecasts of those who are mainly interested in the great economies of production and exchange which they believe will result from the superior economic organization of the Socialist State differ materially from the forecasts of those who are mainly interested in the new status which the Socialist State will confer upon the producing class.

The first class idealizes the expert and relies upon the methods now generally followed by municipal bodies, the employment of experts as superintendents and foremen by administrative committees chosen by the popularly elected governing body. The functions of these administrative committees would not differ greatly from those now performed by the boards of directors of industrial corporations. They would have power to appoint and discharge managers and foremen, and to regulate the conditions of employment, including, of course, the remuneration of labor.

Against this simple collectivist view, which many Socialists condemn as undemocratic, we may place the view of Gronlund,¹ and many others, that the foremen and managers in each industry will probably be elected by the workers employed in it. Obviously this suggestion is the child of a great and inspiring vision of a new social status for the producing class. The idea is sometimes carried so far that it is seriously suggested that the labor unions will select managers and determine the hours and wages of labor. The adoption of this essentially unsocial suggestion by Socialists is a curious illustration of the intellectual myopia which often afflicts the propagandist.

¹ LAURENCE GRONLUND, *The Coöperative Commonwealth*, p. 186.

Menger¹ suggests that the managers and foremen will be appointed by the popularly elected governmental bodies. At the same time he does not wholly dismiss Grönlund's suggestion but regards it as a possible ultimate goal. Even such a conservative thinker as Hillquit adopts Grönlund's suggestion, and can see "no valid reason why the managers and foremen of the 'labor group' should not be elected by the group members."² This unqualified acceptance of the principle of Grönlund's proposal by such a remarkably acute thinker proves that the plan is not one to be lightly dismissed. Wise or unwise, it has commended itself to many very thoughtful minds.

It is not necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of the difficulties of this method and the many objections to it. It is sufficient to point out its central defect, namely, its essentially anti-social and undemocratic character. From this point of view it is quite as objectionable as the plan to have the managers and foremen appointed and the conditions and terms of employment regulated by governmental committees. It would be quite as incompatible with democracy to have such matters determined by the workers alone without reference to the will of the general body of citizens

¹ ANTON MENDER, *Neue Staatslehre*, Second Edition, pp. 199-200.

² MORRIS HILLQUIT, *Socialism in Theory and Practice*, p. 136.

as to have the workers excluded from participation in the settlement of such matters. Industrial democracy requires that the workers must have a very much larger share in the organization and management of their work than is the rule to-day, even in our State and municipal enterprises. As I have elsewhere said: "It is perfectly clear that if the industrial organization under Socialism is to be such that the workers employed in any industry have no more voice in its management than the postal employ  s in this country, for example, have at the present time, it cannot be otherwise than absurd to speak of it as an industrial democracy."¹

It would be equally undemocratic to give the power of selecting the Postmaster-General and other directing officials of such an important public service to the employ  s only. Not only is it probable that, as pointed out many years ago by Mrs. Besant,² the plan would neither work well in practice nor be consistent with the discipline necessary in carrying on any large business undertaking, but it would place the whole people at the mercy of a relatively small number. The plan would result in an industrial hierarchy, essentially undemocratic, and open to the gravest and most dangerous abuses. The workers engaged in those services

¹ *Socialism, a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles*, New and Revised Edition, p. 303.

² In *Fabian Essays*.

in which a temporary cessation of work would become immediately a serious menace to the general welfare, say the railroad workers, would be in a position of great advantage as compared with the workers in an industry the temporary cessation of which would involve less suffering — the weavers, for example.

Inseparable from such a system would be the danger of conflict between the decisions of the workers engaged in important branches of the industrial organization and the interests of the people as a whole. The experience of the French government with its railroad employ  s points to the imperative necessity of some modification of labor unionism as we know it to-day to make it compatible with collective ownership. We may not agree with the English Socialist, J. H. Harley,¹ that labor unionism and collective ownership are antagonistic, but we can hardly escape the conclusion that the attitude which the labor unions of to-day very properly take in industrial conflicts would not be tolerated if adopted against the State. In self-protection the State would be obliged to treat as treasonable, acts which are perfectly proper and justifiable when directed against individual or corporate employers.

It is very evident, therefore, that some way must be found to base the industrial organization of

¹ HARLEY, *The New Social Democracy*. London, 1911.

the Socialist State upon the dual basis of the interests of the whole citizenry on the one hand, and the special interests of the workers as such upon the other hand. One Socialist writer has gravely proposed the establishment of an elective "industrial parliament of two chambers, in one of which representation will be according to numbers, while in the other every industry will be represented irrespective of size."¹ This plan is put forward as an alternative to the bureaucratic method of leaving all matters relating to the management of industry in the hands of government boards. Presumably these representatives to this bicameral parliament are to be elected by the workers employed in the various industries. The author does not make clear whether the industrial parliament is to be an advisory body merely, or whether its decisions will be binding. If the latter, the plan is open to the same objection as that of Gronlund, which it resembles; if the former, the plan is too cumbersome and wasteful.

One weakness is common to all such ingenious devices. They are all essentially Utopian. Based upon abstract principles, they fail to take into account the important fact that society is an organism subject to the laws of evolution. Social institutions are never the result of the deliberate adoption of clever inventions. It is easy

¹ EDMOND KELLY, *Twentieth Century Socialism*, pp. 305-306.

enough and harmless enough for the believer in a certain form of social organization to sit down and ask himself: "What institutions and what methods will best serve that form of social organization in which I believe?" but we must not be disappointed if quite other institutions and methods are developed.

Socialism is the child of capitalism. If the Socialist State is ever realized at all it will be a development of the capitalist State, not a new creation. Many of us believe that the transition from capitalism will be a tranquil process, stretching over a period of many years; that the "Social Revolution" of which we hear so much, instead of being a terrible upheaval attended with an enormous amount of violence and suffering, which even the stoutest hearts must anticipate with anxiety, is a long-drawn process of social effort and experiment. The Social Revolution is not a sanguinary episode which must attend the birth of the new social order. It is a long period of effort, experiment and adjustment, and is now taking place.

The acceptance of this evolutionary view will save us from wasting time and energy in devising social institutions and methods to conform with abstract principles. Instead, we shall seek the beginnings of such institutions and methods as the new epoch will require within the present order,

together with the beginning of the new epoch itself.

From this point of view our problem at once appears much simpler. The organization of the industrial affairs of the Socialist State upon the dual basis of the common civic rights of all and the special interests of the workers is not an impossible ideal, but a condition which is being gradually evolved within the existing capitalist State. The labor unions are at present, in the main, organizations for class warfare. Their business is fighting the employing class. But there are not wanting signs that the labor union is capable of a large constructive and administrative activity. In those industries in which the organization of the workers has been most successful it is fairly common even now for the unions to exercise a very considerable amount of control over the conditions of employment of their members. By hard fighting the workers have gained the right to share in the control of their industrial life. They make trade agreements upon such matters of vital importance as wages, hours of labor, protection against accidents, apprenticeship, engagement and discharge of workers, duties and powers of foremen, and so on, the list of things thus made subject to the joint control of the workers and their employers covering the most important phases of industrial life.

It is by no means uncommon for all such matters to be regulated by joint boards of employers and employés,¹ and the Socialist State will in all probability build its industrial policy upon the foundations laid by capitalist industry in this as in most other particulars. Of course, no man can say what methods will eventually be evolved by the Socialist State. Our present concern is with the more immediately practical matter of the methods available in its early stages, the transition from capitalism to Socialism. There is no apparent reason why the industrial policy of the Socialist State, including in that term the adjustment of every relation between the State as employer and the citizen as employé, should not be determined by joint boards composed of representatives of the workers engaged in certain trades or groups of trades and representatives of the departments of the State responsible for the adminis-

¹ "The Filene Stores, of Boston, a shareholding company employing seven to nine hundred men, has gone farthest of all in the direction of making its employés joint owners. The capital stock is held only by employés. . . . *The most important advance is that all questions are submitted to arbitration, not only complaints or disputes, but wages, scope of work and tenure of employment. More than four hundred cases of arbitration have arisen. . . . When an employé is discharged he has the right of appeal to an arbitration board composed of fellow employés of different grades. All wage disputes have been satisfactorily settled.*"—ANDREW CARNEGIE, *Problems of To-Day*, pp. 73-74. [Italics mine. J. S.]

tration of those branches of industry. Provision for the arbitration of matters upon which such boards could not agree could easily be made. Such a method would meet the requirements of democracy and avoid the evils necessarily involved in leaving the regulation of such matters as the conditions and remuneration of labor to the State on the one hand, or to the workers on the other.

One other problem remains to be faced, namely, the regulation of the relations existing between the Socialist State and voluntary industrial enterprise.

The voluntary industrial enterprise possible within a Socialist State may be divided into two classes: (1) production and distribution by voluntary coöperative associations; (2) production and distribution by individuals. It is quite evident that both forms of voluntary effort would have to be subject to the regulative power of the State. The regulation of voluntary industrial and commercial enterprises constitutes a very large part of the work of the State to-day, so the Socialist State in asserting the right to prescribe the conditions under which production or distribution might be carried on outside its own organization would not be instituting a new principle of jurisprudence.

Let us take the manufacture of shoes as an illustration: We will suppose that the people of the nation decide to "socialize" the manufacture

of shoes. To the making of that decision several forces contribute. Some people, possibly a majority, resent the exploitation of the producer and aim thus to end it; others resent the exploitation of the consumer, through extortionate prices, and hope thus to end it; still others resent the waste of effort inseparable from capitalistic manufacture and trading and hope thus to end it. Motivated by very different considerations, these three classes of people, constituting an overwhelming majority of the nation, unite in bringing about collectivist shoe production and distribution.

The various State and municipal governments establish big factories and distributing depots for the production and distribution of shoes. Thus a capitalist monopoly becomes transformed into a public or social monopoly. Between the two kinds of monopoly the all important difference is that while the capitalist monopoly serves the interest of a few investors, through the exploitation of the labor and needs of the many, the social monopoly conserves the interests of all the people, and permits no class of investors to exploit the labor and needs of another class.

Now, Citizen Jones, being an employé of the municipality in its big collectivist shoe factory, conceives the idea that machine-made shoes are an abomination, and a great desire to go back to the old method of making shoes by hand. Will

the power of the State be invoked to prevent him from making the attempt to support himself making shoes by hand? Not at all. To answer the question affirmatively would be to declare the Socialist State synonymous with industrial servitude of the worst kind. If Citizen Jones can find other citizens who are willing to purchase his handmade shoes there is no reason why he should not make them, provided that the conditions under which he makes them do not imperil his health or well-being in such a manner as to menace that interest which the State has in the efficiency and welfare of all its citizens.

The State may very properly determine the conditions under which this individual production of shoes by hand labor may be conducted. It may prescribe the sanitary and other qualifications of the place in which such work is done. It may limit the hours of labor. It may even prescribe both the quality and the prices of the shoes. The fear that the Socialist State must depend upon an immense bureaucracy arises from the mistaken notion that Socialism involves the forcible suppression of all voluntary industrial enterprise and the coercion of every citizen into the performance of whatever task may be assigned to him. In point of fact, neither of these things is essential to the attainment of the Socialist ideal.

If Citizen Jones finds other citizens engaged,

like himself, in making shoes for particularly fastidious people who do not like the shoes made in the collectively owned and operated factory, there is nothing in the philosophy or programme of Socialism to justify the assumption that their co-operation would be forbidden. Given a body of producers working together as equal partners, regulated by the State, the main evil of capitalist industry, the exploitation of the producer through the operation of the wages system, ceases to exist. There is nothing anti-social in such an arrangement. Socialization of industry includes such voluntary coöperation just as truly as it includes production and distribution under the auspices of the State.

Many of the critics of Socialism imagine that a great conflict will necessarily develop from this condition, a conflict between the State as the principal producer and distributor of goods and bodies of citizens independently engaged in similar production and distribution, therefore rivals of the State of which they are citizens. Such fears and forebodings are not best met by suggesting and describing elaborately devised safeguards to protect the unity of the Socialist State, but by insisting upon the mutuality of Socialism and democracy. There is a vast difference between the State as an instrument of class rule and the State as the administrative instrument of all the people.

So long as the State is the instrument of a class whose whole being depends upon the successful exploitation of a subject and dependent class, it will naturally use its power to advance the interests of the class represented by it, whose creature it is, and to oppress the weaker, dependent class. But when the State ceases to be merely an instrument in the hands of a privileged class, and becomes the administrative instrument of all the people, its oppressive character ceases with its class character.

In other words, the State, under Socialism, could impose no condition for the regulation of voluntary industrial enterprise of which the majority of the people did not approve. Whatever abuses might develop would be easily remediable, the State being ever responsive to the interests and will of the people.

We may suppose a crisis to have developed in the Socialist régime in the following manner: A certain municipality establishes big collectively owned factories for the manufacture of furniture. After a while, a number of the best artisans employed by the municipality in its furniture factories decide to leave the municipal service and start a coöperative factory for the manufacture of specially designed furniture. Very soon, the municipal enterprise begins to suffer from the competition

of the coöperative enterprise. People prefer its product to that of the municipal factory.

What may we expect the outcome of this condition to be? Will the State use its power to force its competitor to the wall? The answer is that the people as a whole must decide, and that is a sure guarantee that voluntary enterprise conducive to the general welfare of society will not be suppressed by the State in order to maintain an inefficient and uneconomical form of collective enterprise through State channels. Unless the municipal factory can turn out a product equally as satisfactory in quality, style and price as that turned out by the voluntary coöperative concern it will not prosper; the superiority of the products of the voluntary coöperative concern will assure its success. Under these conditions municipally owned and operated factories will not hold their own, and the trend of industrial development will be in the direction of voluntary coöperation.

If the workers can make more in less time as employés of the State or municipality than they can make in a longer time working as individuals, they will not choose to work as individuals, except in rare cases. If the people find that voluntary industrial enterprise produces better results than the collective industrial enterprise which takes the form of production and distribution by the State

or municipality, they will, naturally, foster — and if need be defend — voluntary enterprise.

By reason of the fact that the State and its subdivisions would inevitably employ a vast number of citizens in carrying on the productive and distributive functions entrusted to them, and thus become organizers of a tremendous body of labor, they would automatically set the standards which voluntary industrial enterprise must necessarily observe. Thus, in the last analysis, it is the State as producer which sets the standards for, and regulates, private industrial enterprise, rather than the State as a coercive agent.

VI

PERSONAL LIBERTY IN THE SOCIALIST STATE

ONE of the most common and effective arguments against Socialism rests upon the fear that it must necessarily lead to a great increase in the coercive functions of the State, and a corresponding decrease in personal liberty. Many able and earnest opponents of the Socialist movement have based their main attacks upon the assumption that Socialism involves the suppression of all individual initiative; that the life of the individual under Socialism must be governed by an immense bureaucracy.

The late Professor Goldwin Smith, for example, believed that the Socialist State would have to deny "freedom and personal choice of calling"; that the government would have to "pick out inventors, scientific discoverers, philosophers, men of letters, artists, set them to work and assign them their rewards."¹ This view closely resembles the famous caricature of the Socialist State by Eugen

¹ *Labor and Capital*, p. 27.

Richter,¹ and that form of State despotism which Herbert Spencer denounced.²

One thing is common to all those critics who offer this objection to Socialism; they all regard the total suppression of private property and industry as an essential condition of Socialism. Overlooking and ignoring the central principle of Socialism, the class struggle, they fail utterly to comprehend that a vast amount of private property and industrial enterprise is quite compatible with the Socialist ideal. As we have seen, the objective of the Socialist movement is not so much the establishment of a form of economic organization as the realization of certain social relations, a state of equal opportunity in which no individual will have the power to exploit the labor and needs of other individuals.

It may well be doubted whether the attainment of this end would involve the slightest extension of the powers of government in the direction of bureaucracy. It is important that we bear in mind the fact that the maintenance of the existing capitalist system involves a vast amount of restrictive legislation and interference with the individual. One of the most significant facts in the whole range of modern social and political phenomena is the increasing tendency of all the great nations of

¹ *Sozialdemokratische Zukunftsbilder.*

² *The Coming Slavery.*

the world toward bureaucracy in their government. This is equally true in England with Free Trade and in the United States with Protection; in Germany under monarchical government and in France under republican government. It is as true under the Southern Cross as under the Great Dipper. For the restraint of capitalist enterprise, to protect society against the abuses of capitalism, the leading nations of the world have been compelled to develop bureaucratic governments. Trusts and monopolies have developed such a menacing power that in self-protection the State has been obliged to undertake an enormous amount of inspection and regulation. The evils inseparable from the development of capitalism are continually forcing the State to enact laws restrictive of personal liberty, to enforce which armies of prying officials are necessary. Regulation of capitalist enterprise in the great public services, such as railroads and light and power plants, involves an astonishing amount of legislative and administrative interference with the individual by the State, much of it irritating, humiliating and oppressive. Bureaucratic government is not an evil resting in the lap of the future, waiting for Socialism to introduce it to the world. It is a present evil.

When it is suggested that the railroads ought to be socialized, publicly owned and operated for

the common good, it is ridiculous to object that such a step would be in the direction of bureaucracy. In New Zealand the railroads have been socialized. They are owned and operated by the State. In the United States they are owned and operated by corporations for profit. Do we find, then, that the management of the railroads in New Zealand involves a larger amount of government interference with the individual than is experienced in the United States where capitalist ownership obtains? On the contrary. It is in the United States that we find the government becoming more and more bureaucratic so far as its relation to the railroads is concerned. To "regulate" the railroad service, to overcome the natural tendency of the owners of the railroads to take advantage of their position and the increasing dependence of the public, it has been found necessary to enact an immense body of legislation and to maintain a formidable army of officials to enforce that legislation. "Liberty requires new definitions," says Carlyle somewhere. It is quite remarkable that not one of the numerous writers who have written about liberty has satisfactorily defined it. Cicero, for example, declared that "the essence of liberty is to live just as you choose."¹ This fairly expresses a popular conception of liberty, perhaps,

¹ *De officiis*, Book I, Ch. XX.

but it is of little value as a definition. In society there can be no right of the individual to live just as he chooses, at least, not until each individual will becomes synonymous with the collective will, in which case there can be no choice, for choice implies differences of will and desire. And even if it were possible for the individual to live according to his choice, absolutely unrestrained by the contrary choices and interests of other individuals, there would not be absolute freedom unless there was freedom of the will. Unless the volitions of the individual were self-caused, to use John Stuart Mill's expression, and he had control of all the circumstances which determined his choice, the individual would still lack absolute liberty.

But there is no such a thing as freedom of the will, either for mankind or the lower animals.¹ Herbert Spencer states the matter very clearly in a well-known passage: "Psychical changes either conform to law or they do not. If they do not conform to law, no science of psychology is possible. If they do conform to law, there cannot be any such thing as free will."² The Duke of Argyll makes a very similar observation and concludes: "There is nothing existing in the world which is absolutely alone — entirely free from inseparable relation to some other thing or things.

¹ E. HAECKEL, *History of Creation*, Vol. I, p. 237.

² SPENCER, *Principles of Psychology*, Pg. IV, Section 20.

Freedom, therefore, is only intelligible as meaning the being free from some kind of restraint.”¹

The statement that freedom “is only intelligible as meaning the being free from some kind of restraint” deserves close scrutiny. Taken in conjunction with its context, it means that there cannot be a universal, absolute liberty, since no individual can ever be wholly free from all forms of restraint. If the passage be changed to read that “freedom” is only intelligible as meaning the being free *from all forms of restraint*, it at once becomes a worthless abstraction, like Cicero’s definition. It is fairly obvious that I may be politically free to act according to a certain desire or choice but restrained by economic disabilities or by custom.

John Stuart Mill wrote a book on Liberty without defining it. The nearest he came to a formulation of a definition was to postulate the principle that “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”² Herbert Spencer accepts this principle as a working definition. “Each man has freedom to do all that which he

¹ ARGYLL, *Reign of Law*, Ch. VI.

² *On Liberty*, Ch. I.

wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.”¹ According to both philosophers, liberty is a social concept. It is relative, not absolute. There are very few important actions in which any individual can indulge which are not the concern of others than himself. No considerable class of acts can be named which are not in some degree social acts, which the individual can at all times perform without affecting in any manner the interests of others than himself. Interdependence is inseparable from social organization.

Thomas Hill Green defines liberty as the positive power or capacity which each man exercises or holds through the help or security given him by his fellowmen, and which he in turns helps to secure for them.² Subjectively considered, this is a good definition. Objectively considered, it is as far from being satisfactory as any. The sum of the positive powers which the individual enjoys through the reciprocal activity which Green describes may be, and often is, very far from amounting to anything worthy of being called liberty.

It is, perhaps, impossible to formulate a definition of liberty which will be wholly free from objection. We may, however, postulate two prin-

¹ *Social Statics*, Ch. IX.

² *Essay on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract*.

ciples which are essential to a rational conception of liberty.

The first of these principles is that *liberty is not an intelligible term except as it relates to some particular phase or phases of life*. We may intelligently speak of political liberty, of religious liberty, of economic liberty, and so on. Each of these terms implies the absence of restraint of a certain kind from a particular phase of life. In considering the advisability of performing a certain action a man may take into account that he is politically free either to do it or to leave it undone. The State will neither punish him nor reward him in either case. There is, therefore, no political pressure or restraint. But there are other forms of compulsion and restraint, fear of social ostracism or ridicule, belief in a future life and rewards and punishments for the deeds committed in this life, are sufficient examples. We simply cannot conceive of the whole of life being free from all forms of compulsion or restraint. Even if the compelling or restraining forces be moral ones, our wills and desires, they are none the less real and none the less effective. And we know that we are not free in our wills and desires, but that these are the resultants of factors largely beyond our knowledge and control.

The second principle is *that liberty, even thus narrowed to a single phase of life is a relative term*.

The closet philosophers of Anarchism have set up an abstract ideal of absolute liberty, but it has no place in the world of reality. We cannot escape the limitations of social interdependence. *Mine* is always bounded by *Thine* in society. Absolute freedom for any individual in society, unrestricted liberty to do as he pleased regardless of the interests and wishes of other individuals, would necessarily involve despotism. We are reminded of Plato's wise saying that "From excessive liberty tyranny springs as certainly as a tree from its roots."

Let us suppose that the citizens of a community agree to protect themselves against outbreaks of disease by an elaborate system of public drainage. But one citizen objects to having his property drained. He regards the drainage scheme as an invasion of his "liberty," and in the name of that "liberty" demands that his property be left undrained. If the citizens, while considering that to omit the property of the objecting individual will expose the entire community to danger, either abandon or modify their scheme out of solicitude for the liberty of that individual, is it not clear that the individual is thus made a sort of tyrant? To make the liberty of the one individual absolute all the other individuals have sacrificed their own.

The irreconcilable conflict between Anarchism and Socialism as systems of philosophy and as

movements arises from the fact that the former considers society as nothing more than an aggregation of individuals, while the latter regards it as a highly organized body whose members are interdependent. To the Anarchist every attempt of society to assert its supremacy over the individual is essentially tyrannical, and, *per contra*, every attempt of the individual to resist that social supremacy and control is a blow struck for individual liberty. To the Socialist, on the other hand, the greatest advancements of personal liberty appear to be those which have resulted from the assertion of social interests over individual interests. Thus, while the Anarchist contends that the greatest social good must result from the complete freedom and independence of the individual, the Socialist contends that the fullest freedom of the individual must result from the recognition of the supremacy of society over the individual, of social interests over private interests.

On the side of the Socialist the testimony of history is certain and conclusive. It is that political and religious liberty has progressed rapidly where social supremacy has been most firmly established. No one can study the history of the conflict between the feudal barons and the Free Cities and fail to recognize in the victory of the latter an immense advance of individual liberty. It would be easy to construct a chart of human progress

showing that the boundaries of personal freedom have been broadened or narrowed according to the increase or decrease of social supremacy. All through civilization we find that social supremacy has added to the sum of individual liberties. It has forced initiative upon higher planes by forbidding initiative upon lower ones.

It is worthy of remark that the Anarchists themselves invariably abandon that fundamental tenet of their faith, absolute liberty, when they attempt to state the principles of that faith constructively. Thus, Kropotkin, in his very interesting study, *La Conquête du pain*, considers what would happen in the ideal Anarchist society which he depicts should an individual persist in conduct which the great body of citizens regarded as inimical to the common welfare. Quite boldly Kropotkin cuts the Gordian knot and tells us that the individual who refused to observe the will of his fellows would be forcibly expelled from the community.¹ Banishment has always been regarded as a rather drastic form of punishment. The important point, however, is that even Kropotkin has to admit that liberty is based upon social consent, not upon individual desire. The most elementary study of the conditions of social existence will suffice to show the fallacy upon which the idea of absolute personal liberty is based. And this idea in turn is the

¹ P. KROPOTKIN, *La Conquête du pain*, p. 202.

basis of the Anarchist contention that freedom and the mere absence of government are synonymous.

Of all the foolish notions that ever obsessed the minds of men surely none has ever been more foolish than the notion that the mere absence of government and law means freedom. So far from that being the case, there is often freedom only within the law, and the absence of government means tyranny. An English Anarchist, addressing a bitterly hostile audience, denounced government and law as being essentially tyrannical. Again and again he declared that "Anarchists are opposed to the State and to all forms of government because these rest upon force." Because of the bitterness of his attack upon the government and his abuse of the reigning sovereign, the crowd was enraged and wanted to mob him and prevent him from speaking. But the police stood by and protected him from the crowd. The law said that he had a right to speak, and the officers of the law were there defending him and insuring his right, his freedom. Yet the Anarchist apparently did not recognize the grotesque humor of his situation.

The same principle is illustrated every time mob violence prevents the exercise of legal rights. During the agitation in England over the Boer War it was my fortune to be involved in the propaganda which aimed at first to prevent war, and, later on, to put an end to it. The law gave to all

citizens the right to hold meetings for the purpose of our propaganda, but the public temper was such that mobs of infuriated — and often inebriated — “patriots” tried to destroy that right. Frequently we had to speak under police protection. Thus our liberty to hold meetings was made possible only through the law and its officers. It would be easy to multiply instances in which the law stood for liberty, and tyranny took the form of opposition to the law. To say, then, that mere absence of law is synonymous with liberty, or that law is synonymous with tyranny, is folly of the worst type.

The majority of the laws upon our statute books are in no sense oppressive so far as the normal individual is concerned. Some years ago I had an amusing encounter with an Anarchist upon this point. I was lecturing in a town in New Jersey and in the discussion which followed the lecture an Anarchist arose and made the customary Anarchistic declaration that all law is oppressive. It happened that the public mind just then was impressed by a crime of a particularly shocking nature. Calling the Anarchist's attention to the fact that the atrocious deed in question was a felony, that the law forbade such deeds and imposed long terms of imprisonment upon those committing them, I asked him whether he had ever felt that the existence of that law upon the statute books of the State of New Jersey oppressed *him*, or in

any way restricted *his* freedom. Of course, the reply was that he had not. Similar replies were given in response to similar questions concerning a dozen or more laws which are to be found upon the statute books of every civilized state.

Like all normal, honest citizens, the Anarchist had gone through life without feeling in the slightest degree oppressed by the laws enacted against murder, rape, arson, burglary, bigamy, robbery, and so on. So far as he was concerned, these laws were non-existent. In no sense were they oppressive to him; they restricted no liberty of his. Only that man could logically claim that he was oppressed by them, that they restricted his liberty, who felt a desire to commit one or more of the dangerous anti-social acts in question. We all go through life without ever being conscious of any oppression from numerous laws.

It will be obvious from the foregoing that antagonism to the law and government, as such, is not a part of the Socialist philosophy. But the essential difference between Socialism and Anarchism is not that the former idealizes law while the latter anathematizes it. Anarchism and Socialism are not polar opposites because the former would abolish all law while the latter would surround all life with legal enactments. Not every extension of the power of the State over the life of the individual is a step toward Socialism as is some-

times suggested by superficial thinkers. The fundamental difference between the two schools of thought lies in the fact that while the Anarchist seeks absolute individual liberty the Socialist holds that to be a mere abstraction and strives after the maximum of individual liberty attainable, which he believes can only result from the establishment of true democracy — the supremacy of social interests over private interests. Even if society should progress to a state of civilization in which laws backed by the organized force of government became unnecessary, it would be none the less a Socialist society, so long as it was regulated by the social will, however informally ~~these~~ might be expressed.

In a true democracy laws are simply the crystallizations of the will of a preponderating majority of the citizens. First comes the desire, a product of experience, and then comes the enactment of the desire into law. Sometimes social desires, even when not enacted into laws, crystallize into sentiments so strong as to have all the force of laws. So much is this so that we speak of "unwritten laws." When dueling was the fashion public sentiment had crystallized into unwritten laws so strong that a man who was insulted was practically compelled to challenge the aggressor to mortal combat. If he failed to do this, he was subject to much worse punishment than would

in all probability have been imposed had the law been one of legal force, and this despite the fact that he had a clear legal right to refuse to fight a duel.

Here, again, we can see the impossibility of the Anarchist ideal of absolute liberty. Even in the Anarchist Utopia there would be public sentiment, and that, in the absence of some legal forms for its expression, would crystallize itself into such "unwritten laws" as have existed all through the ages. Individual liberty of action might, therefore, be restricted quite as much as it is under present conditions with legal institutions. In the light of all human experience it may be safely predicted that in such a Utopia violations of the unwritten laws would often be punished with the ferocity and mad revenge which result from excess of passion and inflamed public tempers. Every lynching is an illustration of what "justice without the law" almost inevitably involves. Kropotkin seems to rely upon just this sort of terrorism to maintain his anarchial Utopia, for he tells us that "customary law," as jurists say,¹ "will be sufficient to maintain a good understanding," and conformity will be adequately assured by necessity,² by fear of expulsion,³ and, if necessary, by the intervention of

¹ *Paroles d'un révolté*, p. 221.

² *Anarchist Communism*, p. 24.

³ *La Conquête du pain*, p. 202.

the individual citizen,¹ or of the masses.² Lynch law does not make an attractive Utopia, after all.

Many persons are restrained by and live their lives in terror of custom, who never felt in the slightest degree oppressed by the State. Many things which are not wrong, but have the sanctions of morality and reason, are forbidden by custom. The opposition to rational dress for women is but one illustration of many which might be cited. The attitude of society upon the relations of the sexes, compelling all the open and frank advances to come from the male, illustrate the same point. Custom is cruelly repressive very often and many of the victims of its tyranny have had to seek the protection of the law. Yet, despite the plain lessons of human experience, the Anarchists continue to indulge in their quixotic attacks upon law as the embodiment of all oppression, and rely wholly upon "unwritten laws" and customs to secure personal freedom!

There is no promise of absolute personal liberty in the Socialist State. In order to insure the greatest liberty to the greatest number it may be necessary to restrain the actions of some individuals, to restrict their liberties, or even to take them away altogether. Thus, in the Socialist

¹ *Revolutionary Studies*, p. 30.

² *Paroles d'un révolté*, pp. 110, 134, 135; *La Conquête du pain*, p. 109.

State "eternal vigilance" will still continue to be the only guarantee of liberty. Man is a creature of dual nature, controlled by dual forces. On the one hand, he is an egoist, ever striving for individual expansion. On the other hand, he is a gregarious animal, ever seeking the companionship of his fellows. Life is an oscillation between these two motives. On the one hand there is the struggle for individual expression, on the other hand the sense of dependence and mutuality. Relying upon the lesson of experience, the test of reality, the Socialist believes that, upon the whole, the largest individual liberty is possible for all where the social will is predominant. He is essentially a pragmatist.

In those countries in which constitutional government exists the greatest tyranny is not political and legal in its origin, but economic. That fact becomes the more evident the nearer we approach democracy. In the United States to-day we have, relatively speaking, political freedom, but we are held in the grip of economic tyranny. Herbert Spencer, individualist that he was, recognized this great fact. With all his hatred of legislation restrictive of individual liberty, he could not ignore the fact that modern tyranny is economic in its essence. He frankly admitted that the so-called liberty of the laborer "amounts in practice to little more than the ability to exchange one slavery

for another," and, further, that "the coercion of circumstances often bears more hardly on him than the coercion of a master does on one in bondage."¹

Spencer realized that this condition could only be remedied through control of the economic factors of the common body, and he hoped for amelioration through coöperation. Thus he approached very closely to the Socialist position, his hostility to the State as the regulative agent constituting almost the only barrier to his acceptance of the Socialist remedy. Perhaps it was his fear of the regulative power of the State, which he regarded as belonging to the régime of Militarism that blinded him to the significance of the fact that modern progress toward social betterment has been characterized by a coincident increase of control over the economic forces of life and a decrease of sumptuary legislation. With the growth of democracy laws regulating private expenditures have almost wholly disappeared.² The interference of the State with private expenditures is not long tolerated by the masses when they have the power to change the laws. On the other hand, they have everywhere used that power to enact

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. III, p. 525.

² Prohibition of the liquor traffic has been called a modified form of sumptuary legislation but it is hardly that. It is more nearly analogous to legislation regulating the sale of poisons and dangerous weapons than to the ancient sumptuary laws.

laws bringing the economic conditions of life, such as wages, hours of labor, sanitation of workshops, insurance against accidents, and the like, under social control and laws regulating monopolies belong to the same class.

Now, it is quite apparent that so long as these matters are the subject of class conflict so long must all such legislation involve a vast amount of interference with the individual by the State. If the railroads, for example, were owned and controlled by the State, in a democracy at least, an effective majority of the citizens would be able to say how they should be operated. It would be relatively a simple matter. The people, that is the State, would be at once the owners of the railroads and the makers of the laws regulating them. But so long as the railroads are owned by a class within the State, every law enacted by the State which the owners regard as hostile to their special class interests will be resisted and evaded with all the energy and ingenuity they can command. To cope with this resistance and evasion the State must organize a costly system of espionage, inspection and punishments.

It is in this manner that modern governments are being forced on in the direction of bureaucracy. Laws passed against child labor, the employment of women and girls at night, restraint of trade, and other evils are systematically evaded and vio-

lated to such an extent that the State is compelled to keep on adding to the great army of those whom it employs to enforce the laws. The plain lesson of experience is that the socialization of the means of production and exchange, through social ownership and control, will render a great deal of such legislation unnecessary, do away with a vast amount of government interference with the individual and liberate society from the bureaucracy inseparable from capitalism as it is now developed.

If it is asked what assurance we have that the Socialist State will not develop new forms of restraint which will involve the servitude of the individual, we can only reply that our one assurance is democracy. Ruling classes have always devised legal forms to bind the classes over which they ruled, but no class voluntarily forges legal chains to bind itself. The basis of the new social order will be democracy, the right of all adults ¹ to an equal share in the determination of the laws which they need and must obey. It is inconceivable that in such a democracy laws will be enacted limiting the essential liberties of its members. After all, that is the most assuring answer to make to those who fear that the Socialist State will enmesh the life of the individual so completely as to deny freedom of choice of occupation, freedom of speech

¹ This does not mean that the Socialist State will not exclude lunatics, idiots and criminals from the franchise.

and movement, freedom of religious and philosophical belief and association, and so on.

That there will be far less restrictive legislation in the Socialist State than we are now accustomed to is a reasonable expectation. One of the most important tasks of the Socialist State in its early stages will be the abolition of a great mass of irritating restraints imposed by the necessities of capitalist development. At the same time it is almost equally certain that, from time to time, new restraints will be devised. Huxley,¹ among others, has pointed out that the progress of civilization is generally attended by the repression of initiative on lower planes and a resulting development of new fields for initiative upon higher planes. There is hardly a page in the history of the conscious progress of the race which does not bear witness to this great fact.

For many years English chimneys were cleaned by forcing little girls and boys to climb through them. Generally the children were defenseless paupers who had been taken from the workhouses for the purpose. They were frightfully abused, and it was not at all an unusual thing for a fire to be kindled below them in order that the heat and smoke would make them climb more rapidly and prevent them from lingering over their task. When the State abandoned its *laissez faire* attitude

¹ T. H. HUXLEY, *Evolution and Ethics*.

and forbade the employment of children for such a purpose, it restricted "liberty" of a brutal sort but it enlarged the real liberty of the children. It repressed initiative upon a low and brutal plane, but it thereby forced the development of initiative upon a higher plane. Chimneys were swept by mechanical devices, and a new sanctity was given to the rights of childhood.

In the Socialist State, then, liberty will continue to grow — sometimes, perhaps, through self-imposed compulsions, the restraints which the citizens of a true democracy may place upon themselves in order that they may become more truly free to live noble and worthy lives. Just as the fancied "liberty" of the *laissez faire* period was in reality bondage, and just as the compulsion in factory laws, education laws, public health laws, and the like, has widened the boundaries of real liberty, so in the Socialist State enlightened democracy may attain new heights of freedom through restrictive legislation which binds and throttles ignorance, disease, vice and squalor. To adapt a pregnant phrase from Rousseau, the citizens of the Socialist State may well *legally force each other to be free*.

There can be no promise of perfection, no assurance that no error will ever be made by democracy under Socialism imposing needless and profitless hardship upon the individual. The Future may have its martyrs like the Present and the Past.

The forerunners of progress in art and science and philosophy may suffer as they have suffered in all ages, but they will be far safer under a true democracy than under any class government the world has ever known. No despotism which a democracy controlling the means of production and exchange can by any stretch of imagination be considered likely to impose upon itself, can equal the despotism of circumstances which obtains in present society, based as it is upon the class ownership of the economic requisites of existence.

All those who argue that the Socialist State must be despotic in its nature base their argument upon one of two fundamental errors, or upon both of them. These cardinal errors are: (1) that Socialism involves the total suppression of private property and individual initiative; (2) that the State under Socialism will be a power apart from the mass of people and opposing their interests as the State has always been in class-ruled society. We have already seen that Socialism does not involve the suppression of private property and individual initiative and enterprise; that the principal forms of property and industry to be socialized are those which now involve the dependence of the many on the few. We have seen, too, that State ownership is not the only form of Socialization compatible with the Socialist ideal, that voluntary coöperation may well have an im-

portant place in the Socialist State. Finally, we have seen that the political basis of Socialist society must be democratic; that the State will have only such powers as the majority of its citizens freely confer upon it.

John Stuart Mill declared the social problem of the future to be "how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action with a common ownership in the raw materials of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labor."¹ That problem cannot be solved by "benevolent feudalism," or the "moralization of capital," but only by a free and unfettered democracy.

¹ *Autobiography*, Ch. VII, p. 232.

VII

LABOR AND ITS REMUNERATION

I

THE fear of many honest and sincere opponents of Socialism that in the Socialist régime the State will have to assign each individual his or her task, denying the element of personal choice, has provided Socialists with a great deal of amusement which has relieved the strain and hardship of their propaganda. There is something irresistibly comic in the thought of a State official attempting to select poets and gravediggers, inventors and laborers for the Socialist Commonwealth, tagging the children who are to be its Newtons, Darwins, Whitneys, Edisons, Angelos, Rodins, Beethovens, Wagners, Raphaels, Millets, Shakespeares and Shelleys, and so on, setting them apart for special development and training. One wonders what would happen in the event that a lad "set apart" as a farm laborer should prove to be another Burns. Would he be punished, for some kind of *lèse majesté*, if he dared to offer to the world his apostrophes to the

mouse or to the daisy turned up in the plow furrow?

The fundamental natural incentive to labor is the need of making a living. In a society whose social organization and control of its economic resources made it impossible for any person to exploit the labor and needs of others, and thus live in idleness, this natural incentive would compel all to labor who were competent to do so. This, rather than any law of the State, would operate to prohibit parasitic living upon the labor of others. Where this natural pressure proved ineffective the State would act, for the Socialist State must guarantee the right to labor, and, as a corollary, impose upon every competent person the duty of labor. The immature child, the aged, the sick and infirm would be exempted from labor as incompetents.

The maintenance of these incompetents would, as now, be a charge upon society. But instead of our present haphazard, wasteful and cruel method of meeting that obligation by means of "charity," a Socialist State would frankly recognize the right of its helpless members to maintenance, and would meet their claims out of the common funds by carefully organized methods. We see within the present social order the beginnings of such a system. Social insurance against sickness, accident, and old age, developed within

the capitalist system to keep it going by mitigating some of its most dangerous evils, may well be regarded as the foundation for the more comprehensive system of social insurance of the Socialist State — in principle if not in form.

The vast army of unemployed workers who to-day vainly seek work while those employed are overworked would find employment, with the result that there would be leisure for all and overwork for none while the sum of production would be greatly increased. Then, also, an enormous number of those employed to-day in occupations largely dependent upon the maintenance of capitalism would be available for really useful labor. When we think of the tremendous amount of productive energy to be gained by diverting to production the non-productive labor of to-day we get an idea of the wonderful possibilities of the scientific organization of industry.

But the right to labor and the duty to labor must be accompanied by the freedom of the individual to choose his occupation. As far as possible the selection of occupation must be personal and free, subject to the laws of supply and demand, and the fitness of the individual for the task chosen. No free democracy would tolerate a system which gave the State power to assign each man and woman his or her task. That idea of the regimentation of labor ignores the fundamental

principles of Socialism and assumes a despotic State independent of the will and interest of the people.

When we affirm that the choice of occupation is not to be made by the State, but by the individual, we at once confront one of those difficulties which have served the opponents of Socialism to such good purpose. It is obvious that all occupations are not equally desirable. Some occupations are pleasant and attractive, while others are unpleasant and repellant. There are some occupations which are dangerous and disagreeable. Who will do the dirty work and the disagreeable work under Socialism?

Let us briefly consider disagreeable and dangerous work as a distinct and separate category, leaving the broader question of the relative degrees of attractiveness as it bears upon the free choice of occupation for subsequent consideration. In the industrial legislation of several countries various occupations which are attended by more than the usual percentage of dangers to life and limb are classified as "dangerous occupations" and special laws are enacted with regard to them. We have ample precedent, therefore, for thus considering the unusually dangerous and disagreeable occupations as a separate category. Possibly the Socialist State might so regard them and make spe-

cial provisions for their regulation, but with that we are not concerned here and now.

Now, a great deal of the dangerous and disagreeable work done to-day is not in the highest and best sense of the word necessary. Advertising alone involves an incalculable amount of such work. The use of lead in glazing pottery is quite unnecessary and so is the use of white phosphorus in making matches. These and countless other dangerous methods of production could easily be dispensed with. Their only *raison d'être* is the fact that it has been possible for a few investors to reap profit at the peril of those engaged in such forms of production. The Socialist would eliminate all such unnecessary, dangerous occupations and methods of production, for there would be none to profit by their maintenance. Matches and glazed pottery would still be made but not at the risk of lead poisoning or "phossy jaw." Repression of initiative upon the lower plane would stimulate initiative upon the higher plane, just as the prohibition of the employment of little boys and girls in the English woolen factories led to the invention of the piecing machine.¹

Furthermore, a great deal of the dangerous and disagreeable work now being performed by human

¹ "The Economics of Factory Legislation," in *The Case for the Factory Acts*, by MRS. SIDNEY WEBB, p. 20.

beings to their degradation or the injury of their physical health could be done by machinery. This is not the optimistic speculation of a dreamer. Already machinery has been invented and is available to do thousands of the things which are now done by human labor of the most disagreeable and dangerous kind. Much of this work is indeed done in competition with machinery. The wretchedly ill-paid labor of women and children in sweatshops under disease-breeding conditions, and the life-destroying toil of little boys in glass factories illustrate this important point.

Capitalist society does not and cannot provide inventive genius with an effective incentive to liberate mankind from drudgery and dangerous labor. So long as enough cheap human labor can be had to do it, the master class will not trouble itself to discover other and better methods. The degradation of human beings and the waste of their lives do not matter so long as they do not lessen profits. Not only does the employing class fail to make any effort to secure the invention of mechanical appliances to prevent the degradation and waste of human life, but when such inventions are made it frequently resists all attempts to bring about their use. From the point of view of the capitalist the human labor is "cheaper." For the larger social view he does not care. It does not matter to him that every life wrecked by disease

is a social loss and burden. This is why all efforts to conserve human life, whether they take the form of laws insisting upon proper safety devices in factories, the abolition of dangerous processes, or the maintenance of decent standards of hygiene and sanitation in tenement houses are resisted by capitalists and landlords. Often, indeed, inventions which would materially lessen the amount of dangerous and disagreeable work to be done are bought by capitalists for the sole purpose of preventing their use. Many a valuable patent is thus purchased and pigeonholed, so that the work of the inventor is lost to society. On the other hand, inventions which make possible greater profits are eagerly adopted, despite the fact that they involve an increase in the amount of dangerous or disagreeable work to be done.

Pratically all effective effort to conserve human life, like the effort to conserve natural resources, has had to be undertaken by the State in the face of the organized opposition of the classes whose incomes are derived from rent, profit and interest. Each increase of social ownership would necessarily reduce the force of such opposition until, finally, it disappeared all together. Every conceivable incentive would operate to force the Socialist State to organize all its resources for the conservation of life and happiness, and the elimination of degrading and dangerous labors. To this

end it could and doubtless would offer honors and rewards which would stimulate incentive genius, until even the most repulsive occupation of sewer cleaning was made pleasant. It might go further and remove the drudgery of housework by equipping every home with the numerous electrically operated devices devised for that purpose. After all, the sense of social responsibility which insists upon homes being equipped with fire escapes to guard against loss of life by fire, and proper sewers to guard against disease, may well take the logical step of insisting upon vacuum cleaners to prevent dust-borne diseases, and upon mechanical devices to prevent the needless exhaustion of women, the mothers of the race.

The steps suggested would take us far toward a solution of our problem. At least the most distressing features of the problem could thus be solved. This claim will hardly be seriously challenged. But when it has been admitted, candor compels us to recognize the fact that the elimination of disagreeable and dangerous occupations would take a long time, that the Socialist State during that time would have to provide the labor for work of this kind. It must also be admitted that, under the best conditions imaginable, with all the essentially disagreeable, debasing and dangerous occupations eliminated, some occupations would continue to be less attractive and agreeable than

others. The problem is much deeper and broader than merely providing for work that is disagreeable or dangerous. The question we are bound to face is: How will the Socialist State meet the practical problem presented by the fact that some kinds of work are much more desirable than others?

Let us begin with the fact that there has always been a natural inequality of talent. There is no reason for supposing that this form of inequality will ever wholly disappear. We may freely admit so much without calling into question the conclusion of Professor Ward that "all men are intellectually equal in the sense that, in persons taken at random from different social classes the chances for talent or ability are the same for each class."¹ This inequality of talent is the basis for one very effective method of dealing with our problem. In general, men will not freely choose tasks which call for greater talent and ability than they possess. There is good reason to believe that there would be an automatic adjustment of talent and task which would insure the doing of the rough, unskilled and unpleasant work by those unfitted for tasks calling for talents of a higher order than they possess.

Quite apart from the natural inequality of talent is the marked diversity of talent which men and

¹ LESTER F. WARD, *Pure Sociology*, p. 447.

women possess. Two men may be equally gifted, but differently, so that one has a natural aptitude for mechanics and the other for chemistry. If the matter were left to free choice there is little reason to believe that the man with the talent for mechanics would select work in a chemical laboratory in preference to work in a machine shop. As a rule, men will choose the tasks for which their natural talents and aptitudes best fit them. Should this process of selection by personal inclination be considered too hazardous and uncertain, or should it fail to give satisfactory results, there is no reason why competitive tests should not be resorted to. By imposing qualitative tests the Socialist State could select the workers best fitted for various occupations far more systematically than has ever yet been done.

Against the suggestion that personal inclination based upon inequality and diversity of talent, supplemented by competitive tests, would solve our problem two objections may fairly be urged. It may be objected that, however the selection might be made, it would be unjust to give equal rewards for a day's labor at some easy and pleasant occupation and a day's labor at some arduous, disagreeable and dangerous occupation. It may well be asked what justice there can be in giving the same reward for a certain number of hours devoted to labor in which the worker takes a keen delight

which comes from self-realization and self-expression, and for an equal number of hours devoted to labor in which the worker finds no such delight, labor which is ugly, repellent and uninspiring.

The question and the difficulty it presents rest upon the utterly unwarranted assumption that equality and uniformity of remuneration must be the basis of the industrial policy of the Socialist State. Socialism does not involve the principle of equal remuneration, and there is no reason why some occupations should not be more highly paid than others. An occupation so repellent in itself that few would choose it might be made exceedingly attractive by (1) increasing the amount of remuneration, or (2) reducing the number of hours constituting the workday. If we assume the normal working day under Socialism to consist of six hours, it is easy to see that by reducing the number of working hours in certain disagreeable occupations to three per day such occupations might well become attractive and popular.

The second objection is not based upon ethical considerations, but is based upon practical considerations. Granting the Socialist contention that the unequal opportunities of the present social order operate to repress natural and latent talent and ability, the removal of these inequalities must result in a much greater equality of intellectual equipment than now exists. Under such condi-

tions, it is urged, there would be relatively few unfit for any but rough, unskilled labor, while far more than were needed would be qualified for the occupations requiring a high degree of skill and training. There would be a dearth of laborers in the occupations requiring little or no intellectual training, and a surplus of laborers in those occupations requiring considerable skill and training, a majority electing, possibly, a single attractive occupation.

Most of those who make this objection confuse the concept of *equality* with that of *uniformity*. There is no reason to fear that because Socialism would develop a greater degree of intellectual equality than has ever yet existed diversity of talent and achievement must disappear. We do not deny intellectual equality to the great names in history because their work was different in kind. Is Faraday inferior or superior to Jenner, Robert Koch, inferior or superior to Samuel Morse? Just as we cannot balance great achievements in widely different fields of effort and determine with anything like precision their relative merit, so we cannot sharply classify occupations and say which offer the greatest scope for intellectual interest. One man will find mechanics as full of intellectual interest and challenge as another will find chemistry, or still another will find medicine. Until quite recently farming in general and dairy-

farming in particular were regarded as occupations demanding only a low standard of mental development and offering little intellectual stimulus. Bacteriology and agricultural chemistry have created a new conception of these occupations, and we are fast coming to a general recognition of the fact that successful farming requires just as much trained intelligence, and offers as much opportunity for intellectual development, as any other occupation.

Even if we attach the greatest possible importance to the objection we are considering, then, there is no reason to fear that intellectual uniformity will lead to the overcrowding of a single occupation or group of occupations. With the exception of a few forms of rough and unskilled labor, all the necessary work of the world may be made equally attractive to men of equal but diverse intellectual ability and interest. It will be within the power of the Socialist State to make even the most repellent forms of labor attractive by increasing the remuneration or reducing the hours of labor in those occupations, reversing the rule of present society according to which such labor is generally the worst paid.

Under the most favorable conditions it is highly probable that there would at times be an oversupply of available laborers in some branches of industry, and an undersupply in other branches.

Under our present form of production the adjustment of this condition is left to chance and the unregulated force of economic circumstances. Overwork for some and unemployment for others are coexistent phenomena. In those branches of industry where there are too many laborers the employers take advantage of the condition to reduce wages, increase the hours of labor, or intensify the pressure under which the laborers must work. This is done solely with a view to the employer's profit, and not as a deliberate attempt to adjust the supply of labor to the demand. On the other hand, in those branches where there is a scarcity of laborers wages are reluctantly raised in order to increase the supply. Here, again, there is no attempt to bring about the scientific organization of industry and the proper adjustment of the supply of labor force to the demand for it. The whole process is planless and leads to social and industrial anarchy.

As the organizer and director of the principal economic activities, the Socialist State would be able to deal with this problem in a scientific manner. It would be able to do systematically that which capitalist enterprise has never been able to do, and, in fact, has never attempted to do, except in a spasmodic and haphazard way for its own selfish and anti-social ends. By increasing the remuneration and decreasing the number of hours in

the branches of industry suffering from a dearth of laborers; by imposing more difficult tests for employment in the overcrowded branches of industry, and even by decreasing the remuneration or increasing the number of hours should there be need of such measures, the Socialist State could adjust the supply of labor to the need for labor, and avoid the evils inseparable from our present planless and anti-social methods. The agencies employed might not differ from those which have been employed by the capitalist class, but the result would be different. The Socialist State would have the immense advantage of dealing with industry as a whole, in a systematic manner, with a view to the interest of society in general.

II

We come now to the important question of the method of remunerating labor under Socialism. A great many of our critics, and not a few of our friends, are sorely disturbed when they first encounter the statement that Socialism does not involve equal remuneration for all workers, irrespective of the amount or quality of labor performed. Yet the communistic principle of equal remuneration for unequal efforts has never been a recognized principle of the modern Socialist movement. Kautsky and Vandervelde may fairly be regarded as typical exponents of "orthodox" Marxian So-

cialism, and they both accept the view that Socialism does not imply equality of reward, that there is nothing in the philosophy or programme of Socialism to prevent the Socialist State from paying more to some workers than to others.¹

The idea of equal remuneration belongs to Communism. The perfect ideal of Communism is summed up in Louis Blanc's noble motto, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." It is a beautiful ideal, but obviously attainable only by a perfected humanity, a highly socialized society in which every member could be relied upon to strive for the common good to the full extent of his ability, and to practice the virtue of self-restraint to such a degree as might be necessary to limit his taking from the common stock enough to satisfy his need.

It may be that human society is capable of this degree of perfection. Socialism neither affirms nor denies that belief. The Socialist may join with the Communist in his faith in the ultimate attainment of that blissful state of social unity, or he may join the most skeptical Individualist in mocking it as a vain dream, a mirage luring mankind with false hopes further into the desert of disappointment and despair. Socialism concerns itself only with that which it believes to be the next great

¹ KAUTSKY, *The Social Revolution*, pp. 128-135; VANDERVELDE, *Collectivism*, pp. 149-150.

step in social evolution, not with the ultimate goal of society.

Upon the ground of pure reason and justice equal remuneration of all labor cannot be successfully assailed. How are we to measure and compare the relative value of different kinds of social service? By what rule shall we decide that he who makes and cleans our sewers, and so protects us against epidemics of disease, is more or less valuable to society than he who in his laboratory invents new productive processes which enable us to enjoy greater material comforts? Furthermore, even if we discover such a rule enabling us to determine with exactness the relative value of each kind of social service, how shall we justly decide that he who performs the greater service merits the greater reward and that he who performs the lesser service merits the lesser reward? Were their opportunities equal? Had each an equal inheritance of physical, mental and moral strength and an equally favorable environment?

Family life at its best has often been glorified as an epitome of what the ideal Social State would be, a social microcosm illustrating the ideal toward which the race forever strives. It is not without significance, then, that in the family at its best we find the Communistic principle prevailing. We do not find in the best developed family life that the parents discriminate against the weaker chil-

dren and lavish extra tenderness and material advantage upon the stronger children. The time may come when society as a whole will attain that degree of humanity and enlightened justice which the family already foreshadows. Socialism may prove to be a step in the direction of Communism.

Curiously enough, the principle of remuneration which is most commonly set forth in the popular propaganda literature of Socialism is not that of Communism, but that of pure Individualism. We are solemnly assured by many of the writers of this sort of literature that "under Socialism each worker will get the full value of the product of his own labor," minus his share of the necessary social charges for the maintenance of the State, the support of the sick, the infirm, the aged, and others incompetent to labor. It is by no means an unusual thing to see banners borne in Socialist processions bearing the legend, "To each the full value of the product of his toil."

Now, this is obviously the ideal of Individualism rather than of Socialism, and its adoption by Socialists can only be accounted for upon the hypothesis that in their eagerness to discover popular watchwords and easy formulas they have lost sight of the principle they wish to advocate, and content themselves with watchwords and formulas which upon analysis prove to be expressions of a very different principle. Whatever the explanation

may be, the fact remains that the principle of giving to each producer the full value of his product, less his share of the necessary social expenditures, is purely individualistic, and, what is more important, quite unscientific and reactionary.

The fundamental fallacy in the principle is obvious enough. Production is too highly socialized to make the precise share of the individual producer a measurable quantity. It is impossible to tell what share of the total value of any modern industrial product is created by the individual worker. In the modern factory the contribution of the individual worker loses its identity. No individual can say of a commodity, "This thing I have made." Specialization and subdivision have made of modern production a collective process. No human intellect could ever determine the share of a particular worker in a particular commodity produced under these conditions.

This individualistic ideal which masquerades as a Socialist ideal is, therefore, an impossible one. The more socialized industry becomes, the more completely will the individual effort lose its identity in the stream of collective effort and the further shall we pass from the state of production which made it possible for the individual worker's exact share in the production of wealth to be determined. Here, in fact, lies the main strength of our appeal to the economic interest of the workers as a class.

So long as individualism in production prevailed, the single worker taking the raw material and fashioning it into a commodity, private ownership of the tools of industry involved neither servitude, upon the one hand, nor the power to exploit labor upon the other hand. Collective ownership of the tools of industry was neither necessary nor practicable. Collective ownership is the necessary outcome of collective production.

There is only one way by which the Socialist State could give to each individual the full value of the product of his labor, namely, by going back to the old hand-labor system of production. But that is unthinkable. We do not want to destroy machinery and social production. Our ideal is not based upon the hope of retrogression. It is rather based upon the hope of further socialization. In other words, we are driven by the logic of economic development ever further from the economic ideal of Individualism toward that of Communism.

Most Socialists feel this to be true, even though they use the old individualistic formula, and speak of Communism as a fuller development of Socialism — a stage higher in the social ascent. Marx himself seems to have shared this view. One of the very few of his utterances upon the subject is contained in his famous letter to Bracke, Liebknecht, Bebel and Auer criticizing the Gotha Pro-

gramme. In that letter he says: "In a higher phase of Communist society, after the servile subordination of individuals to the division of labor and therewith the contrast between intellectual and manual labor, has disappeared; after labor has become not only the means of life, but itself the first necessity of life; after, along with the all-around development of the individual, the forces of production also have grown and all the fountains of confederate wealth flow more freely — only then can the narrow bourgeois horizon of right be wholly crossed, and society inscribe upon its banners: 'From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs'!"

The letter from which these words are taken was written by Marx in criticism of the programme upon which the two factions of the German Socialist movement, the Lassalleans and the Marxists, proposed to unite in 1875. Marx's letter was suppressed by those to whom it was addressed, the unity of the two factions consummated and the programme adopted in spite of his opposition.¹ That programme contained as its opening declaration the following sentence: "*Labor is the source of all wealth*, and of all culture, and since labor is only possible in society and by means of society,

¹ Cf. JOHN SPARGO, *Karl Marx, His Life and Work*, pp. 308-313.

*the uncurtailed returns of labor belong to all members of society with equal right."*¹

Now, something very like this declaration is quite commonly encountered in our Socialist propaganda. How often do we hear it declaimed that "all wealth is produced by labor and, therefore, ought to belong to the laborers." But Marx was never guilty of that error. Nowhere does he attempt to base an argument for Socialism upon the "right of labor" to the whole product of industry. "Labor is not the source of all wealth," he declared in his letter to his German disciples. "Nature is just as much the source of use values (and of such, to be sure, is material wealth composed) as is labor, which itself is but the expression of a natural force, of human labor-power." This is something more than an academic quibble, for Marx goes on to demonstrate that "it is just because of the limitation of labor by natural conditions that it follows that the man who possesses no other property than his labor-power, must in all conditions of society and civilization be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the objective conditions of labor. He can work only by their permission, consequently can live only by their permission."

From time to time there have been many learned attempts to refute Marxian Socialism by

¹ Italics are mine. J. S.

the easy method of demonstrating the impossibility of basing a workable system of distribution upon the principle of giving to each worker the value of his labor-product. The authors of most of these attempts, like many ill-informed Socialists, have made the mistake of supposing that Marx's theory of value must be regarded as the basis of the system of distribution which the Socialist State must adopt. They have taken it for granted that the whole fabric of Socialist society would depend upon the perfect application of the law of value, the exchange of equivalent values. As a matter of fact, Marx's theory of value has no more to do with the method of distribution in the Socialist State than with the length and breadth of the canals of Mars.

The title-page of *Capital*, the great work in which Marx developed his theory of value, contains a suggestive subtitle. It reads, "An Analysis of the Capitalist Mode of Production." This subtitle is a statement of the scope and purpose of the book, and explains much. The only purpose of the book and the theory of value which it sets forth is to analyze and describe the workings of the capitalist system. It has nothing to do with any other system of society. "In the whole chapter on Value in his *Capital*," says Engels, "there is not the slightest hint whether and to what extent this theory of value is applicable to

other forms of society." ¹ Kautsky makes a similar observation and warns us that "There could be no greater error than to consider that one of the tasks of the Socialist society is to see to it that the law of value is brought into perfect operation and that only equivalent values are exchanged." ²

Briefly stated, the Marxian theory of value is simply that, "in those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails," to quote from the opening sentence of *Capital*, the value of a commodity is determined by the labor socially necessary at the time for its production. In other words, it is not the amount of *actual* labor embodied in commodities which determines their value, but *abstract* labor, and, that "abstract" labor is social — the "socially necessary" labor. Clearly we have implied here the impossibility of determining value upon the basis of actual individual labor. Clearly, also, those Socialists who propose to substitute "labor certificates" for money, measuring the value of commodities by the labor time actually consumed in their production, in the belief that they are thus meeting the requirements of the Marxian theory of value, are

¹ F. ENGELS, *Herrn Eugen Dühring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft*, p. 209.

² KARL KAUTSKY, *The Social Revolution*, p. 129.

mistaken. They fail utterly to comprehend that theory.

Now, while it is true that no standard of distribution or method of remunerating labor can be logically deduced from Marx's theory of value, it must be admitted that in his letter upon the Gotha Programme, Marx himself suggested that, pending the development of that "higher phase of Communist society" in which each individual will give according to his ability and take according to his need, the system of distribution might be based upon a system of labor-time checks. He regards all labor as of equal value, hour for hour, and proposes to give the individual certificates representing his full labor-time, minus the necessary deductions for social purposes. There can be no doubt as to the meaning of the following words:

What we have here before us, is a Communist society, not as it has developed up from its own foundation but the reverse, just as it issues from capitalist society; which, therefore, is in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually still encumbered with the mother marks of the old society out of whose lap it has come.

Accordingly, the single producer (after the deduction) receives back exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it, is his individual amount of work. For example, the social workday consists of the sum of individual working hours; the individual working time of the single producer is that part of the social workday furnished by him, his share of it. He receives from society a receipt that he has furnished so and so much work (after deduction of his work for the common

funds) and with this receipt he draws out of the social supply of the means of consumption as much as costs an equal amount of work. The same amount of work which he has given society in one form, he receives back in another form.

Obviously the same principle governs here that regulates the exchange of commodities, in so far as it is the exchange of equal values. Substance and form are changed because under the altered condition no one can give anything except his work and because on the other hand, nothing can become the property of the individual except individual means of consumption.

But in so far as the distribution of the last amongst the single producers is concerned, the same principle governs as in the exchange of equivalent commodities, a certain amount of labor in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labor in another form.

Now this remarkable utterance by the great founder of modern scientific Socialism does not involve the necessity of modifying anything we have said upon the subject. In the first place, it will be observed that Marx does not make the claim that the principle of distribution which he suggests is a necessary application of his theory of value. Such a claim cannot be made for it. There is no necessary connection between the theory of value with its abstract social labor and the crude rule of distribution based upon the easy expedient of regarding all labor as of equal value, hour for hour. In the second place, it will be noted that the scheme of distribution which Marx sketches in his letter conforms to the communistic ideal of equal remuneration, rather than to the individualistic ideal of giving to each worker the value of his product.

"To search for the portion of an individual's labor in a social product is, in the vast majority of cases, like trying to find a needle in a haystack," says Vandervelde.¹ Marx does not waste effort trying to find the needle. He ignores the individualistic ideal, and, recognizing that the fruitfulness of individual labor is largely due to social efforts, past and present, embraces the communistic ideal to the extent of saying that the weak and inefficient worker who labors for a given number of hours must receive as much for his efforts as the strong and efficient worker who labors for the same amount of time, and in that time creates far more value.

It must be confessed that in sketching the system of distribution for the future Marx fell into the old Utopian error of preparing a plan for the reorganization of society according to an abstract principle. His plan does not differ greatly from the "equitable labor exchanges" of Owen and his disciples which ended so disastrously. As an incident of biographical value, illustrating the fact that, like so many other great thinkers, Marx occasionally lapsed into the very error he most vigorously assailed, the forecast of the scheme of distribution which Marx made in his criticism of the Gotha Programme is interesting and worthy of note. But it has no other value.

¹ EMILE VANDERVELDE, *Collectivism*, p. 143.

What, then, is the correct method of approaching this important question, the method of science as distinguished from that of Utopianism?

The true Marxist, the *alpha* and *omega* of whose philosophy is evolution, will not be greatly troubled by this question. The Utopian method is to take some abstract principle and make it the basis of plans and schemes for the arbitrary shaping of social institutions. The scientific method is to take the facts of the present, and, bearing the great central fact of evolution in mind, attempt to discern the tendencies of social and economic development. Whatever forecasts we may make concerning this or any other function of the Socialist State must be logical deductions from the facts of economic and social development, from the realities of the present.

The Socialist State, as we have seen, cannot be other than a development of the existing state. Its methods of production, distribution and exchange must take their rise from the methods developed by capitalist society. Similarly, the methods of remunerating labor must have as their starting point the methods prevailing in capitalist society. From that point they may develop to the point of equal remuneration for all workers, or even to the extreme of free Communism, but with that we are not here and now concerned. The important fact to us is that Socialist society will

inherit from present society a great many social functions, forms and institutions, among them the method of paying wages, unequal in amount, for services rendered. Some of the forms, functions and institutions which the Socialist State inherits it may discard very speedily; others it may retain for a considerable period of time. The Socialist State will not be static. Progress will still be made, and the Socialist State will have its periods of infancy, growth and maturity.

This much we may say with tolerable certainty; at first, and probably for a considerable period of time, wages will be paid for labor — wages unequal in amount and paid in money.¹ What, then, becomes of the shibboleth which we have so long inscribed on our banners, the "abolition of the wage system"? Is not the possibility of retaining the plan of wage payment, for any length of time, inconsistent with that ancient party shibboleth and the ideal it expresses, and suggestive of fatal compromise? To that perfectly just and inevitable question I must answer with an emphatic "No."

The phrase "the abolition of the wage system," which is so frequently used in our literature, must not be interpreted too narrowly. It is very similar to that other phrase, "the abolition

¹ Cf. HILLQUIT, *Socialism in Theory and Practice*, pp. 114-119; KAUTSKY, *The Social Revolution*, pp. 128-135; SPARGO, *Socialism*, pp. 314-316.

of capital," which has troubled so many persons. By the average man, the latter phrase is commonly understood to mean the abolition of money capital, machinery, and capital stock, and he wonders just how production is to be carried on when these are abolished. We have to explain that we do not mean the abolition of the *things* which he calls "capital," but the social relation in which the things are used. In like manner, the average man, when he encounters the phrase, "abolition of the wage system," is very apt to misunderstand it. He concludes that either we want to have each worker barter his surplus product, or a military form of organizing labor, with a regular system of distributing rations and uniforms. He does not understand that by the abolition of wages we mean the abolition of a social relation which is expressed through the form of wages, *the power of the owners of the means of production and exchange to exploit the producers of wealth.*

But that is exactly what is meant. We are no more concerned to abolish the material *form* — wage payment — than we are to abolish the material *things* — money, machinery and production goods — called capital. Just as in the case of capital we hope to abolish the social relation expressed through the medium of the things by socializing the things themselves, so our real purpose is to abolish the social relation expressed

through the form of wages by socializing the form itself, the *thing*. This is the real task of Socialist society, and if we are not going to waste our strength in quixotic assaults upon the non-essential, we shall distinguish between the outward form of the wage system and its inward and social force.

By wages to-day we mean a money payment by one individual to other individuals for the expenditure of labor force directed to certain specified ends. This money payment is not an approximation to the value created by the expenditure of that labor force; indeed, it bears no relation to it as a rule. It is a sum paid in lieu of that value, and is fixed by the competition for labor which goes on among the laborers when the means of production are owned and controlled by others. Under these conditions the money payment tends to approximate the cost of maintaining the workers and their families, rather than the values created. The entire objective of the wage-payer throughout the whole process is the gathering of a value greater than that represented by the wages paid.

Let us suppose, by way of contrast, that we have a democratic state organization of industry. Money payments for work performed still prevail, and the old name "wages" is retained. Wage-payer and wage-receiver now represent the same interest. The objective now is not the enrichment

of one class through the labor of another class, but the good of the State, with which the good of the individual is synonymous. To secure as close an approximation as possible to an equal distribution of the products of labor among all the members of society is the conscious aim of the State. Surely, here we have the socialization of wages, together with the abolition of the wage system as we know it to-day. Of course, the Socialist State might abolish the name "wages" if it chose to do so, but it would be little likely to concern itself with such non-essentials.

We come now to the question of unequal remuneration and the degree to which such inequality is compatible with Socialist principles. Because we admit the possibility of unequal wages in the Socialist régime it does not follow that the present glaring inequalities would be continued. It is impossible to conceive the Socialist State tolerating the extremes represented to-day by the manager with a salary of half a million dollars and the laborer with a wage of a dollar a day. Even if such extremes existed when the degree to which collective ownership in the means of production reached the point at which it became possible to speak of organized society as a Socialist State, they would of necessity soon disappear, for very obvious reasons. In the first place, they would be too repugnant to the democratic sense of justice to be

long tolerated. In the second place, the equalization of opportunity and the abolition of privilege would inevitably result in the development of so many available workers of trained ability for the highest positions that, by the operation of the law of supply and demand, without any action by the State, a great degree of inequality would disappear.

Granting that the ultimate ideal is that of Communism, it follows that in the Socialist State there must be a constant tendency toward *approximate equality of remuneration*. It is not necessary, however, that we should contemplate this being brought about by legislative enactment. The abolition of all the class privileges of to-day, which give the sons and daughters of the well-to-do exceptional advantages and a practical monopoly of the best paid and the most desirable occupations, would enormously increase the available supply of workers for all such occupations. By the equalization of opportunity the Socialist State would create a force which would automatically operate to equalize remuneration by increasing the number of competitors for the positions which demand relatively high intellectual and educational requirements, and lessening the competition for the positions requiring relatively low intellectual and educational qualifications.

The standardization of salaries which is becom-

ing more general every year may prove to be one of the steps toward the solution of the problem. It is quite probable that there will be a gradation of occupations according to their social utility and the relative degrees of ability demanded by them, wages being fixed accordingly. Thus wages will be determined by the standard of social utility, determined, ultimately, by (a) the relation of supply to demand, and (b) ability, fitness for particular work, including what the economists call pain-cost — the labor and sacrifice involved in acquiring the requisite fitness. There is every reason to believe that, within a reasonable period of time, the operation of the law of supply and demand would result in approximate equality of income. In any case, whatever degree of inequality might persist, it is certain that the gross inequalities of to-day would disappear; there would be no exploitation of class by class, and the worker would find the rewards of collective service infinitely richer and more justly distributed than the workers in capitalist society ever knew.

We must not fall into the error of supposing that the operation of the law of supply and demand in the Socialist régime can be compared to the blind force which drives us on in our present economic chance-world. In a society in which the social agencies of production and exchange are collectively owned and democratically governed,

and in which there is no privileged class, but a perfect communism of opportunity, the free choice of the citizens, bounded only by the limitations imposed upon them by nature, expresses itself in the relation of supply and demand. But in our present society, with the social agencies of production and exchange owned and controlled by a class, with privilege enthroned and opportunity to develop denied to the mass of mankind, there is no free choice for the majority of citizens. To the limitations imposed upon individuals by nature are added the limitations arising from economic dependence, including artificially arrested intellectual development and all that it implies. Under such conditions, the law of supply and demand is simply a blind force which adds to the oppression of the workers and to the confusion and chaos of our economic chance-world.

Finally, we must consider briefly the medium of distribution, money. Through the whole fabric of our Socialist literature there runs the thread of open hostility to money as a medium of distribution. From the angry outbursts against the "yellow relic of barbarism," and the energy and ingenuity expended in devising substitutes for money, we might almost conclude that Socialism depends upon a revision of the well-known and oft-quoted Pauline dictum to read "money is the root of all evil." Babeuf's equal distribution of concrete

consumption goods, Owen's "Equitable Labor Exchange Banks," the elaborate and ingenious system of labor certificates devised by Rodbertus, the credit cards of Bellamy and the store checks of Edmond Kelly, all indicate a profound conviction that money must be abolished by the Socialist State.

It is easy enough to understand the belief of the old Utopian Socialists to whom Socialism meant absolute equality, that money must be ruled out of the Socialist commonwealth. It is not easy, however, to understand the prevalence of that belief among Socialists of the modern school, except as an inherited tradition to which they cling with the proverbial conservatism of reformers and radicals. There is no reason why collective ownership and democratic control of production and exchange should be made dependent upon the substitution of some other circulating medium for money. It is true that in his polemic against Dühring, Engels argued that the retention of money in Dühring's Utopia was a fatal defect, that money must lead to "the resurrection of high finance."¹ He considers money with all the functions it possesses in capitalist society. Thrift upon the one hand and extravagance upon the other would lead to usury and, therefore, to enormous inequality and exploi-

¹ F. ENGELS, *Landmarks of Scientific Socialism* (Anti-Dühring), translated by Austin Lewis, pp. 248-250.

tation. Curiously enough, he does not consider the possibility of the State so thoroughly monopolizing the credit functions as to make it impossible for private usury to exist to any considerable extent. Yet it is obvious that a Socialist State could loan money to its members at a rate of interest so nominal and inconsiderable that the extent of exploitation through private usury would necessarily become incidental and insignificant. Moreover, an effective and economical system of insurance against loss through the exercise of this function would be possible for the State.

The position of Kautsky upon this question is entirely consistent with the Socialist philosophy. Indeed, it might with reason be claimed for it, that it is the only position which is wholly justified by the evolutionary philosophy of Socialism. Money is a creature of private property. Not until the rise of private property as a dominant social institution was a monetary system necessary. Should private property disappear and its place be taken by pure Communism, money will also disappear. But Socialism is not Communism: it does not aim at the abolition of private property. It is by no means certain, therefore, that money will be abolished. It may well be that the continuance of that degree of private property which is compatible with Socialism, and an essential feature of it, will involve the continuance of money,

even though some of its present functions may be modified or entirely abolished.

In the British Museum one may see arranged in periods on a series of boards the gold and silver coins of all ages. These collections bear interesting testimony to the fact that all civilized nations have experienced the need of some convenient mediums for the expression of value in terms of price, and have with notable uniformity developed monetary systems based upon the precious metals.¹ Now, just as it is exceedingly unlikely that the Socialist State will be able to *abolish* the wage form of payment for labor, though it may *outgrow* it, so, from the evolutionary point of view it seems unlikely that it will be able to abolish money, though it may outgrow it.

This is the view of Kautsky: "Money is the simplest means known up to the present time which makes it possible in as complicated a mechanism as that of the modern productive process, with its tremendous far-reaching divisions of labor, to secure the circulation of products and their distribution to the members of society. It is the means which makes it possible for each one to satisfy his necessities according to his individual inclination (to be sure within the bounds of his economic power). *As a means to such circulation*

¹ ROBERT BARCLAY, *Disturbance in the Standard of Value*, Ch. I.

money will be found indispensable until something better is discovered. To be sure many of its functions, especially that of the measure of value, will disappear, at least in internal commerce.”¹ Money thus becomes practically “token money,” and in place of the regulation of production by the exchange of money values it will be possible for society to evolve a method of conscious social regulation. The important point to be remembered is that the Socialist State will take that which capitalist society has developed and, in the light of experience, gradually transform it.

¹ KARL KAUTSKY, *The Social Revolution*, p. 129. (The italics are mine. J. S.)

VIII

INCENTIVE UNDER SOCIALISM

I

CLOSELY allied to the question of the remuneration of labor, but more far-reaching, is the question of incentive. Terrible prophecies are made concerning the Socialist régime by the enemies of Socialism. We are solemnly assured that at best the Socialist State can only permit a "common level of achievement," that in ordinary productive labor the motives to exertion will be impaired and progress retarded. The volume of production will be lessened, and, therefore, the standard of comfort will be lower than to-day, at least so far as the efficient producers are concerned.

Before proceeding to the larger aspects of the question, the incentive to genius, let us examine the question in its simpler aspects, its bearing upon ordinary economic production. The dire prediction that the motives to exertion will be so impaired as to lessen the volume of production rests upon the twin assumptions that the Socialist State

must reward equally the lazy and the industrious, the efficient worker and the inefficient worker, and that human nature is so selfish and unsocial that under such conditions the laborers would shirk their duty. The whole argument is very clearly and forcibly stated by Mr. John Rae in the following words:

“What is the ideal of the working class? It may be said to be that they shall share *pari passu* in the progressive conquests of civilization, and grow in comfort and refinement of life as other classes of the community have done. Now this involves two things—first, progress; second, diffusion of progress; and Socialism is so intent on the second that it fails to see how completely it would cut the springs of the first. Some of its adherents do assert that production would be increased and progress accelerated under a socialistic economy, but they offer nothing in support of the assertion, and certainly our past experience of human nature would lead us to expect precisely the opposite result. The incentives and energy of production would be relaxed. I have already spoken of the loss that would probably be sustained in exchanging the interested zeal and keen eye of the responsible capitalist employer for the perfunctory administration of a state officer. A like loss would be suffered from lightening the responsibility of the laborers and lessening their power of acquisition. Under a Socialist régime they cannot by any merit acquire more property than they enjoy in daily use, *and they cannot by any fault fail to possess that*. Now, Socialist laborers are not supposed, any more than Socialist officials, to be angels from heaven; they are to carry on the work of society with the ordinary human nature which we at present possess; and in circumstances like those just described, unstirred either by hope or fear, our ordinary human nature would undoubtedly take its ease and bask contentedly in the kind providence of the State which relieved it of all necessity of taking thought or pains. The inevitable

result would be a great diminution of production, which, with a rapidly increasing population (and Socialism generally scouts the idea of restraining it), would soon prove seriously embarrassing, and could only be obviated by a resort to the lash; in a word, by a return to industrial slavery. Now, with a lessening production, progress is clearly impossible, *and the more evenly the produce was distributed, the more certain would be the general decline.*"¹

It will be seen that the entire argument is pivoted upon the assumption that the Socialist State must establish a uniform reward for all kinds of labor, paying as much to the laziest producers as to the most industrious. We are assured that no amount of merit can increase, and no fault lessen, the income to which the worker will be entitled. Now, even if we grant the contention which Mr. Rae bases upon this assumption, the case for Socialism is not affected in the slightest degree. The argument has no bearing upon Socialism. It may or may not be valid against Communism, to which it relates, but with Socialism it has nothing to do.

Socialism, considered objectively, means simply the collective ownership and democratic management of the means of production, distribution and exchange to the extent which may be necessary to prevent the exploitation of the producers by non-producers owning and controlling the means of pro-

¹ JOHN RAE, *Contemporary Socialism*, 3rd edition, (1901), p. 333. (*Italics mine.* J. S.)

duction. There is nothing involved in that principle which necessarily precludes the payment of special rewards for special services; nothing which precludes the establishment by society of a minimum standard of efficiency and accomplishment in every occupation; nothing which precludes the possibility of imposing heavy penalties upon those who fail to attain the required standard of efficiency and attainment.

There is no incentive known to capitalist society, no force impelling men to labor with diligence, of which the Socialist State may not avail itself if it so desires. Payments based upon units of result rather than upon units of time consumed and prizes for exceptional work will not be impossible regulations should they be found necessary. Even the penalty of hunger, which capitalism inflicts upon workless proletarians when they have sought work with eager desire, will be available as a penalty to be inflicted upon those who refuse to work, if any such there be. At the very worst, then, a Socialist society would be able to avail itself of every form of incentive which capitalism has ever enjoyed. That the incentives we have named will not be necessary it is our privilege to believe. It is enough that we concede to our opponents that they may be found necessary, and point to the fact that in that event they will be available.

It may be contended, however, that the objection still retains a certain and not inconsiderable validity by reason of the fact that we admit that Socialism tends toward the Communist ideal of equal remuneration. Admitting that Seattle is nearer Alaska than Chicago is, it does not follow that objections which may be perfectly valid against a proposition to go to Alaska are valid against a proposition to go to Seattle. We will not take refuge in this analogy, however, but frankly face the argument. The defense of Communism does not devolve upon us, but, so far as the problem of efficient incentive is concerned, that would be an easy task as compared with the defense of capitalism.

It is upon the alleged limitations of "human nature" that *a priori* condemnation of the Communist ideal rests. It is a remarkable fact that all those critics who reason after the fashion of Mr. Rae, no matter how loudly they declare themselves to be evolutionists, completely ignore the evolutionary view point when they discuss "human nature." With a degree of unanimity that is as significant as it is striking, they all regard "human nature" as something fixed and unchanging; something which is not materially influenced by environment or by the general progress of mankind. According to this view, certain qualities and instincts predominate in human life in every age,

and are not capable of development, control or suppression. "Human nature is unchanging," we are told.

The Socialist accepts the opposite view of evolution. That which is vaguely called "human nature" is nothing more than the fundamental instinct of self-preservation which man enjoys in common with the lower animals. To that extent it is true that human nature is selfish. But in its expression it varies greatly according to environmental conditions, education, intellectual and moral development, and so on. Watch the fierce struggle that goes on when food is brought to a starving mob and each heart is filled with the fear that there will not be enough to go around. Under such conditions men and women will fight as beasts fight, and their selfishness will lead them to brutal frenzy. But watch a crowd of men and women in a fashionable hotel, where there is an assurance of plenty for all. Under such conditions men and women will be exceedingly courteous and gentle toward each other, and find self-satisfaction in their courtesy and gentleness. Shall we say that their selfishness is less than that of the hungry men and women of the mob? Or shall we not rather say that their selfishness, their self-interested conduct, is upon a higher plane, the plane of their superior environment?

In either case, the argument of the opponents of

Stuart Mill long ago pointed out, *only a very small part of the production of civilized nations is now carried on by individual producers for their own benefit*. Nearly all of the work of modern society is done for wages or salaries, and by far the greater part of production is carried on by collective labor. Mill wrote more than sixty years ago, answering the objection as applied to Communism in production and consumption goods, but his argument is equally valid to-day against the objection as applied to Socialism.

"The objection supposes that honest and efficient labor is only to be had from those who are themselves individually to reap the benefit of their own exertions. But how small a part of all the labor performed in England, from the lowest paid to the highest is done by persons working for their own benefit. From the Irish reaper or hodman to the chief justice or the minister of state, nearly all the work of society is remunerated by day wages or fixed salaries. A factory operative has less personal interest in his work than a member of a Communist association, since he is not, like him, working for a partnership of which he is himself a member. . . . I am not undervaluing the strength of the incitement given to labor when the whole or a large share of the benefit of extra exertion belongs to the laborer. But under the present system of industry this incitement, in the great majority of cases, does not exist. If Communistic labor might be less vigorous than that of a peasant proprietor, or a workman laboring on his own account, it would probably be more energetic than that of a laborer for hire, who has no personal interest in the matter at all. The neglect of the uneducated classes of laborers for hire, of the duties which they engage to perform, is, in the present state of society, most flagrant. Now it is an admitted condition of the Communist scheme that all shall be educated, and this

being supposed, the duties of the members of the association would doubtless be as diligently performed as those of the generality of salaried officers in the middle or higher classes who are not supposed to be necessarily unfaithful to their trust, because so long as they are not dismissed, their pay is the same in however lax a manner their duty is fulfilled. Undoubtedly, as a general rule, remuneration by fixed salaries does not in any class of functionaries produce the maximum of zeal; and this is as much as can be reasonably alleged against Communistic labor.¹

Mill's statement is admirable and quite unanswerable. Even if we grant to our opponents their contention that collective labor does not offer the individual the incentive to exert himself to the full extent of his powers which is provided by individual labor for the direct benefit of the laborer, their case is not strengthened, neither is our case weakened. The objection they make against Socialism is quite as valid against the present system, for only an insignificant part of the productive labor of the modern world is performed by individuals working for their own benefit.

We may well go further than this, and say that the objection must of necessity possess the greater force when directed against the existing capitalist system. The average wage-laborer has not the incentive of working for his own gain. He knows that any extra exertion upon his part will only increase the gain of others. His interest, therefore,

¹ JOHN STUART MILL, *Principles of Political Economy*, Third Edition, Book II, Chap. I.

is to do the smallest amount of work which the employer can be forced to accept. As Adam Smith long ago pointed out in the *Wealth of Nations*,¹ there is an antagonism of interest between the worker and the employer in consequence of this condition. To a very considerable extent this has been recognized by our critics, and schemes of profit-sharing have been devised to increase the incentive of the laborers. Thus Professor Gilman bases his advocacy of profit-sharing upon the fact that, "the wage-system, viewed in its simplest form of time-wages, does not supply the necessary motives for the workman to do his best."²

With that curious illogicality which characterizes so much of his writing upon questions of industrial economy, that canny Scot, Mr. Andrew Carnegie, declares himself to be an Individualist and bitterly opposes Socialism, while at the same time he urges the need of profit-sharing to increase the incentive to labor, going even to the limit of advocating the abolition of the wage-system. He quotes with approval John Stuart Mill's declaration that, "The form of association, however, which, if mankind continue to improve, must be expected in the end to predominate, is not that which can exist between a capitalist as chief and work-

¹ Bk. I, Chap. VIII.

² N. P. GILMAN, *Profit Sharing*, p. 62.

people without a voice in the management, but *the association of the laborers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected and removable by themselves.*" He is "convinced that this is to be the highly satisfactory and final solution."¹

No attempt has been made to explain why the logical extension of the profit-sharing method of increasing incentive, to the extent of making the producers equal partners in production and distribution, should destroy incentive. Keeping upon the ground of self-interest which our critics have chosen, it would appear to be almost axiomatic that a thousand men working at fixed wages for a great corporation, and knowing that some non-producers expect to derive a profit as a result of their labor, are far less likely to exert themselves to the maximum of their capacity than they would be if all the benefits of such extra exertions as they might make were to become their property, to be distributed in accordance with their common agreement. In actual practice this has been demonstrated times without number. The sloth and indifference of the average day laborer and the dili-

¹ Cf. ANDREW CARNEGIE, *Problems of To-Day*, pp. 51-82.

The passage quoted is from MILL's *Principles of Political Economy*, People's Edition, p. 465.

gence of the workers in coöperative workshops is a familiar contrast.

It may be said that we have overlooked the important fact that capitalist society provides a force which tends to increase the productivity of labor, which would not be possible in the Socialist State, namely, the vigilance of superintendence by the employer. But, here, also, we are confronted by the fact that this has become the function of a salaried class. If the advantages of good salaries and responsible and authoritative positions are sufficiently powerful incentives to induce men with a talent and capacity for directing labor to stimulate those whose labor they direct to exert themselves to the uttermost, why are we to suppose that similar incentives offered by the community would fail to induce at least an equal effort, especially when there would be the added incentive of an equal share in the benefits resulting from the increase of production? To-day, as a result of the instinctive recognition of the separation of class interests, there exists a sort of freemasonry of the workers. The rapid worker is always unpopular among his fellow workers; the slothful worker who is constantly malingering and idling away his time has only the superintendent to fear. Is it not reasonable to suppose that the sense of social loss which such conduct must incur would supplement the forces deterring it, that, in the words of

Mill,¹ "it must be remembered that in a Socialist farm or manufactory, each laborer would be under the eye not of one master, but of the whole community"?

There is a widespread belief that laborers in the employ of the public do not labor with the assiduity and efficiency of laborers employed in ordinary industrial establishments. From this fact — if fact it be — the inference is drawn that private employers can command more efficient and industrious service than the Socialist State could command, even though the latter offered the incentive of a participation by the individual producer as a citizen in the social gain from increased production, an incentive the former does not offer. This argument comes nearer than any other offered by our opponents to being an appeal to fact. Let us, then, pay it the attention it deserves.

As to the fact itself we are by no means certain. No conclusive study of the subject seems ever to have been made. We are, to a large extent, dependent upon that most unreliable of all authorities, general observation. Laborers in our public parks, for example, are seen to be working very leisurely, or even loafing in obscure corners. The average taxpayer, just because he feels that to some vague degree he is one of the employers of

¹ JOHN STUART MILL, *Principles of Political Economy*, Third Edition, B. II, Ch. I.

these laborers, and a victim of their idleness, specially observes what, had the men been laborers on a private estate, he would not have observed at all. It may be very much doubted whether, having regard both to the quantity and the quality of the work done, public employment would suffer by comparison with private employment.

A bricklayer employed by a speculative builder whose aim is to get as much profit as possible, and who will be content with the poorest work which can be disposed of, will lay more bricks per hour than one employed by a public authority whose principal aim is to get good work. We might cite a hundred illustrations of this principle. It is a significant fact that the great English municipalities have been able to compete successfully with the private contractor. The London County Council, for example, has repeatedly demonstrated that great undertakings can be carried out by the public bodies at a less cost than the lowest bid by a private contractor, even though higher wages are paid than by private contractors and a better class of work secured. Likewise, in Washington, D. C., some years ago, an exhaustive test showed that direct employment was a far cheaper method of street cleaning than the contract system. Even though the street-cleaning department paid its laborers twenty-five per cent. higher wages than the contractors paid, the cost per thousand yards

was only eighteen cents as against thirty-two cents under the contract system, a difference of eighty per cent.¹

The success of the United States Government in that greatest engineering task of modern times, the Panama Canal, is another illustration of the power of collective authorities to secure as good results as the most efficient capitalist employers.

But even if this were not the case, if it could be demonstrated that, as a rule, public employment does not call forth the same degree of industry and efficiency on the part of the laborers that private employment does, it would be foolish to infer from that fact that the Socialist State must fail to command as efficient and industrious service as capitalist employers do. The fallacy is obvious. To-day capitalist industry is predominant. It commands the genius of administration, and direction to a very large extent because the State, while it retains its present character and keeps out of industrial enterprise as far as possible, is not and cannot be a competitor. Does any one profess to believe that if the State adopted a new policy and entered into competition with the capitalists it could not secure its full share of that genius?

We may at this point conveniently and ad-

¹ *Report of the Superintendent of the Street Cleaning Department of the District of Columbia, Sept. 20, 1899.*

vantageously summarize our discussion of the objection that the volume of ordinary economic production will be seriously lessened because of the impairment of the incentive to labor. We have seen that the objection is based upon the erroneous assumption that Socialism involves equal remuneration of all, regardless of the service performed. This, however, is not Socialism but Communism. There is no reason why the Socialist State should not avail itself of every incentive which operates to-day. It can give special rewards for special services, and it can force the lazy man to labor. Whatever strength the objection has when applied to Socialism is increased when applied to present conditions. Socialism simply adds new incentives to those existing. Whereas to-day the great majority of workers for an individual employer or a corporation instinctively realize that they cannot improve their position by increasing their exertions, and so rarely do more than they are compelled to do, the workers in a coöperative factory know that every increase of production operates to their mutual advantage, and the knowledge stimulates their energies and spurs them on. Thus, the self-interest which, for the laborer, is largely destroyed by capitalist production, reappears in a new form in coöperative production. In this form it would be still more developed under Socialism. So far from anticipating a decrease of productive effi-

ciency under Socialism, we may fairly predict the opposite result.

II

Some of our critics freely admit that it would not be impossible for a Socialist society so to organize its economic system as to avoid lessening the volume of production and lowering the standard of comfort. But these same critics urge that it would be found necessary to repress those forms of individuality and initiative which are essential conditions of progress. A high degree of comfort might be attained by an effective organization of the productive forces already developed by capitalism, but at the expense of repressing the higher forms of individuality which make growth possible, and reducing all to a dead level of mediocrity. It would stop the development of art and science in all their varied forms, and, in particular, stifle the inventive spirit of mankind.

This objection also rests upon the assumption that the equal and uniform reward of all forms of service is a fundamental condition of Socialism. We need not repeat the demonstration of the fallacy of the assumption. We may, however, with profit consider the objection from another point of view, namely, the overvaluation of the motive of material gain as an incentive. Is it true that the greatest incentive to progress is the desire of

individuals to secure and enjoy exceptional material advantages, to pile up riches? Put bluntly, the question is whether greed is the chief inspiration of progress, of humanity's noblest achievements in art, science, literature, philosophy, statecraft and invention.

We may safely assert that there has never been another age in all human history in which the desire for material gain and advantage has been as powerful as it has been throughout the age of capitalism. This is not difficult to understand. Capitalism is essentially the era of materialism. The amassing of fortune typifies success in the dominant form of human enterprise. To a very large degree, the test of success or failure in life is the amount of material wealth which an individual amasses. Under these conditions, it is natural that the value of material gain as an incentive should be overemphasized and overrated. Certainly, we are justified in saying that this form of incentive attains its maximum force in capitalist society.

But, even under these conditions, greed is by no means the most powerful of the incentives to human effort. Even the man of business who keeps on piling up wealth long after the point of satiety has been reached, until, as in the case of some of our modern financial kings, wealth becomes *illth*, as oppressive as the gold of Midas, is urged on by some other force than the passion to obtain

more of that which he already possesses in superabundance. Pride in achievement, the glory of success in the characteristic struggle of the time and love of power are the real motives which are masked by the hoarded wealth. When the point of satiety is reached, all further acquisition is useless and burdensome. After his physical and intellectual wants have been supplied, the normal man of business values the money he gains only as the Olympic victor valued the laurel wreath. It is a symbol and sign of victory in a great contest. The lavish public gifts of our multimillionaires prove how highly they value the approbation and esteem of their fellow men over mere money.

Greed, the passion for material gain, is far more powerful as an incentive to evil and anti-social conduct than as an incentive to great creative work in art, science or invention. As an incentive to crime and wrong-doing it can hardly be overestimated. It has inspired the wars of conquest and spoliation which have reddened the earth with blood; it has been the incentive to murders and thefts innumerable; it has inspired those who have corrupted our legislators and judges and have devised schemes enabling the great corporations to exploit and oppress the people, and to defeat the laws enacted for the people's protection. Greed has caused the adulteration of food for profit; the building of houses and factories which are firetraps

and fever-dens; the prostitution of press, pulpit and class-room and the traffic in vice.

Society does not hesitate to repress the incentive of gain in these, its most numerous, manifestations. No matter how much ingenuity may be represented by the tools of the burglar, the weapons of the highwayman, or the adulterations of the chemist; no matter how much skill or daring the corruption of legislatures and courts may require, self-protection leads society to repress all such manifestations of that incentive to gain which we are asked to worship.

On the other hand, the desire for material gain is not an effective incentive to great achievements in art, science, invention or statesmanship. It is one of the commonplaces of criticism that the aim to make money is fatal to art. So long as Millais was inspired by the artist's passion for self-expression his work was noble and worthy, but when, for the sake of money, he turned to the production of soap advertisements, his work became pitiful and poor. So long as Scott wrote merely because he was overpowered by that master passion for self-expression, the creative impulse which gives birth to all great and enduring art, he was an artist and his work was in its warp and woof woven of immortality. But when poverty and debt compelled him to write for money, he ceased to be more than an uninspired literary drudge.

To cite only one other example, who among all his admirers would not gladly blot out of existence the works which Mark Twain wrote under similar pressure?

If there is one fact to which the history of the intellectual advance of mankind bears indisputable testimony, it is that desire for material gain never inspired the highest and best work of poet or painter, sculptor or prose-writer. Money cannot buy the genius essential to the making of a great picture like Leonardo's dramatic masterpiece, "The Last Supper," or a piece of sculpture like Angelo's "Pieta," or a poem like Tennyson's "In Memoriam." That which made possible Shelley's "To a Skylark" was not the prospect of a good sale for the poem, but a passion for utterance, for self-expression akin to that which forced the skylark itself to sing

"In profuse strains of unpremeditated art."

So long as human lives are bounded by birth and death; so long as love and hate, fear and faith, reverence and wonder, joy and sorrow, knowledge and mystery remain to human experience, so long will art endure. Never while these feelings and emotions find lodgment in the human heart will poets, painters, sculptors, musicians and dramatists fail to find means of expressing them.

Far from being the main incentive to great art,

love of material gain is art's deadliest foe, as it is the foe of all great individual genius. Had they thought more of gaining wealth than of nobly expressing that which burned within them, Richard Wagner would have never composed his great music-dramas and Jean François Millet would never have painted his peasant figures. Both endured poverty and hardship, to say nothing of ridicule and persecution. Each might have found wealth and ease, Wagner by composing "pretty" music and Millet by painting "pretty" pictures, but each took the opposite road of sacrifice, the way to immortal fame.

It is not too much to say that whatever art the modern world has produced has been produced despite the commercial spirit of greed, not because of it. The inequalities of opportunity so characteristic of capitalist society have stifled an incalculable amount of human genius. No man can know — no thoughtful and sensitive mind dare contemplate — the almost infinite amount of genius which has been borne to death and silence upon the merciless tide of poverty. Then, too, commercialism has perverted genius, and many a soul with a vision which in an age less dominated by the passion for material gain would have bequeathed a noble heritage to posterity has spent itself in the market place.

Perhaps it is the perception of these things which leads so many poets and artists to Socialism. Supreme individualists in the sense that for them opportunity for self-expression is life itself, they easily perceive that which we in our lower planes of existence cannot always see, the fact that individuality flourishes best under a communism of opportunity. A society in which privilege finds no place, in which there is neither stultifying idleness nor deadening overwork, in which there is material comfort with healthful labor and ample leisure, is surely a better soil for art, than the society of to-day! Shall we content ourselves with the vain hypothesis of "coincidence" to explain that during the one hundred and fifty years when Athens came nearest to the fulfillment of the ideal we have sketched, except for her slave population, she reached that zenith of culture and genius which has never been equaled in the world? Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, among philosophers; Æschylus and Sophocles, among dramatists; Phidias and Praxiteles, among sculptors; Demosthenes and Æschines, among orators; Pericles and Cimon, among statesmen — all these, and numerous other great figures in Greek history, belong to that period in the life of Athens which was characterized by an elaborate system of public ownership and, for all above the slave class, a

communism of opportunity without parallel in history.¹

We must not forget that the great art of the past was, as a rule, intended for social enjoyment. It is sadly out of place in the private galleries of our modern plutocrats! Only rarely was a great painting or piece of sculpture produced for the selfish enjoyment and gratification of individuals. The highest art had a social inspiration and purpose. Giotto's glorious Campanile and its delicately carved bas-reliefs; Angelo's wonderful paintings on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel and his splendid statues on the Medicean tombs and Raphael's matchless cartoons for the Vatican are all illustrations of this important fact. As with the great cathedrals — Notre Dame de Paris, for example, — religion, a social force, was equally blended in the greatest art of all time.

It would be verging upon charlatanry to suggest that Socialism will give the artist an open and easy way to glory and immortality. Doubtless in the Socialist society of the future, as in all past ages, genius will strike out new paths amid the derisive clamor of short-sighted doubters. New art-forms will be mocked, assailed, studied, praised and revered in turn. But there will always be

¹ See the interesting articles on this subject by my friend, REV. W. D. P. BLISS, *The Outlook*, Nov. 11, 1905, and by PROF. T. D. SEYMOUR, in *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, Nov., 1907.

a chance for the artist to make a living while still pursuing the Holy Grail of art, a chance to earn a living by labor which will leave leisure and strength for art. Perhaps this is the ideal, this union of art and labor in the same person. The great Florentines, Angelo and Leonardo, were not merely artists. In our own generation William Morris has shown that union of craftsman and artist to be possible.

So much for the artist whose work wins no recognition, or wins recognition slowly. He will be able to earn his living at some task for which he feels fitted, and in his leisure paint pictures, carve statues, compose music or write poems to gratify himself, as Leonardo painted the "Gioconda." He will be far better off than such an artist can be to-day, when to earn a living by labor means the abandonment of art in all but rare cases, because the labor leaves neither leisure nor strength for art, and when to earn a living otherwise involves the prostitution of art.

The hope of art lies in democracy and the equalization of material and cultural advantages. "Our inequality materializes our upper class, vulgarizes our middle class, brutalizes our lower class," cried Matthew Arnold. Sweep away this inequality and the instinctive folk-love of beauty will assert itself in a great revolt against ugliness in life and labor, and a demand for beautiful homes

to live in and at least pleasant places to work in. It is inconceivable that once economic servitude has been dispelled, and a communism of opportunity realized, the people will be content to live in the ugly dens of our cities, or to labor in the cheerless and gloomy prison-pens of modern industry. A social demand for beauty will be developed which will give spur and opportunity to talent and genius.

The instinct of the masses is keener in its perception of art than is generally recognized, far keener than the educated "taste" of the convention-bound privileged classes. Folk-song and folk-dance, outpourings of the instinctive sense of beauty of simple peasants, compel our admiration to-day and defy our efforts to surpass them in grace and simple beauty. Nor is it without significance that when Wagner in music, Ibsen in the drama, Whitman in poetry, Millet in painting and Meunier in sculpture — to name only a few of the great moderns — were mocked and derided by the critics, who reflected the standards of conventional education and taste, they were understood and appreciated by the working people in America and Europe who were consciously striving toward the democratic ideal.

Without entering the forbidden land of Utopian fancy, there are some things which may be said with assurance concerning art in the Socialist so-

ciety of the future. The destruction of privilege and inequality will put an end to the waste and repression of genius by poverty and to the degradation of art by commercialism. It will stimulate art in all its forms by extending leisure and cultural opportunities to millions of men and women to whom these are now denied. The demand for beautiful surroundings will inevitably lead to the elevation of the allied arts of painting, sculpture and architecture. So much we may confidently forecast, for democracy triumphant will not socialize the processes of production and distribution merely, but all the advantages which material wealth now makes possible only for the few. And of these the glories of art are among the greatest and best.

Just as in the Middle Ages the services of the great artists were enlisted by royalty and the Church, so the future may see the greatest artists enlisted in the collective service, great cities competing against each other for the honor of being served by the Angelos, Titians and Raphaels of the time. In place of the patronage of the noble, the masters of art will depend upon the collective pride and interest in beauty of all the citizens. Surely, this is not a vain dream! Already, much of the most significant art is produced in the collective service, such as the work of Edwin A. Abbey in the Boston library, of John W. Alexander

and Elihu Vedder in the Congressional Library at Washington and of George Grey Barnard upon the State Capitol of Pennsylvania.

Nor need we fear that the inventive spirit will be crushed so that men will cease to invent new devices and methods of lessening the labor of production. The Socialist State could, if necessary, offer far greater material prizes as incentives to invention than any other form of society. But for the inventor no less than for the artist there are other incentives far more powerful than the desire for material gain. First of all, there is the passion for achievement, the creative impulse, which is irrepressible and unconquerable. "We do not possess our ideas; we are possessed by them," says Heine somewhere. This is especially true of inventors. When we read of the struggles of most of the great inventors against ridicule and poverty it becomes evident that they were mastered by their ideas, and not deliberately seeking material gain. Can we contemplate the picture of Palissy, the potter, starving with his wife and little ones, burning his furniture in his desperate attempt to perfect the glaze which has made his work immortal, and suppose that his incentive was a desire for material gain? Are we not rather compelled to recognize that he was urged by that mightiest of all forces, the creative impulse, and that he could no more help himself

than the toy balloon caught in a gale? The versatile Morse, inventor of the telegraph, deliberately abandoning his artistic career, struggling in poverty and debt, often lacking the necessities of life, illustrates the same great fact.

The great inventors, like their unsuccessful brethren who give their lives to the vain attempt to discover and apply "perpetual motion," have been inspired not so much by the hope of material gain as by the passion for achievement, the anticipation of conferring great benefits upon mankind and of winning fame and honor thereby. For all forms of genius, the attainment of a great end, love of creative work, the desire to benefit mankind, and the hope of winning honor and glory have been far more powerful incentives than the expectation of material reward. In a society of pure Communism, Newton, Faraday, Ohm, Morse, Edison, Jenner, Koch, and all the rest of the great multitude to whom we are indebted for the enlargement of "man's kingdom in the universe," would have found ample incentive as surely as Æschylus, Praxiteles and Pericles found incentive in an age which offered no great money rewards to genius.

So much belongs to the primary stage of our Socialist propaganda. We must pass to another stage and discern, if possible, what tendencies there are in modern social development which

indicate the growing capacity of society as its functions become more and more socialized to provide the necessary stimulus and opportunity for the inventor. Will invention be left to the chances of individual genius and inspiration, or will it be socially organized? And if it is to be socially organized what assurance have we of the competence of the Socialist State to assume that function?

Questions like these bring us face to face with the important and neglected fact that invention is much more dependent upon social forces, and much less dependent upon individual talent, than is generally recognized. The great basic inventions and discoveries were made either under tribal Communism or in a state of society so close to tribal Communism that private property had scarcely acquired any power. What would the modern world have been without the wheel, the boat, the sail, the rudder, the lever, and, above all, without fire? Yet we owe these and numerous other inventions upon which practically all our mechanical appliances rest to primitive Communism. Each age has inherited and improved upon the inventions and discoveries of all the ages before it.

Even those great inventions which most strikingly manifest individual genius cannot rightly be regarded as individual productions. They are social in the truest sense of the word. The indi-

vidual inventor has taken the crude invention of one age, and, guided by the experiments of others, and by the need which social experience has revealed, has made improvements which other inventors, likewise guided, have improved upon in their turn. The modern Hoe printing press, for example, represents not a single invention by one mind, but numberless inventions by inventors known and unknown, including the unknown inventor who under primitive Communism developed the idea of the wheel from the rolling log, and the unknown barbarian who first smelted metal.

But spontaneous and unsystematized individual inventive effort has proven to be inadequate, even for capitalist production. It has been discovered that there is no need for society to depend upon haphazard invention. The fact has been established that the faculty of inventiveness is much more widely diffused than was formerly supposed, and the further fact that it can be trained and developed has likewise been established. Invention has been commercialized. It is now a recognized profession. In connection with our great manufacturing establishments well equipped laboratories are now maintained, some of them employing scores of men and women, for the special purpose of improving mechanical appliances, devising new methods of production, and so on.

Instead of Edison the individual inventor, we now have the great laboratory with its paid force of workers in which electrical problems are grappled with and solved. The modern manufacturer of textiles who finds difficulties in the dyeing of certain fabrics, for example, is not dependent as his predecessor was upon the chance discovery of a solution by himself or another to whom he will be compelled to pay royalties for the use of the process. If he does not maintain an experimental laboratory in connection with his establishment, he can refer his difficulties to professional experimental chemists who maintain a laboratory and employ a large staff for such work. Invention is thus being reduced to scientific method and organization.

There is no more reason, therefore, to fear that the Socialist State will fail here than in any other branch of enterprise. Here, as elsewhere, the exigencies of capitalist development have opened a way for the Socialist State. There is no reason for supposing that what a great corporation can do in the way of stimulating and organizing invention the State could not do. It could build and equip great laboratories in all industrial centers, and, as a result of the equalization of educational and other advantages, it could command a vastly greater amount of talent and ambition than

has ever been at the disposal of the organizers of production.

Already the State has entered this field of effort and attained a large measure of success. In connection with the military and naval forces of every great nation organized research and invention has been developed to a remarkable extent. Each year great inventions are perfected by men in these services which, had they been made by civilians, might have been sold for large sums. Yet, in the vast majority of cases, promotion with a small increase of salary, is the only material gain of the inventors. In the construction of the Panama Canal workers in the employ of the Government have made inventions of great value, and, every year, employés of the United States Department of Agriculture make inventions and discoveries which result in the saving of millions of dollars per annum to the nation.

The social organization of inventive genius and ability is not a dream of Utopia, therefore, but a definite possibility, well rooted in the actual life of the present. The individual inventor and the chance discovery will not become obsolete. The passion to create new forms and forces, the desire for recognition and honor, and the aim to benefit mankind will continue to urge and inspire individual effort. But society will no longer be con-

tent to leave the important functions of invention and discovery unregulated and unorganized. It will develop that collective organization of inventive talent which capitalism has already begun. In the words of Professor Ward, "When we remember how vast have been the results that have been achieved through invention pursued in a purely spontaneous and unsystematized way, we naturally wonder what might be the effect of its reduction to scientific method and its inculcation through systematic courses of training and instruction."¹

Well may we wonder — but that wonderland we must not enter. For that way lies Utopia, the forbidden land!

¹ LESTER F. WARD, *Pure Sociology*, p. 495.

IX

SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

I

IT is charged that Socialism aims at the destruction of monogamous marriage and family life, and the substitution therefor of what is euphemistically called "Free Love." Frightful pictures are drawn of a future in which human society returns to promiscuous sex relations, without any social regulation. Many thousands of pamphlets and books have been written, and innumerable speeches made to fasten this charge upon the Socialist movement. The pages of history have been microscopically searched in order that every word of criticism of our present marriage system uttered by a professed Socialist, no matter how obscure, and every tale of marital difficulty in which Socialists have been involved, might be compiled in support of the charge.

It is a curious fact and a melancholy one, that this sort of attack is nowadays most commonly made by the clergy of a great church which has been a conspicuous victim of the same ugly charge. The Catholic Church, as such, is not responsible

for this. Her position upon the question of Socialism is that of neutrality. But it is unfortunately true that many of her clergy have repeatedly hurled the charge of being hostile to monogamic marriage against the Socialist movement.¹ Have these priests so soon forgotten the similar charges made against their own Church, one wonders! Can it be possible that they have already forgotten the cruel attacks made by fanatical Protestants against convent and monastery and confessional? Do they not remember the insult and ignominy heaped upon millions of men and women of Catholic faith by the "revelations" of the "expriests" and "escaped nuns"?

The Socialist movement is not the only movement against which the insulting charge of being composed of promoters of lust and enemies of the

¹ In *The Independent*, of New York, August 30, 1906, page 534, the following statement appeared:

"This extraordinary editorial note appears in one of the most independent papers of its class, the *Catholic Citizen*, of Milwaukee:

"'At Milwaukee, the past week, there came before the board of aldermen a question of granting licenses to eleven notorious saloons, most of which are virtually temples of "free love." Singular to relate, all of the twelve Socialist aldermen voted against licensing these places and, sad to say, all the Catholic aldermen, except one, voted to license these temples of "free love." Evidently it is a condition and not a theory that confronts us.'

"We offer no comment, except to say that it concerns those whom it concerns."

family has been hurled. It is a remarkable fact, fraught with profound significance, that the same charge has been made against nearly every great movement in history. It was made against the early Christians by their pagan enemies. When we remember how vice was cultivated in that pagan society in which the Christian Church was founded, there is something grotesquely ironical in the memory of the fact that the early Christians were denounced, even as the Socialists of to-day are denounced, as Atheists who secretly conspired against civil order and family life. Yet, such is the well-known testimony of the historians. The meetings of the Christians were alleged to be given over to all kinds of debauchery and sexual excesses. In pre-Reformation times the Roman Catholic Church was assailed upon the same grounds. Did not the priestly ideal of celibacy prove that marriage was at best only tolerated by the Church as a necessary evil, but held to be incompatible with exemplary holiness? It was charged that celibacy was only a priestly fraud, that the priesthood reveled in the *jus primæ noctis*, that in monastery and convent lust reigned supreme, and that the church as a whole was attempting to destroy family life. Even within the last twenty-five years Protestant fanatics of the Kensit type have made these charges the basis of their savage and brutal assaults upon the Catholic Church.

In its turn Protestantism had to encounter the charge of "Free Love." It was hurled against Luther and his followers, especially, after the rebellious monk took a nun for his wife. It was made against Luther's rival revolutionist Thomas Münzer and his followers. Even to this day marriage in a Protestant church or by civil ceremony is regarded as no-marriage by the Catholic Church, a living reminder to us that the Protestant is still an "infidel" and Protestant marriage adulterous.

Coming down to the popular movements of modern times, we find the same old charge being made against the Chartists in England, the Quakers, the Abolitionists and, especially, the pioneers of the Woman's Rights movement. Frances Wright, Ernestine L. Rose and Abby Kelly Foster, among others, were assailed as advocates of "Free Love" who sought to destroy the family and the home. When Mr. Roosevelt, soon after leaving the presidential office, made the old insulting charge against the Socialists of America he had evidently forgotten that in 1856, in Fremont's campaign, the same charge was made against those who laid the foundations of the Republican Party; that through the length and breadth of the land bitterly unjust partizan spirits chanted the scandalous refrain, "Fremont, Free soil, Free niggers and Free Love"—which was a despicable and

cowardly parody of the Fremont slogan, "Free soil and Free men."

We do not need to deny that from time to time individual Socialists have assailed monogamic marriage or openly practiced what is called "Free Love." Nor need we resort to the *Tu quoque!* argument, easy as that would be. That vice cloaked by religion has existed, under Catholic and Protestant rule alike, no candid student of history can deny. It has found shelter in the papal chair and in reformatory sectarianism. That the excesses of Montanism in the early Christian church, and of some of the Anabaptist sects of the Middle Ages, led, in some instances, to a vicious promiscuity of sex relationships is not to be denied, but that fact does not justify an attack upon Christianity. We can at least be sufficiently Christlike in our human charity to refrain from following the example of our revilers.

Not restrained by any such sense of charity, many of our opponents have searched the history of all the numerous communistic theories and experiments of the past for evidence of antagonism to monogamic marriage, or of sexual excess, and used that evidence in attacking present day Socialism. That there is no bond of connection either historical or philosophical, between the modern Socialist movement and those communistic theories and movements, many of which were of religious

origin, offshoots of the Christian church, does not restrain these unscrupulous opponents. The fact remains, however, that whether we consider celibacy or sexual promiscuity, the two principal forms in which hostility to monogamous marriage and family life has been expressed in communistic theories and movements, the connection with religion is very close and intimate while the connection with Socialism is extremely remote.

Whatever hostility to marriage and the family has manifested itself in the course of the evolution of modern Socialism has been incidental and accidental, a remnant of the old Utopian spirit. The passion for perfection is the soil in which Utopianism flourishes. The Utopian believes that for every ill of human society a remedy can be discovered or devised. From Plato to the ingenious Mr. Wells, all the Utopians have attempted to devise plans for a perfect social state. Not a few of the great Utopians have been inspired by secular ideals. Plato's *Republic*, More's *Utopia*, and Harrington's *Oceana*, for example, are the dreams of political philosophers. On the other hand, many have been inspired by religious ideals. Campanella's *City of the Sun*, Saint Simon's *New Christianity*, Father Rapp and the "Harmonists," Ann Lee and the "Shakers," J. Humphrey Noyes and the "Perfectionists" are illustrations of Utopianism inspired by religious mysticism.

Far from being less antagonistic to monogamic marriage than secular Communism, religious Communism was much more generally hostile to it. Plato has been regarded as teaching "Free Love," but if by that term we mean either sexual promiscuity or the right of individuals to mate according to their fancy, without interference by the State, it is altogether misleading when applied to the teaching of Plato. Living in an age when women were regarded as chattels, Plato advocated common ownership of women as well as of other forms of property. But in his *Republic* all sexual relations are regulated by the State, and confined to those persons who possess certain physical, mental and moral qualifications. Rather than describing it as "Free Love," we might describe it as a very highly developed form of State regulated stirpiculture.

Sir Thomas More, on the other hand, regarded woman as a human being, not as a chattel. In his *Utopia* he retains the family based upon monogamic marriage, but procreation is subject to a large degree of State supervision and regulation. When we come to Campanella, the Calabrian monk, we find him at one with Plato in advocating Communism of women and State regulated stirpiculture. It is a strange union this of the pagan philosopher and the loyal son of the Catholic Church, but not at all uncommon. Upon one im-

portant point they differ, and the difference is entirely to the credit of the Catholic monk. Campanella could not tolerate slavery: in his *Civitas Solis* there are no slaves as there are in Plato's *Republic*. But they are one in their hostility to marriage and family life.

A very slight consideration of the subject will suffice to explain why so many of the Utopian schemes of all ages, both secular and religious, manifest hostility toward the monogamic family. To the Utopian mind, mastered by a passionate yearning for perfection and the belief that it can be attained, every ill-working human institution is a challenge and an opportunity for experiment. No matter how essential to human progress and well-being we may regard it, we cannot claim that monogamic marriage has been perfectly successful at any time or in any place. The failure of a large percentage of marriages is a universal phenomenon to which we must give recognition. It is quite natural, therefore, that the Utopian desire for perfection should inspire many attempts to devise a more successful marriage system. That some of the plans devised and experiments made seem foolish, fantastic, or even repulsive and dangerous, need not blind us to the fact that the comparative failure of monogamic marriage is the secret of their origin.

This is true of those early Christian sects which

preached and practiced celibacy, no less than of Plato's ideal. It is true of the antagonism to marriage which underlay the sexual ascetism of some of the mediæval Christian sects, which ascetism, by the way, often provided a reaction to sexual promiscuity. It is true, also, of the Shakers and similar sects of celibates in modern times. On the other hand, it is equally true of the antagonism to monogamic marriage which we find exemplified in the sex communism of some of the early Christians during the first few centuries of Christendom; of such mediæval sects as the Apostolicans, the Adamites and the Brothers and Sisters of Free Spirit; and of the Perfectionists of Oneida and similar sects in our own time.

In addition to the contempt for the monogamic marriage system entertained by the host of seekers for perfection on account of its manifold shortcomings, the fear that it could not be reconciled with Communism and equality has played a large part in determining the exclusion of the monogamous family from many great Utopian schemes and experiments. Private property and the monogamous family are very closely associated in the evolution of human society, and it is not to be wondered at that, in those societies in which production rested upon hand labor and was very strictly limited, Communism in consumption goods was regarded as being incompatible with the main-

tenance of the separate family life. Would there not be the inevitable temptation to hoard and otherwise advance the interests of the family against the interests of the community? Above all, would there not be danger of overpopulation — that, in the words of our friend, M. Georges Renard, “too many guests might be summoned to the banquet of life” ?¹

Modern Socialism does not have to face this danger. In the first place, it does not aim at Communism in consumption goods but at a limited sort of Communism in production goods and, as Kautsky reminds us, that is not at all incompatible with separate family life.² “The family of to-day is in no way inconsistent with the nature of coöperative production. Therefore, the carrying into practice of a Socialist order of society does not of itself in any way necessitate the dissolution of the existing family form.”³ In the second place, the immense productive forces of to-day have banished the fear that under the ideal conditions at which Socialism aims overpopulation would result and bring back the lean and hungry years of struggle. Not only do we recognize that we have now available means of

¹ *Le Socialisme a l' Œuvre*, p. 425.

² KARL KAUTSKY, *Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation*, p. 15.

³ KARL KAUTSKY, *Das Erfurter Programm*, p. 146.

production which make the fear of the older Malthusians seem childlike, but that we can increase our really useful and necessary production enormously.

Finally, there is the assurance which human experience gives that, among human beings, population neither increases abnormally where the highest degree of physical comfort and luxury is attained, nor keeps to the minimum level consistent with the maintenance of the race where poverty abounds and the struggle for existence is fiercest. Quite the contrary is true, in fact. Where the standard of living has been raised most, there population has most nearly approximated that equilibrium which the old political philosophers held to be the ideal state. Where, on the other hand, the standard of living is lowest, where there is most poverty and hardship, not only is the birth-rate highest but the actual increase of population is greatest, despite the heavy death-rate which is always coexistent with a high birth-rate. However we may differ concerning the interpretation of these and similar phenomena familiar to students of the subject,¹ it is certain that history lends no support to the belief that by abolishing poverty and the fear of poverty, and assuring comfort and even luxury for all, society must incur the peril of

¹ I have dealt at some length with this subject in my *Common Sense of the Milk Question*, Chap. I. J. S.

an excess of population. The rich and ruling classes of all ages have enjoyed the comfort and the luxury, but nowhere at any time have they equaled the poorest classes in their fecundity.

Now, candor compels the admission that some writers of prominence in the modern Socialist movement have manifested quite as much contempt for monogamic marriage and the family life based upon it as any of the older Utopians, and that they have quite as freely declared their belief that the Socialist society of the future will sweep them aside. Among these writers may be mentioned the veteran leader of the German Social Democracy, August Bebel, and the British Socialists, Belfort Bax and the late William Morris. But, while candor compels this admission, it likewise compels us to assert that the opinions of these individuals, however interesting they may be, are not representative of the movement. The Socialist movement is not opposed to marriage in the present State, and has no substitute for it in the Socialist State of the future.

Bebel, for example, predicts that in the Socialist State the marriage of a man and a woman will be a free voluntary alliance, subject to no regulation by society, to be dissolved at will. In so far as he is sketching that which he regards as the ideal to be aimed at, he is justified. We cannot say to men that they shall not paint dream pictures

of the future. But every Socialist is entitled to laugh at Bebel's picture, and to say that it is an expression, not of Socialism, but of the rankest and crudest individualism. The same may be said of the free alliances described by Morris and Bax. Desirable they may or may not be — *de gustibus non est disputandum!* Our only concern is with the fact that they are not based upon the principle of Socialism, but upon that of individualism. Each of these writers makes the mistake of regarding marriage as it exists to-day as a property relation.¹ That it was so in its origin, the wife being the husband's property, is hardly open to question. That there are still not a few legal and political advantages enjoyed by the husband which are denied to the wife, reminding us of that old basis of marriage, is true. But marriage is not merely an institution for the perpetuation of property, nor even primarily that. The improved status of woman, the increasing degree to which she approaches equality with man through the extension of her legal and political rights, and the educational advantages now open to her, are factors not to be ignored. The normal man of to-day, in progressive countries, neither regards his wife as a chattel nor as a slave to be commanded and driven. That there are many marriages

¹ See, for example, MORRIS, *News From Nowhere*, pp. 89-90 Tenth Edition.

which are based upon economic considerations is unhappily true. There are loveless marriages for fortune, which is only a legalized form of prostitution. There are thousands of women who submit to brutal husbands simply because they are economically dependent, which is only a form of slavery.

It is against such conditions as these, and not against monogamic marriage itself, that a great deal of the Socialist criticism of modern marriage and family life is directed. Thus, in the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels, who both looked upon monogamy as the necessary basis for the ideal sex relation, answer the old charge of attempting to abolish the family. First of all, they point to the destruction of family life by capitalism, which has forced the wife to compete with the husband and the child with the father in the labor market; taken the mother away from the home and the cradle of her child; herded the workers and their families in hovels and tenements where it is difficult for virtue to flourish. Then they point to the commercialization of marriage, — that legalized prostitution which takes place when men and women marry, not for love, but for wealth, title, or social position — and to the vulgar prostitution and the vice with which society is honeycombed. “Even if we were aiming to bring about community of women, as you charge us with

doing," they say in effect, "we should only be trying to do in a frank and open way that which you already do but hypocritically conceal."

Strangely enough, what Marx and Engels wrote as a plea for the family and an attack upon the forces menacing the family, has been quoted by our opponents to prove our hostility to marriage and the family! Again and again I have been called upon to expose this dishonest and cowardly form of attack. The Rt. Rev. James A. McFaul, Roman Catholic Bishop of Trenton, N. J., does not hesitate to take the words of Marx and Engels, and by omitting some words and inserting others, make them appear to have assailed marriage. Marx and Engels wrote "that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system, *i. e.*, of *prostitution, both public and private.*" In a Pastoral Letter published in 1908 the Bishop makes the writers say "that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women — *present marriage* — springing from that system of prostitution, both public and private."¹ When I publicly exposed the fraudulent trick the Bishop neither apologized nor withdrew the statement, but in a letter to the

¹ *Pastoral Letter of the Rt. Rev. James A. McFaul, Bishop of Trenton. Some Modern Problems, 1908, p. 27.*

Trenton Evening Times, denied that the passage as he quoted it misrepresented Marx and Engels. It was translated, he explained, by the Rev. Father Boorman, S. J., who exercised the translator's right to add a word here and there "to bring out the true meaning."¹ The good Bishop of Trenton evidently holds the ninth commandment lightly.

In his admirable exposition of the Erfurt Programme of the German Social Democracy, Kautsky brings against the existing order a very similar indictment to that of Marx and Engels. "It is not the Socialists who are destroying the family — not only wishing to destroy, but actually doing it before our eyes; it is the capitalists. Many slaveowners in former days tore the husband from the wife, the parents from the children who were of age to work; but capitalists go beyond the shameless deeds of slavery; they snatch the sucking child from its mother, and force her to entrust it to the hands of strangers."² And again: "The defenselessness of women, who have hitherto been shut up in their homes, and who have only dim ideas of public life and the forms of organization, is so great that the capitalist employer dares to pay them regularly wages which do not suffice for their maintenance, and to throw

¹ *Trenton Evening Times*, Nov. 19, 1908.

² *Das Erfurter Programm*, p. 4.

them back on prostitution for the additional amount required. The increase of women's industrial labor shows everywhere a tendency to draw after it an increase of prostitution. In God-fearing and moral States there are 'flourishing' branches of industry whose workwomen are so badly paid that they would starve if they did not eke out their earnings by the wages of immorality, and the heads of these businesses say that it is only through the low scale of wages that they are able to meet the competition and to keep their concerns in a flourishing state. A higher scale of wages would ruin them."¹

In his little book, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Friedrich Engels discusses with admirable lucidity the relation of private property to monogamous marriage. He traces the development of monogamy through private property and its inheritance, accepting Bachofen's view that the development from group marriage to monogamy was mainly due to woman. But the monogamy which arose in response to the need for a system of inheritance and bequest was one-sided and bound only the woman, while man retained his polygamous practices, either secretly or openly. A very large part of inheritable wealth consists of property in the means of production. Will the abolition of that form of prop-

¹ *Idem*, p. 42.

erty entail the abolition of the system of monogamous marriage? On the contrary, argues Engels, it will place woman upon a plane of equality with man and make monogamy the rule for men as well as for women. "Remove the economic considerations that now force women to submit to the customary disloyalty of men, and you place woman on an equal footing with men. All present experiences prove that this will tend much more strongly to make men truly monogamous than to make women polyandrous."¹

Let it be admitted that a few modern Socialist writers, harking back to the Utopian spirit and method of pre-Marxian times, have assailed monogamic marriage and preached an individualistic ideal of sexual freedom which may fairly be regarded as meaning polygamy and polyandry. Shall we, then, condemn the whole movement, and ignore the fact, which its fair-minded critics recognize,² that Socialism does not of necessity involve any interference with the existence of the family, either by the abolition of the marriage tie or the diminution of parental responsibility? Shall we close our eyes to the fact that the privilege of non-interference by society which is asserted by the advocates of "Free Love" is not only not in-

¹ FRIEDRICH ENGELS, *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Chap. III.

² See, e. g., GONNER, *The Socialist State*, p. 122.

volved of necessity in the philosophy or programme of Socialism, but is in fact incompatible with that principle of social responsibility and supremacy which distinguishes Socialism from Anarchism,¹ and upon which the entire Socialist programme ultimately rests? Shall we ignore the fact that, from Marx and Engels down to the humble propagandist on the street corner, the vast majority of Socialists have assailed those forces which make for the destruction of family life, and have upheld the strictest monogamy as the ideal to be attained? Surely, the juster view is to regard these things as the characteristic features of Socialism, and the "Free Love" propaganda as an offshoot, akin to those offshoots of Christianity which manifested themselves in the preaching and practice of sex communism!

II

So much for the negative side of our discussion. On the positive side it must be frankly stated that Socialism must inevitably affect the family more or less profoundly. Like the State, the family is subject to economic evolution. As the macrocosm is, so is the microcosm. There has never been any disposition upon the part of the leaders of Socialist thought to evade this fact or

¹ Cf. HILLQUIT, *History of Socialism in the United States*, Revised Edition, pp. 209-212.

to deny it. Even now, within the existing order, family life is undergoing great changes. Upon every hand we see changes so extensive and fundamental that many of our most conservative friends are talking about "the passing of the family." To deny that the vast social and economic changes which Socialism implies will influence the basic institution of social organization would be exceedingly puerile.

"We are aware, it is true," says Kautsky, "that every special mode of industrial life has its special form of the household, to which a special family form must correspond. We do not believe that the present form of the family is the final form, and we expect that a new form of society will also develop a new family organization. But such an *expectation* is a very different thing from *the attempt to dissolve every family bond.*"¹

Now, this is at once very frank and very lucid. It is also very obvious. A great deal of the world's manufacture was formerly carried on in the home. That the transference of production from the home to the factory led to profound changes in family life is indisputable. It is also true that a great many other functions which were formerly left to the family are now performed by the State. There was a time when the child's welfare was left to the family entirely. If the

¹ *Das Erfurter Programm*, p. 41. (Italics mine. J. S.)

parents were too poor to provide the children with educational advantages, or were too ignorant to appreciate the importance of education, the children were left in ignorance. There was no legislation protecting the child against the cruelty of its parents. The State did not interfere to save the child from brutal treatment. The child was left exclusively to the parents. Housing was a matter which the family alone cared for. No matter how unsanitary it might be, no matter what the danger to the helpless child, or to society, the State did not interfere. The child of feeble mentality was left to the exclusive care of its parents. The idea of collective interest and responsibility for the special care and training of idiots and deaf mutes and blind children had not yet developed. When smallpox or diphtheria entered a family the State did not assume the responsibility it does to-day. The idea of the State as Over-Parent, or Outer-Parent, as Mr. Wells ¹ so happily expresses it, is a new one. That it has greatly modified and changed some important phases of family life as it used to be cannot be denied. It has not, however, dissolved every family bond. So far as those activities which we have enumerated are concerned, no sane person will contend that they have injured the family.

But while it is self-evident that many changes

¹ H. G. WELLS, *Socialism and the Family*, p. 61.

must take place in the family as a result of the realization of the Socialist ideal in the political and economic life of the State, it is impossible to make a positive forecast and describe those changes in detail. Upon this point Engels says: "What we may anticipate about the adjustment of sexual relations after the impending downfall of capitalist production is mainly of a negative nature and mostly confined to elements that will disappear. But what will be added? That will be decided after a new generation has come to maturity — a race of men who never in their lives have had any occasion for buying with money or other economic means of power the surrender of a woman; a race of women who have never had any occasion for surrendering to any man for any reason but love, or for refusing to surrender to their lover from fear of economic consequences. Once such people are in the world, they will not give a moment's thought to what we to-day believe should be their course. They will follow their own practice and fashion their own public opinion about the individual practice of every person — only this and nothing more." ¹

We may concede without argument the contention that men and women of future generations will not consider what we of to-day believe they ought to do. But that is beside the point. The

¹ *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, p. 101.

question is, not how far our beliefs and opinions will influence the family life of the Socialist régime, but how far, if at all, can we predict what the family life will be from (a) the principles of Socialism, and (b) the observed facts and tendencies of social evolution. Are there any conditions which must characterize family life, the absence of which will prove that the Socialist State has not been attained? And are there any tendencies in the present attitude toward marriage and the family which offer any suggestions for an outline of the probable attitude toward marriage and the family under Socialism? I believe that any affirmative answer can be given to each of these questions with full scientific sanction.

Let us consider the subject first from the standpoint of the essentials of Socialist philosophy. We can say with reasonable certainty that marriage will not rest upon "Free Love" as we have thus far interpreted that term. It will not be a matter which concerns only the individual man and the individual woman. The State will exercise some control over marriage. It is a fundamental postulate of Socialism that the social body and not the individual is supreme. Now, procreation is one of the ends of marriage. It is also a matter of vital social concern. The State, the social Over-Parent, cannot ignore its own interest in marriage, therefore. Instead of exercising less con-

trol over marriage than the present State, it is probable that it will exercise more. "We do not believe there will be a slackening of family bonds," says the Italian writer, Saverio Merlino, "but we believe other bonds will be added to them, and that men will not be any the less good fathers, brothers, husbands, because they will be better citizens."¹ It is probable that the Socialist State will prevent the marriage of those suffering from certain dangerous, incurable and transmissible diseases, as well as of the feeble-minded and other degenerate types. There is something wholly antagonistic to the basic principle of the supremacy of the social interest upon which Socialism rests, as well as repugnant to the moral sense, in the idea that such persons are to be free to marry and burden the earth with their degenerate offspring.

Marriage under Socialism will rest upon love, but not upon the selfish sensualism to which the misnomer, "Free Love" is commonly applied. It is foolish to speak of "free" love, for there is no love where there is not freedom. Love is not bought for gold nor is it exacted by fear. Socialism presupposes the economic equality of the sexes, the independence of woman as an economic unit. Marriages for fortune would not take place. That form of prostitution would no longer exist

¹ SAVERIO MERLINO, *Formes et Essence du Socialisme*, Paris, 1898, p. 115.

with the cloak of respectability now provided for it at the altar. The future society will not witness the sickening spectacle of the prelates of a great Church waiting by the hour until the stipulated settlement — the price of the "honor" sold — has been paid by the family of an idle parasite to a titled fortune-hunter. The young girl will not be wedded to the senile octogenarian for the purpose of repairing the family fortune. No woman will be driven by economic necessity into a loveless wedlock. To these forms of prostitution within wedlock the communism of economic opportunity will put an end, just as it will put an end to that part of prostitution without wedlock which is due to the unjust economic conditions of to-day.

Still considering the subject from the standpoint of the essentials of Socialist philosophy, we may conclude with reasonable certainty that in the Socialist State marriage will take the form of a civil contract. The State can have no other interest. The complete neutrality of the State upon all matters concerning religious belief and affiliation leads logically to the non-recognition of religious ceremonies. There is no reason why all persons who desire to marry and are competent to do so, should not be compelled to be married by a civil authority according to certain prescribed civil forms. In principle, this does not differ from the legal requirement in most of our States that mar-

riages performed by ecclesiastical authorities must be registered with the civil authority. But the State has a right to insist that a matter of so much civil importance must be considered as being primarily a matter of civil, rather than religious concern. This does not imply hostility to religion. Religious freedom is inseparable from that full democratic liberty which is essential to Socialism. There must be complete freedom of religious belief, association and worship, and if any citizens desired to add a religious ceremonial to the civil ceremonial there could be no rational objection, provided, of course, that the religious ceremonial did not conflict with the civil ceremonial and aim at the subversion of the State.

The condition described by Morris of everybody being "free to come and go as he or she pleases"¹ is not compatible with the nature and requirements of Socialist society. It ignores the interest of the child, upon which society's right to interfere is pivoted. The social interest requires the greatest possible stability of marriage and the greatest possible parental responsibility. We need not fool ourselves into believing that the latter can be dispensed with; that children can be taken better care of in communal institutions, by social servants, than in their own homes by their own parents. That way lies disaster. One of

¹ *News from Nowhere*, p. 90, Tenth Edition, 1908.

the most precious, and most fundamental, rights of the child is the right to love and care by its own mother. When it loses this right, whether by death, abandonment, divorce or the mother's selfish devotion to her own pleasures, it loses that which is infinitely precious, and which no institution, however scientifically managed, can replace, not even when the institution is served by noble women in a spirit of loving social service. The finest experiment in caring for babies ever made by a modern city was made in connection with the care of the foundlings in the City of New York. But the babies pined for mother-love and the death-rate was appalling. When an investigating committee looked into the matter a wise woman suggested that the babies needed "mothering," that every little child needed one pair of mother's arms. The babies were "placed out," most of them with poor Italian women in the tenements, where conditions seemed far less favorable than at the hospital. But the babies lived.¹ That is the universal experience.

Parental responsibility is not to be dispensed with, then, and its maintenance makes it important that the marriage should be as enduring as possible. Here we encounter that most perplexing of problems, divorce. Will the Socialist State follow the example of the Japanese and permit the

¹ Cf. JOHN SPARGO, *The Bitter Cry of the Children*, p. 233.

dissolution of the marriage contract at the will of both parties, or will it be as hostile to divorce as the Roman Catholic Church? Here it must be frankly confessed there is little in the Socialist philosophy upon which we can predicate an answer. Beyond the fact that the Socialist philosophy points clearly to the very definite interest of society in the stability of marriage, there is little or nothing to guide us. This is not to the discredit of Socialism. We are simply called upon to face the fact that the citizens of the future society must solve the problem for themselves, in the light of their own experience and needs.

Most Socialist writers upon this question have taken it for granted that divorce will be made very easy in Socialist society, so that the marriage bond will be a very slender and tenuous thing, divorces being granted for almost any and every cause of dissatisfaction. If that is a correct forecast, it need not alarm us unduly, for in truth we have practically reached that condition in contemporary American life. On the other hand, there are some Socialist writers who repudiate this view. Thus Macdonald suggests the possibility of denying divorce altogether: "I can imagine a time when, the marriage choice being absolutely one of free will and the stability of family life having proved itself to be essential to the

stability of State life, the Socialist State will decline to recognize divorce altogether as being too subversive to its policy." ¹

Even our very liberal friend, M. Georges Renard, who believes that divorce should be made easy, and the marriage contract made terminable at the wish of both parties, or even of one of them, would institute "legal delays, which will serve as precautions against too hasty action." ² Probably most Socialists would agree with Anton Menger that the popular will in every country would reject any form of "Free Love" or sex communism, and firmly maintain the present form of marriage, which, however, must not be indissoluble, as with the Roman Catholics, but terminable, as in the Protestant marriage law, on important grounds.³ But, as stated above, this is not a necessary deduction from the fundamental principles of Socialism.

In this connection it is pertinent to suggest that the problem will not be as formidable as it appears to us to-day. The economic causes to which a very large proportion of present day divorces are due would of necessity disappear to a large extent, if not altogether. Not until we rid society of the debased marriage, whether it be that of the

¹ J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, M. P., *Socialism*, p. 68.

² GEORGES RENARD, *Le Socialisme à l'Œuvre*, p. 422.

³ *Neue Staatslehre*, p. 132.

poor woman who marries a man she does not love in order to escape the drudgery and uncertainty of the factory or the shameful servitude of the street, or that of the society woman who marries for title or fortune, shall we know anything of the sufficiency of love to secure and maintain real monogamy.

For marriage in the Socialist State will be based upon monogamy, the union of one man to one woman. Sex communism, the so-called "complex marriage" of the Perfectionists and similar sects, is impossible, unthinkable. This view, again, is not a necessary deduction from the fundamentals of Socialist philosophy. It is based rather upon the observed facts and tendencies of social evolution. The real argument against polygamy, polyandry and group marriage is not a moral one. Most peoples have passed through group marriage in the course of their evolution, and many peoples have, for considerable periods of time, been polygamous. These forms of organization of the sex relation have been the necessary outcome of economic conditions and, therefore, considered highly moral. When Jan of Leyden introduced polygamy into Munster, for example, the fact that he resorted to the Old Testament for his argument in favor of the system does not suffice to hide the fact that the excess of the female population in the city made polygamy necessary,

under the then existing modes of production.¹ The real argument against polygamy, group marriage, and similar forms of family organization is that they belong to outgrown stages of economic development.

The whole trend of evolution is toward monogamy and away from polygamy, and polyandry and group marriage. Engels is perfectly right in his conclusion that the raising of woman to a plane of economic independence and equality with man would result in a greater degree of monogamy.² Even if the elected representatives of the Socialist State in some frenzied outburst should legalize "Free Love," and sweep away all the laws and religious sanctions of the present marriage system, they could not build polygamy or "Free Love" upon the economic foundations of Socialist society. Menger very justly and wisely observes that "There are so many defects associated with free love that the masses of the people would themselves refuse to permit it, even if in the course of events all those political and ecclesiastical forces which buttress the present monogamic system had been condemned to silence."³

¹ Cf. KAUTSKY, *Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation*, pp. 262-278; BAX, *Rise and Fall of the Anabaptists*, pp. 203-211.

² FRIEDRICH ENGELS, *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Chap. III.

³ *Neue Staatslehre*, p. 132.

Around the monogamic marriage will develop the private household. Why should we assume communal dwellings, glorified barracks, akin to our New York apartment hotels, to be necessary under Socialism? There was some excuse for this assumption in Fourier's day. The amount of hard and disagreeable labor involved in caring for an ordinary household led naturally to the suggestion of coöperative households. But the invention of numerous electric appliances for doing housework has opened up wonderful possibilities of which Fourier and his contemporaries could not dream. There is no reason why the work of the average household should be other than a light, agreeable and recreative occupation for a normal, healthy woman. No one who has attended one of the great exhibitions of domestic appliances can fail to see a possible solution for the problems of domestic drudgery and service. We have moved far and fast since Mrs. Besant, in the *Fabian Essays*, sneered at the "old-fashioned cottages" and hailed "large dwellings" as a solution of the problem of the housewife.

The individual home is better than the best communal establishment, and there is no reason why it should not flourish under Socialism. A glorified Waldorf-Astoria is inferior to a simple cottage with an old-fashioned garden, alike from the point of view of family felicity and the de-

velopment of individuality. Of course, there are many details of housework which might with advantage be done outside the home by collective agencies. Laundry work is already done outside by commercial agencies, and could be easily socialized. There is no reason why the heating of homes should not be done by collective agencies as the lighting of homes now is in so many places, and by the same wonderful force, electricity. Windows in the business section of our cities, and to some extent in the residential districts, are cleaned by professional cleaners. There is no good reason why this should not be a collective service under the management of the public authorities. Indeed, the possibilities of using the collective organization of society and the new inventions to preserve the private family and the separate home are almost unlimited.

The demand for the economic independence of woman carries with it the obligation to labor. The Socialist ideal is not a sex parasitism. The obligation to labor will rest equally upon men and women. But equal obligation to labor does not imply obligation to perform *identical* services. In his *Letter to Women*, M. Renard says: "Never allow yourselves to forget that your ideal is not an imaginary equality with man, but a legitimate *equivalence* with him. That means, that in the family, as in society, you will have a place which

is as high and as wide as his, though a different place.”¹ Here, once more, capitalism has paved the way for the Socialist State. Women work side by side with men in factories, stores and offices; they enter all the professions. The self-supporting woman is not an imaginative being; a prophecy of an uncertain and more or less remote future. She is already here, an impressive and commanding figure. There will be no return to the old days of helpless parasitic dependence — even though some Socialists in their denunciations of present conditions seem to believe that it is wrong for women to work anywhere outside of the nursery or the kitchen.

But what of woman when she marries? It is easy to understand that the unmarried woman will find a legitimate place in the organized industrial life. Perhaps, too, we can include the married woman who is childless with her unmarried sister. But the married woman who is engaged in the performance of the duties of motherhood, child-bearing and child-raising, must be considered as belonging to a quite distinct category. Her position must, therefore, be separately considered. We cannot contemplate the possibility of a Socialist society perpetuating that abominable evil of present society, the imposition of double labor upon large numbers of women, as wage-earner in the

¹ GEORGES RENARD, *Lettre aux Femmes*, Paris, Giard et Briere.

factory and as wife and mother in the home. The woman who cares for her child or children performs as useful and necessary a service to the State as any. No further labor, outside the home, could be justly demanded from her.

But what of her economic independence? Will she receive a definite income from the State, or be as now dependent upon the wages of her husband? We may independently hazard a guess, but it will be no more. The Socialist philosophy does not lead to any particular plan. Nor can we say with assurance that the solution of the problem is indicated by any set of observed facts or tendencies. At best the wisest of us can only guess for himself, and set his guess beside the guesses of other individual Socialists, such as Bebel, Morris, Menger, Renard and Wells. We cross here the borderland of Utopia. Our justification — if justification we need — lies in the fact that we can thus best emphasize the important truth which so many of our critics do not perceive, namely, that for all such guesses no one is responsible except their authors.

A favorite solution of the problem before us is that maternity will be endowed by the State. The childless wife, it is predicted, will work outside the home, just as though she were unmarried. The labor involved in housekeeping would, in the absence of children, be a negligible quantity, gladly performed and amply recompensed by the advan-

tages of married life. The State will endow motherhood, giving a definite sum for each child born and a regular salary for the care of the children during the age of dependence, with a pension after the children have passed beyond the need of maternal care and guidance. This is the ideal which Mr. Wells has sketched with a good deal of naïve assurance.¹

All this is very simple, in a way, as Utopias are apt to be. Personally, I find it as difficult and repellent as its opposite, "Free love." If "Free Love" is the Scylla of individualistic selfishness, State endowed and wage-paid motherhood is the Charybdis of bureaucratic control.² The State will hardly consent to bear the burden unless it controls procreation to a degree that is incompatible with a free, democratic society.³ Mr. Wells, indeed, recognizes that State control of procreation is the corollary of the payment and endowment of motherhood. In this he follows the example of Karl Pearson: "If the State is to guarantee wages, it is bound in self-protection to provide that no person shall be born without its consent. The State is to sanction the number of births; all others are immoral, because anti-social. . . .

¹ Cf. H. G. WELLS, *Socialism and the Family*.

² Cf. STEWART HEADLAM, *The Socialist's Church*, p. 51.

³ MACDONALD, *Socialism and Government*, Vol. II, p. 148, argues this with great force.

An unsanctioned birth would receive no recognition from the State, and in time of overpopulation it might be needful to punish, positively or negatively, both father and mother.”¹

We may rest assured that there is no immediate danger of the realization of this hideous bureaucracy. If Socialism were a plan to be imposed upon society by a powerful ruling class, as the Jesuits imposed their modification of Campanella's Communistic Utopia upon the natives of Paraguay, such a scheme might be tried and might succeed until the people had developed the intelligence, initiative and strength to free themselves. A free democracy will not forge for itself such galling chains. It is far more likely that the wife will depend upon her husband's earnings, very much as she does to-day. Menger² suggests this “with fear and trembling” as it were. Would not that involve the dependence of the wife upon the husband? The question at once suggests itself.

But the reply is as obvious as the question. The wife of the wage-earner of to-day, who keeps house, cooks, and otherwise cares for the comfort and health of her husband is not a dependent in any parasitic sense. She is rather a co-earner of

¹ KARL PEARSON, *Socialism and Sex*, quoted by BARKER, *British Socialism*, p. 347.

² *Neue Staatslehre*, p. 134.

the family income. If its division were practicable, if the ordinary wage-earner's income were not so small that its division would be ridiculous, it ought to be divided to give the woman her well-earned equal share. Among the professional classes to-day it is by no means rare to find the arrangement which sets aside a certain portion of the total income for the household expenses and support of the children, the remainder being equally divided between husband and wife. Is there any good reason why such an arrangement should not, or could not, be made a legal condition of marriage in the Socialist State? Such a plan has at least the merit of avoiding the frightful bureaucracy implied in the scheme of making motherhood a profession controlled by the State. Likewise, it has the merit of being foreshadowed in the progressive sections of modern society. To that extent, it is something more than a mere guess, an idle dream.

We have returned from Utopia to the realm of reality!

X

SOCIALISM AND INTELLECTUAL SERVICE

I

NOT long ago, a young Socialist wrote to the editor of a leading party organ presenting a difficulty which greatly perplexed him, as it has perplexed thousands of other students. How will the Socialist State deal with the intellectual workers; will they be paid the same wages as ordinary manual laborers and compelled to work the same hours,¹ and, if so, who will determine which man shall be a brain-worker and which an ordinary manual laborer?

The reply he received amply testifies to the extreme crudity of much of our present-day Socialist thought. In effect, the reply was: "You must remember that Socialism will abolish all classes. Therefore, under Socialism there will be no intellectual workers and no manual workers. Every one will have to do a fair share of the productive work, so that no one will need to do manual labor

¹ It is unnecessary to discuss the question of remuneration as applied to intellectual service in this chapter. The subject is sufficiently discussed in chapters VII and VIII.

for more than a few hours each day. That will give every individual a chance to develop all his intellectual faculties." The editor was evidently guided by "authority." Unfortunately, Marx had left no answer to be quoted as scriptural authority to the Faithful, but, happily, there was Bebel, a mighty prophet. Many years ago, Bebel discussed the subject in his famous study of *Woman and Socialism*. In a purely Utopian spirit, he described how, in the Socialist régime, every man and woman would be called upon to do a given amount of work, either in industry or agriculture, and how the intellectual needs of society would be abundantly met by the use of the leisure and cultural advantages which such a life must afford. With a working day of three hours or less, what need of making a profession of art or of science? Our editor was piously repeating to the anxious inquirer the gospel according to Bebel!

Considered as a solution of the problem presented, the reply had a two-fold significance. In the first place, it is entirely Utopian and unscientific. It is not only un-Marxian, but anti-Marxian. It is not a forecast based upon careful observation of the tendencies of social evolution, nor is it a necessary deduction from any fundamental principle of Socialist philosophy. It is a prophet's vision, hung in air, a thing of dreams.

If it is a necessary deduction from a fundamental principle, that principle is not of modern scientific Socialism, but of the dreamy Communism and "equality" of the Utopian mystics. It does not take into account, but blindly runs counter to, one of the most significant and powerful tendencies of economic evolution, the tendency to specialization of function which Marx so clearly perceived even in his day. How little of Marx our most vociferous "Marxists" have absorbed!

In the second place, the reply is significant as an illustration of that perverted and distorted view of the essential meaning of the class-struggle theory which manifests itself in a contempt for culture and learning, and a demagogic glorification, not merely of the manual laborer, but of those very limitations and disadvantages from which he must be liberated before Socialism can succeed. It is not necessary to repeat here the story of the sinister part which anti-intellectualism has played in the Socialist movement.¹ Suffice it to say that it is the child of demagogy and the father of schism and disruption. Anti-intellectualism is not a democratic doctrine. The attitude of the truly class-conscious proletariat toward education and intellectual leadership is one of genuine

¹ For this see JOHN SPARGO, *Sidelights on Contemporary Socialism*, pp. 67-106, and JOHN SPARGO, *Karl Marx, His Life and Work*, pp. 96-97, 276-277, 300, 307.

admiration and respect. The whole history of democratic movements generally, and of the Socialist movement in particular, proves this. The contempt for learning and hostility to intellectual leadership which sometimes manifest themselves in the Socialist ranks are not evidences of proletarian class consciousness. "We are armed with the complete culture of the century!" cried Lassalle. The true Socialist honors education and demands that all the means of education and culture be socialized. In the meantime he hails with gladness those leaders like Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Liebknecht, Jaurès, Hyndman, Kautsky, and others, who bring to the movement the superior service of trained intellectual power.

We are specially concerned here and now with the Utopian nature of the suggestion that the Socialist State will do away with the specialization of functions from which society has gained so much, that it will not tolerate the exclusive devotion of some men to intellectual service, but will insist upon every individual doing manual labor for a given number of hours each day. What an infinite and incalculable loss to the world such an industrial economy would involve! Fourier's fantastic vision of lions pulling heavy wagons and tame whales pulling becalmed sailing-ships is not more absurd!

Democracy does not imply the equal fitness of

all men for all tasks. Still less does it imply that men of special talents and gifts must devote their time in whole or in part to labor which other men, not possessing those gifts, could do equally well. Imagine Karl Marx climbing tenement stairs distributing Socialist leaflets and advertising cards from door to door!. William Morris selling copies of *Justice*, the Socialist paper, upon the streets of London may appear heroic from a certain point of view, but he might have served the Socialist cause far more effectively by using his wonderful talents which, while he was doing what the most illiterate costermonger could have done equally well, were buried in a napkin. The Socialist State will be too solicitous of its own interest, too deeply imbued with social consciousness, to compel its Metchnikoffs, its Edisons, its Darwins and its other intellectual servants to spend any of their precious time and strength plowing fields, tending machinery, or bookkeeping.

Socialism rests upon evolution. Capitalism has developed great productive agencies which were unheard of and undreamed of before. We who are Socialists recognize the great part which Capitalism has played in human progress. Nowhere in the literature of the world can we find a nobler eulogy upon the material and spiritual gains to society as a result of capitalist development than

that contained in the *Communist Manifesto*. It is the key-note of our faith and hope, as evolutionists, that all the great powers developed by capitalist society will be inherited by the Socialist society of the future. And among the greatest legacies of the capitalist epoch to the Socialist epoch a foremost place must be given to a system of production based upon specialization of function. It is not at all conceivable that in a vain effort to attain "equality" the citizens of the Socialist State will destroy that system of specialization. They are far more likely to improve it, and to find it socially advantageous to greatly increase the number of those devoted exclusively to intellectual tasks.

Marx himself has pointed to the fact that the efficiency of capitalist production is greatly increased by the specialization of function, and, especially, by the development of a special class of directors of industry. The "collective power of masses" requires directing authority to be efficient. So there is developed "a special kind of wage laborer" whose "*established and exclusive function*" is the work of supervision and direction. This work of direction and supervision is as necessary, he argues, as the work of the conductor is to an orchestra.¹ Production under Socialism will still depend upon the "collective power of masses,"

¹ KARL MARX, *Capital*, Vol. I, Part IV, Ch. XIII.

and will still require supervision and direction if the maximum of efficiency is to be secured.

Starting with a highly developed productive system, the supreme task of the Socialist State will be, not the mere maintenance of its efficiency, but the greatest possible increase of that efficiency. If the standards of material comfort are to be materially raised, and leisure greatly extended, there must be increased productivity. The technical processes of production must be constantly studied and improved. There is not the slightest reason for supposing that this important work will be left to chance, to the voluntary effort of men who are compelled to contribute their share of manual labor. It is far more reasonable to suppose that the work will be systematically organized, that specialists will make it their exclusive function.

Thus the direction of industry, including in that term the improvement of the technical processes of production, will itself involve the employment of a large body of intellectual workers, as distinguished from ordinary manual workers. They will be intellectual servants. The method of their selection offers no great difficulty. There is no reason why the selection could not be made as in the civil service of to-day, by competitive tests. Gronlund's forecast of the Socialist régime¹ with

¹ GRONLUND, *The New Economy*, p. 48.

its subdivision of labor and specialization of function, governed by something similar to our present civil service, is far more scientific than the absurd notion of destroying all specialization of function and compelling each individual to perform a given amount of manual labor each day.

Quite apart from the direction of industry and the development of increased efficiency, the Socialist State will employ a large body of intellectual social servants. Let us consider one department of social activity only, the prevention and cure of disease. Not only is it too wildly absurd for anything short of comic opera to suppose that the medical service will be so conducted that the medical man will be compelled to give so many hours each day to manual labor, but it is quite as absurd to suppose that medical research and experimentation will not be specialized; that the Pasteurs and Von Behrings of the future will have to perform each day their share in the ordinary routine of medical practice, prescribing for colds, diagnosing infantile digestive troubles, and so on, depending upon their leisure time for opportunity to investigate and experiment.

We have already progressed beyond that stage. There is hardly a government in the civilized world which has not in its employ numerous men of science, who are set apart for the purpose of studying the great problems of medicine, bacteri-

ology and sanitation. The public Health and Marine Hospital-Service of the United States with its well-equipped laboratories is an illustration of the method by which the national government, like all the governments of the great civilized nations, assumes responsibility for the solution of scientific problems which relate to the health of its citizens. In our States and our great cities there are similar organizations upon a smaller scale. A very large amount of our present understanding of the origin of epidemic diseases, and the means of preventing and combating them, has been derived from socialized investigation and research.

It is a well recognized fact that there is an urgent need for a great extension of this sort of service. Already private philanthropy is being relied upon to supplement the work of the State. Institutions such as the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research are resulting in marvelous advances in the conquest of disease, and clearly point to the far-reaching extension of collectively organized research and experiment in the Socialist State. To suppose otherwise, we must abandon our claim that Socialism is a step forward, and freely admit the counter-claim of our enemies that it is a retrogressive step which we are trying to induce society to take. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the fact that Socialism presupposes the conservation of every gain made by mankind in the

centuries of evolution. We shall destroy nothing of social value, abandon no height of culture or productive efficiency — not even for the sake of equality!

We have already learned that the economic value of such discoveries as those made by Robert Koch, Pasteur, Metchnikoff, Behring and thousands of less known men, is infinitely greater than they could produce by any amount of manual labor. The hook-worm disease costs our Southern States many millions of dollars each year. It is estimated that the economic loss to South Carolina alone is not less than thirty millions of dollars each year.¹ What we know of the disease, of curing and preventing it, we know mainly as a result of the studies made by Dr. Stiles and others under the direction of the United State Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service. Dr. Stiles believes that in a generation the disease could be stamped out through the wise expenditure of two millions of dollars or less. Even now we are intelligent enough to socialize the intellectual gifts of men like Dr. Stiles by making them public servants, and we may be assured that the Socialist State will carry this socialization of intellectual service a great deal farther than has ever yet been attempted. The service of such men will, as now,

¹ Cf. IRVING FISHER, *Report on National Vitality, Its Waste and Conservation*, p. 122.

be performed in the laboratory, and not in the factory or the counting room.

Here again, the Socialist State will not begin *de novo* and devise a method of selecting its intellectual servants, with nothing to guide it. Already we have a method of selection, imperfect perhaps, and capable of great improvement, but providing a foundation upon which to build. We have civil service rules, entrance to the public service by means of scholarships, or upon the basis of meritorious work in some particular branch of discovery, experiment or research. Here, as in every branch of inquiry, we must bear in mind that the Socialist State will not be an arbitrarily created thing, but a development, a modification, of the existing State, attained through a process of readjustment which is even now going on. That process of readjustment implies that the transformation of the organic structure of society will be a gradual process.

II

But what shall we say of those intellectual workers, the molders of public opinion, the journalists and publicists whose work, often of tremendous value, must frequently take the form of hostile criticism of the State and its methods? It is easy enough to conceive that the State might publish books and periodicals which were consid-

ered "safe" and "sane," but what about those which, because they attacked the State, were considered "unsafe" and "insane"? Are we to contemplate the suppression of the right of criticism as the French writer, Mermeix, does in the following words: "The State, being the only printer, might refuse to allow the uses of its presses to anti-socialist newspapers, to conservative journals which seek to undo the Revolution, as well as to anarchial, too-Socialist papers, which might think the Revolution incomplete. Papers, as well as books, would be under the censorship. *The people would read nothing except by permission of the Government.*"¹

It is very obvious that nothing could be further from the democratic ideal of Socialism than the condition which the French writer depicts. It suggests the despotism of Czarism against which the democratic spirit in Russia has been waging relentless war for so long. Democracy has at all times, and in all lands, fought with much heroism and sacrifice for the freedom of the press from all

¹ Quoted in *The New Socialism*, by JANE T. STODDART, pp. 152-153. (The italics are mine. J. S.)

I note, by the way, that a writer in *The Catholic World*, May, 1910 (p. 209), attributes this statement to Kautsky, while giving Miss Stoddart's book as reference! The error—if error it be—is inexcusable, for Miss Stoddart plainly states that the words are cited from M. MERMEIX's book, *Le Socialisme*, p. 298. Why, one wonders, are our Catholic critics so generally reckless and unreliable?

forms of censorship. We think with pride of the heroic fight for a free press made by Henry Hetherington and his followers in England in the days of the iniquitous Stamp Act, and by the Social Democratic Party of Germany in later years. It is inconceivable, therefore, that a democratic society will ever abolish the sacred right of freedom of publication which has been won at so great a sacrifice. Every Socialist writer of note agrees with Kautsky that the freedom of the press, and of literary production generally, is an essential condition of democratic Socialism.

But to declare that the press will be free under Socialism does not take us very far. As a pious declaration of our hope and belief it is excellent. It does not, however, cast any light upon the practical problem before us; it does not afford an answer to the question: "How can there be freedom of the press when industry is socialized?" Difficult as the question may be, it is important and we must face it with full candor. Nor must we limit ourselves to the press, for the publication of books is quite as important and involves the same difficulties.

Let us consider, first of all, the publication of books. Organized society is already the great book-buyer upon which the publisher for profit relies. At first this may seem a startling statement, but a little reflection will show that it is true.

Our big publishers find their chief source of profit in supplying text-books and manuals for schools, colleges, and other public institutions, and in supplying general literature to public libraries and special libraries maintained in connection with various public institutions. The socialization of education would greatly extend the influence and interest of organized society in this respect. All text-books and manuals for schools, colleges, universities and technical institutions would be produced for the collectivity. The exceptions would be trifling and insignificant.

Under existing conditions, organized society controls the publication of such books to a limited degree, and in a very indirect and circuitous manner. The author takes his manuscript to a publisher and asks for its consideration. The publisher submits it to expert advisers and is guided by their report. If the book is intended for a school text-book and its subject is, let us say, history, the publisher tries to ascertain (1) if the book is accurate and reliable; (2) if it is well adapted for use as a text-book; (3) if there is likely to be an effective demand for such a book in the event of its publication. If he finally decides not to publish the book, the publisher returns the manuscript to the author, who then tries elsewhere. If he tries all the regular publishing houses in vain, the poor author can either consign

his manuscript to the flames or to the tender mercies of the mice, or he can publish it at his own expense.

Let us suppose that the publisher accepts the book. As soon as it is ready for publication the book is submitted to those who determine what text-books must be used by the students — professors in universities, and colleges, head teachers in public schools, superintendents of education, and so on. These officials, then, constitute the jury which ultimately decides the fate of the book. The publisher and his advisers are, in the last analysis, a sort of preliminary jury, and their function is to “weed out” the impossible productions and present the eligible books to the jury of final selection.

It would not be impossible for the state and municipal authorities to dispense with the private publisher altogether, and deal directly with the author, paying him a royalty as the publisher now does, and eliminating the publisher's profit. In Great Britain, I believe, all books used in the public elementary and secondary schools have to be approved by the Educational Department. That some modification of this method would be entirely practicable, and the manuscripts approved by an official board, is fairly obvious. In other words, just as now responsible officials have to select and approve text-books and manuals to be

used in schools and colleges, similar officials could pass upon the books in manuscript and those approved could be published by the state or the municipality as the case might be.

An author whose work was rejected by the officials in one State or city could submit it to the proper authorities in other States and cities, and, if successful, he could still have the privilege of publishing it at his own expense, just as the author must do to-day under similar circumstances. Even if we assume private printing establishments to be forbidden — an assumption wholly without warrant so far as Socialist principle is concerned — there is no reason why the State or municipal printer should not be compelled to print at cost any book, no matter what its nature, provided the cost of printing was prepaid. The author would be responsible for any abuses of the laws relating to obscenity, libel, and so on.

Turning from this special branch of literary production to general literature, including novels, poetry, essays, volumes of sermons, biographies, works on political economy and essays in political and literary criticism, we find society, through its extensive library system, in a position to do away with the private publisher, at least so far as the latter is engaged in supplying the public service. Library boards in State and nation, and even in large cities, might have their literary advisers and

publish such works as the latter agreed to recommend, paying royalties to the authors upon all copies sold. We have already a beginning of this sort of enterprise in the publication for sale of important books by national, State and municipal authorities.

It might be a matter of civic pride to publish the work of a local writer or a work dealing with some matter of local interest. Mr. Winston Churchill's novels might appear under the imprint of the Commonwealth of New Hampshire or Mr. Riley's poems under the imprint of the City of Indianapolis. The author who found himself without honor among his own people might get his work accepted in another city or another State, and so prove himself to be like the prophet of the proverb, not without honor, save in his own country.¹

The army of dejected authors with rejected manuscripts would probably not be materially increased, and if it were the social loss would in all probability not be great. It would be absurd for society to undertake the publication of every volume of "Collected Poems" and every sonnet sequence submitted by ambitious versifiers. Local pride in some cases and genuine appreciation of genius by the cognoscenti in other cases, would probably lead to the publication of about as much

¹ Cf. WELLS, *New Worlds for Old*, Ch. XIII.

verse, good, bad and indifferent, as is published under present conditions. Those who failed to secure the acceptance of their work would either remain "mute and inglorious," or publish their works at their own expense, just as is done to-day. They would — or could — enjoy one advantage, namely, freedom from the robbery and exploitation to which most such poets are now subjected. They could get their printing and binding done at cost and place their books on sale in the public stores upon a commission basis.

All this is, of course, suggestive merely: not a prophecy of what will be, but a hint of what might be, put forward to show that the problem is by no means insoluble. In his more youthful days, when Socialism must have seemed much less complex than it does to-day, George Bernard Shaw suggested a possible solution of the problem. He assumed the total disappearance of private industrial enterprise, not, perhaps, through suppression by law, but as a result of the glorious superiority of publicly owned and operated industry. No private printing presses anywhere existing, all printing being done in the municipal printing offices, Shaw suggested that a committee of the municipal government having charge of the printing could be "left free to accept any publication it thought valuable, as a private firm to-day may take the risk of publication, the arrangement with

the author being purchase outright, or royalty on copies sold, in each case so much to be put to his credit at the communal bank." The author whose work was not wanted could, Shaw suggested, have it printed at cost, the committee having no power to decline such work.¹

As we have seen, the abolition of all private industry is not an essential condition of modern, scientific Socialism. This is not a diluted form of Marxian Socialism: on the contrary, the strictest interpretation of Marxian Socialism leaves room for a good deal of private industrial enterprise. The private printing press will not be impossible under Socialism, nor is there any reason for supposing that the private production of books, pamphlets, newspapers, pictures, statues or other works of art will entirely disappear. To quote the words of Kautsky: "A proletarian régime will no more make this form of commodity production impossible, than it will abolish the little private industry in material production. Just as little as the needle and thimble, will brush and palette, or ink and pen belong to those means of production which must under all conditions be socialized."²

It is quite unnecessary, therefore, to suppose that under Socialism the State will be the only publisher and the only printer, and that the politi-

¹ *Fabian Essays*, pp. 158-159.

² KARL KAUTSKY, *The Social Revolution*, p. 172.

cal essayist whose book is an assault upon the State will be suppressed, or, at best, only permitted to have his book printed at his own expense. Just as in ordinary economic production it is by no means necessary that it should be centralized in the hands of the State, production by municipalities, voluntary coöperative associations of workers, and, in some degree, individual production, being equally compatible with Socialist principles, so here it is needless to assume the centralization of printing and publishing in one great State department. The book which the State refused to publish might still be published by any city in which the views advanced by the author were favored, or in which a large spirit of tolerance ruled the authorities. Or it might be published by any coöperative association, or any society formed for the promotion of the principles advanced by the author.

Under such conditions, the suppression of free criticism would be impossible. The Henry James Eclectic Association would be free to publish its commentaries upon the disputed readings of the novels of Henry James. The Mallock-Shaw Society would be free to publish its cryptograms to prove that William Hulburt Mallock wrote the plays ascribed to George Bernard Shaw. The Society for the Restoration of British Rule in North America would be free to publish its arguments in the most dignified Tory form it chose.

The League for the Abolition of Government and Collective Control would be free to issue its pamphlets.

So much for the publication of books. Let us turn now to consider the publication of newspapers in the Socialist State. Originally, the newspaper was what its name suggests, a compendium of information concerning contemporary happenings. To that function was soon added that of the comment of an individual upon the news. The primary functions of a newspaper, as such, are, therefore: (1) the publication of news for the information of the reader, and (2) the publication of comments, arguments and criticisms from the view point of the publisher. Socially considered, these are the primary and legitimate functions of the newspaper. That they are functions of great importance cannot be gainsaid. Particularly in a democracy, it is of the greatest importance that information should be complete and widespread, and that discussion should be general, candid and public.

The ideal newspaper would publish all the news, as far as possible, without any exaggeration, distortion or bias. It would neither suppress information concerning any incident nor misrepresent it to the advantage of the publisher or to the disadvantage of any person or persons with whom the publisher might disagree. Its comments, criticisms

and suggestions, while not impartial, perhaps, would be fair and candid, and their point of view would be openly declared. It would be free from all suspicion of suppressing or misrepresenting any fact of public interest or importance, or of secretly serving an interest other than that openly avowed by it. There could be no objection to-day, for example, to the publication by a newspaper of editorials in support of a great trust, provided that instead of the lying legend, "An Independent Newspaper," the editorial column was frankly headed, "Published in the Interest of the Steel Trust"—or the oil trust, as the case might be. Honest advocacy of an avowed interest is admirable, whether it be the interest of the labor union, the public service corporation, the saloon keeper or the temperance society.

The typical newspaper of to-day is not published primarily as a means of spreading information or as an honest contribution to free discussion, however. It is a great profit-making enterprise. Where it is not published for the purpose of defending and promoting special interests by misleading the public by the suppression and distortion of the news of the day, and cunning arguments based upon misrepresentation, it is so dependent upon the income from advertisements for its existence that it dare not antagonize the great financial and commercial interests of the advertisers,

either in its news columns or its editorial discussion. The prostitution of the press is the most characteristic feature of its present existence.

That the socialization of industry will not entirely do away with advertising is fairly obvious. Even if all production and exchange were centralized in the hands of the State, it would probably still be socially advantageous to have some system of advertising the goods to be found in the public stores. Such advertising is "news" in the truest sense of the word. It is equally evident, however, that the elaborate and costly advertisements of to-day would disappear with the capitalist ownership of the great socially necessary means of production and exchange. And with the disappearance of the system of capitalist production and exchange, and the extensive advertising it involves, the servile and parasitic press would also disappear. Individuals and groups might still publish papers for the promotion of special political, philosophical and intellectual interests, but such papers would be vastly different from the newspapers of to-day which are published in defense of the interests of a dominant economic class, or, where that is not the case, limited in their freedom by their dependence upon that class for the advertising which alone enables them to exist.

While a great many Socialists believe that in the Socialist State the publication of news will be a

collective function, there are very few who seriously believe that the newspaper published by the private individual, or group of individuals will wholly disappear. Anton Menger is, perhaps, the most brilliant exception to this rule. He suggests that there will be an official newspaper in each city, which will impartially publish all the news of the day as well as complaints and criticisms and suggestions for improvement in the public services.¹

Now, it is not impossible to conceive of a fairly comprehensive municipal or State newspaper. We already have our daily consular bulletins. The gathering and publication of news could doubtless be socialized without special difficulty. We may well doubt, however, whether such a collective news service, no matter how impartially conducted, could, of itself, satisfy the diverse wants and tastes of the citizens, even as well as they are satisfied to-day. There could hardly be that catering to special tastes to meet which the press of to-day provides a fairly extensive choice. For dignified old gentlemen New York offers the *Evening Post*, for the devotee of "sport" the *Evening Telegram*, and for the ardent radical the *Call*. It is doubtful whether, even in the Socialist State, any official paper could suit all three as well.

Edward Bellamy, in some respects the most ingenious of all Utopia builders, offers a much

¹ *Neue Staatslehre*, pp. 57-58.

more attractive solution in *Looking Backward*. The government is the sole printer and publisher, but only in the sense that it must publish what is wanted by the people, even the most radical views of small minorities. The people for whom the paper is published choose their own editor:

"Supposing some of my neighbors or myself think we ought to have a newspaper reflecting our opinions, and devoted especially to our locality, trade, or profession. We go about among the people till we get the names of such a number that their annual subscriptions will meet the cost of the paper, which is little or big according to the largeness of its constituency. The amount of the subscriptions marked off, the credits of the citizens guarantees the nation against loss in publishing the paper; its business, you understand, being that of a publisher purely, with no option to refuse the duty required. The subscribers to the paper now elect somebody as editor, who, if he accepts the office, is discharged from other service during his incumbency. Instead of paying a salary to him, as in your day, the subscribers pay the nation an indemnity equal to the cost of his support for taking him away from the general service. He manages the paper just as one of your editors did, except that he has no counting room as they, or interests of private capital as against public good to defend. At the end of the first year, the sub-

scribers either reelect the former editor or choose anyone else to fill his place. An able editor, of course, keeps his place indefinitely. As the subscription list enlarges, the funds of the paper increase, and it is improved by the securing of more and better contributors, just as your papers were." ¹

If there is anything we may say with reasonable certainty concerning the Socialist State it is that it will bear very little resemblance to Bellamy's highly centralized, mechanically constructed Utopia. Nevertheless, the plan of publishing newspapers which he suggests is not altogether impracticable, and might, with some modifications, be adopted if the printing industry should be completely carried on by State and municipal authorities. Bernard Shaw would apply his method of publishing books, which is an adaptation of Bellamy's suggestion, to the publication of newspapers. "Newspapers might be issued on similar terms," he says; "and it would always be open to individuals, or to groups of individuals, to publish anything they pleased on covering the cost of publication." ²

The imperative necessity of maintaining the freedom of the press, the right of individuals or groups to publish the news which they regard as of special interest and importance, and such comments, criti-

¹ EDWARD BELLAMY, *Looking Backward*, Chap. XV.

² *Fabian Essays*, p. 159.

cisms and arguments as they desire, is generally recognized by Socialist writers as freely and fully as by Bellamy and Shaw. Our friend, H. G. Wells, suggests, that: "The problem of the press is perhaps to be solved by some parallel combination of individual enterprise and public resources."¹ This is in keeping with the suggestion made by M. Lucien Deslinieres, an interesting Socialist writer who is unfortunately little known outside of France. M. Deslinieres suggests that in the Socialist State there will be, first of all, an official newspaper service, freely distributed to all citizens. The machinery for this distribution already exists, for in France the newspapers are distributed through the postoffices. But this official newspaper service will be supplemented by a "free press," the conditions for which will be much more favorable than they are to-day. Very little money will be needed to publish a newspaper under Socialism. Such immense sheets as we have to-day, largely devoted to business and financial advertisements, will not be required. A publisher or a group of writers who wish to bring out a journal dealing with any kind of questions whatever, will apply to the national printing works. They will pay in advance the amount of the cost of printing as many copies of a single issue as they may require. This price will cover the bare cost of

¹ *New Worlds for Old*, pp. 281-282.

printing, for the State can have no desire to make profit out of the service rendered to its citizens, that is, to itself. The copies when printed will be forwarded free of charge to the agents selected, and all moneys received for such copies will be paid over to the publishers without any deduction.¹ While M. Deslinieres assumes that the work of printing must be done by the national government, the method he suggests would be equally adapted to the less centralized methods of municipal enterprise.

Our purpose here is not to make plans for the Socialist State or to write its recipes. It is sufficient that we have explored the subject far enough to discover that there is no reason to fear that the Socialist State must establish a rigid censorship, an intellectual despotism; that, in the expressive words of Mr. Wells, it must "destroy itself by choking the channels of its own thinking." That there are difficulties to be overcome and problems to be solved, need not be denied, even though we may believe that the difficulties have been greatly exaggerated, and that the citizens of the future Socialist State will regard our fearful anticipations with as much wonder and amusement as we now regard the fears with which our forefathers anticipated railways, free schools and public libraries.

¹ LUCIEN DESLINIERES, *L' Application du Systeme Collectiviste*, pp. 358-360, Paris, 1902.

Without attempting anything in the nature of a prophecy, it is certain that there is nothing in the philosophy or practical programme of Socialism which involves the suppression of a free press. It is quite likely that there will be well-edited and impartial official newspapers published by cities and States, for the universal dissemination of information is a democratic ideal as well as a democratic necessity. But it is altogether unlikely that the publication of other newspapers by individuals or societies, for the advancement of their special interests, will be legally prohibited or otherwise made impossible, or that such newspapers will cease to be published because the need for them ceases to exist. Conservatism and radicalism, satisfaction and discontent, timidity and courage will continue as opposing forces and will find their outlet through all the known channels of publicity and argument. Not only may we expect the freedom of the press to be preserved, but it is quite probable that the pamphlet will be restored as a means of political and intellectual discussion and propaganda.

One question only remains to be considered here. There are some of our critics who admit, more or less grudgingly, that the independent newspaper will be possible, and even inevitable, under Socialism. But will it not be necessary for the State, in self-protection to exercise a rigid censorship over the contents? "Could it allow any journalist to

criticize its primary provisions for peace and order?" asks a recent writer.¹

"Why not?" we ask in return. Why should we suppose that such a censorship would be tolerated in a perfect democracy, when it is not tolerated in the partial democracy of to-day? Even in capitalist society, with a powerful class government in control, the journalist of to-day is free to "criticize its primary provisions for peace and order." If it is proposed to increase our military forces, we are free even now to denounce the proposal. If new ordinances imposing restrictions upon personal freedom are enacted, we are free to denounce them even though we must observe them. Why need we fear that democracy which has won this measure of freedom by so much struggle and sacrifice will destroy the freedom and forge new chains with which to bind itself?

Let our critics answer, if they can!

¹ JANE T. STODDART, *The New Socialism*, p. 152.

XI

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM UNDER SOCIALISM

ON one occasion, during an important Reichstag debate, Bebel was taunted by some of his parliamentary opponents for having changed his opinion upon an important matter of Socialist doctrine. In support of the charge, some of his earlier utterances were quoted against him. With characteristic candor Bebel admitted that his views had been modified, and used the expressive phrase "our party is continually molting." He boasted then with justifiable pride that the Social Democratic Party is not wedded to dogmas, but is a "party of learners, a party of progress." The same thing may be truthfully said of the Socialist parties of the world.

Nothing illustrates this continual "molting" more admirably than the remarkable change in the attitude of the Socialist movement toward religion during the last quarter of a century. From the bitter hostility of the early Marxist movement to the fine tolerance expressed in the *Erfurter Programm*, and since followed consistently as a matter of party policy, is a big step. From the

speeches and writings of some of the early leaders of Marxian Socialism in Germany and France it would be possible to compile a moderate-sized volume of passages bitterly attacking Christianity and the Christian Church. Religion and capitalism were regarded as twin evils to be combated with equal bitterness and vigor. Thus, Liebknecht declared in the *Volkstaat* in 1875: "It is our duty as Socialists to root out God with all our zeal, nor is anyone worthy the name who does not consecrate himself to the spread of Atheism." Bebel declared in the Reichstag on the thirty-first of December, 1881: "In politics we profess republicanism, in economics Socialism, in religion Atheism."

It would be extremely disingenuous to set up the claim that these and similar utterances of the period must be regarded as merely the expression of individual opinions, for which the movement must not be held responsible. Such a claim can fairly be made concerning statements of a similar character in the present day, for practically all the great Socialist parties of the world have unequivocally declared their neutrality upon all matters of religious belief. Moreover, blatant Atheism is no longer a characteristic feature of the Socialist propaganda. There has been a good deal of "molting" in the Socialist movement during the last twenty-five years, especially since the adoption of the *Erfurter Programm*. In the early days

of the Marxian movement utterances like those of Liebknecht and Bebel were so common as to be characteristic, and the party never thought of repudiating them.

This association of Atheism and Socialism is the more remarkable by reason of the fact that the Utopian Socialist movement prior to Marx was deeply impregnated with religious sentiment and feeling. Thus, in the case of Weitling, who has been described as the connecting link between Utopian and scientific Socialism, we find that his work is pervaded by a very fervent religious spirit. He is a sort of latter-day Piers the Plowman, a religious enthusiast, whose teachings are based upon the teachings of Jesus. Fourier's whole system was inspired by a reverential admiration and awe of the God-created divine plan of order manifested throughout the universe. The immortality of the soul was as much an essential part of his system as was the theory of attractive industry. Saint-Simon, also, was essentially a religious mystic, as witness his *Nouveau Christianisme*. It is hardly to be wondered at that so many Socialists of the pre-Marxian period proclaimed themselves Christians. Vandervelde quotes from Proudhon's paper, *Le Peuple*, the account of a banquet of French Socialists in 1848, at which toasts were drunk "To Christ, the Father of Socialism," "To the Coming of God on Earth," and "To the Liv-

ing Christ.”¹ The bitter hostility to religion which has characterized the modern Socialist movement in France had not yet taken root.

Now there is no apparent reason why belief in the collective ownership of the principal means of production should be regarded as incompatible with an equally strong belief in Christianity, or, for that matter, in Buddhism, or Confucianism. The most ingenious theologian would find it difficult to show the slightest inconsistency in the acceptance of every fundamental Christian belief and the most enthusiastic support of the full Socialist programme. In actual practice, in every country, tens of thousands of loyal Socialists are equally loyal to their religious beliefs and affiliations. In all the Christian countries of Europe and America, thousands of Christian believers are enrolled members of the Socialist parties, and many thousands more regularly vote for Socialist candidates. This is true of Protestants to a much larger extent than of Catholics, but it is nevertheless true that there are many devout Catholics who are active members of the national Socialist parties, and that the Socialist vote in typical Catholic strongholds steadily increases, alike in Europe and the United States. The Socialists have elected many Catholics to public

¹ EMILE VANDERVELDE, *Essais Socialistes*, pp. 130-131. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1906.

office, including a number of parliamentary representatives.

No sympathetic student of both movements can doubt that there is a very real kinship and affinity between Christianity and Socialism. Even Professor Flint, who may fairly be called one of the least sympathetic and fair-minded of our critics, is forced to grudgingly admit that Socialism and Christianity "are by no means entirely unrelated."¹ Of Socialism he says: "It is to a large extent exaggeration or misapplication of principles which are true and good, which Christ has taught and sanctioned, which the Gospel rests on and must stand or fall by, and Christians will betray Christ and the Gospel if they desert these principles, or depreciate them, or allow them to be evil spoken of, or act as if they were ashamed of them, because Socialism has so far recognized and adopted them."² Kautsky, who cannot be accused of entertaining any strong religious sympathies, admits that it is possible to be a Socialist and a Christian at the same time, that "the striving of the masses for the abolition of class distinction is perfectly reconcilable with the Christian teaching of the Gospels," and that "the Socialist movement stands nearer to primitive Christianity than

¹ ROBERT FLINT, *Socialism*, p. 453.

² *Idem*.

perhaps any other modern movement, for both originated among the masses." ¹

How, then, shall we account for the hostility to religion which has characterized so much of the later Socialist propaganda?

In answering the question it will be well to distinguish clearly between that instinctive and bitter hostility to organized Christianity which is so commonly encountered in the propaganda literature of Socialism, and the intellectual opposition to Christian theology upon rationalistic grounds, dogmatic Atheism, which until lately was hardly less common. The former represents not so much antagonism to essential Christianity as to the Church. Not infrequently it is accompanied by a very profound and tender affection for Jesus Christ, and a passionate longing for the realization of his teaching. Bernstein has called attention to the fact that the masses have instinctively sensed a certain definite relation of Socialism to Christianity. Many a Socialist lecturer — and it would probably be safe to say every Socialist lecturer of large experience — has been told by workingmen, and working women, that all he had said was to be found in the Bible, and that they could find it there.² Such men oppose organized Christianity

¹ Cf. KAUTSKY's pamphlet, *Die Sozialdemokratie und die katholische Kirche*, pp. 7-8.

² EDWARD BERNSTEIN, *Evolutionary Socialism*, p. 166.

because they believe it to be false to the teachings of Jesus. The utmost love and reverence for Jesus and his teaching is coupled with the bitterest hatred and most scornful contempt for the Christian Church.¹

This attitude is, in a large degree, a result of the growth of the *class consciousness* of the workers. It is notorious that the Christian Churches, both Protestant and Catholic, have been largely dominated by the interests of the capitalist classes and have, in the main, defended their interests against the interests of the masses. In the vast majority of cases, they have either openly opposed the workers in their struggles, or they have remained silent when they ought, as followers of Jesus, to have spoken. Dependence upon the rich supporters of the Church and fear of offending "the best people in town," have silenced the voice of the ministry in so many cases that the workers have come to look upon the Church as the ally of capitalism. For one who is at all sympathetic with the best in the Christian Church, who realizes the sincerity of faith and purpose of many Christians, it is not a pleasant thing to contemplate the indictment of organized Christianity which needs must be made. Why is it that one rarely sees the union label upon any piece of printing done for

¹ Cf. my *Spiritual Significance of Modern Socialism*, Section IV.

the Church? Does anyone doubt that it is because the master class so far controls the churches that they *dare* not take the side of the workers in the industrial struggle, even to that slight extent? ¹

If anyone were to make a canvass in any great industrial city and compile a list of the worst exploiters of labor, the bitterest enemies of Organized Labor, the owners of man-killing tenements and factories that are fire-traps, the men responsible for corrupting legislators and public administrative servants, and the real leaders of those political machines that traffic in votes and draw tributes from gambling hells and brothels, does anybody at all familiar with the facts doubt that the list would include the names of most of the "prominent leaders" in the churches and synagogues of the city? It is true, of course, that one would also find these same men actively interested in every philanthropic work in the city, serving on boards of directors of Charity Organizations, contributing to hospital funds, "rescue missions," and so on. But this fact does not atone for the other. The workers do not want charity! The unemployed workmen who marched through the streets of London, bearing banners inscribed, "Damn your charity! We want Justice, not Charity!" were

¹ These remarks apply equally, of course, to Judaism and its synagogues.

far more truly Christian in their thought than the professed Christians who contributed to the temporary relief of the starving men and their families.

Rarely indeed has organized religion given its support to the struggling proletariat. Chartists struggling for the franchise, trade unionists fighting for better wages and shorter hours, Socialists combating the capitalist system — all have encountered either the active opposition or the cowardly silence of church and synagogue. All too often the spokesmen of organized religion have discouraged and condemned the struggling proletariat and preached meekness, obedience and resignation; all too often they have urged the workers to endure with patience earthly wrongs in the hope of a heavenly recompense; too often they have taught the workers that they must be “content in the station whereunto Almighty God has been pleased to appoint them” — thus organized religion has been made the servitor of the master class. The masters of bread and lords of power have not been slow to recognize this fact. M. Thiers, the French statesman, said in 1848: “I wish to make the influence of the clergy all-powerful, because I depend upon them to spread that good philosophy which teaches man that he is here on earth to suffer, and not that other philosophy, which says

on the contrary, to man, 'Enjoy.'"¹ The workers, too, have come to regard church and synagogue as allies of the capitalist class.

We cannot wonder, then, that the class consciousness of the workers, which modern Socialism has done so much to develop, expresses itself very often in bitter antagonism to the church. As the Rev. R. J. Campbell says: "There is good reason for the antagonism, and the reason is that the churches have been captured to a large extent by the forces which Socialism seeks to destroy. The churches have largely forgotten their own origin. . . . We are thus confronted with a curious and anomalous situation: The Socialism which is developing so generally in antagonism to conventional Christianity is far nearer to the original Christianity than the Christianity of the churches. *The objective of Socialism is that with which Christianity began its history. Socialism is actually a swing back to that gospel of the Kingdom of God which was the only gospel the first Christians had to preach*; the traditional theology of the churches is a departure from it. I do not mean, of course, to make the foolish statement that primitive Christianity was identical with the Socialism of to-day; it was not, but it was far nearer to the Socialism

¹ Quoted by PAUL LAFARGUE, in *The Right To Be Lazy*.

of to-day than to the official Christianity of to-day." ¹

We move here in a tragic circle of circumstances. So long as the churches and synagogues are dominated by the class interests of the masters of bread, so long will the class consciousness of the workers express itself in bitter hostility. And so long as the workers are hostile to these institutions and distrust them, so long will the master class control them. The workers will, under these conditions, be compelled to create for themselves other channels for the expression of their religious instincts and enthusiasm.

Turning from the apparently increasing hostility of the practical movement of the working class toward organized religion, to the intellectual opposition to religion upon rationalistic grounds, we find a conflict that is constantly diminishing in extent and intensity of bitterness. Even the worst enemies of Socialism admit this to be the case. Generally, the suggestion is made that the changed attitude is due to tactical exigencies, a suppression of one of the real aims of the movement for the sake of votes. Rarely do we find a critic wise enough to perceive and candid enough to admit the real reason, the general subsidence of the tide of

¹ R. J. CAMPBELL, M. A., *Christianity and the Social Order*, pp. 19-20. (*Italics mine.* J. S.)

rationalism and the universal reaction against the dogmatic Atheism of a generation ago.

Elsewhere I have attempted to explain rather than to excuse the close alliance with dogmatic Atheism in our early propaganda.¹

The modern Socialist movement, the movement which the genius of Marx inspired, dates from the middle of the nineteenth century. Its rise was contemporaneous with the rise of that destructive rationalistic criticism of religion which spread all over the world. Darwin's *Origin of Species* and Marx's *Critique of Political Economy* both appeared in the same year, 1859. Darwinism provoked an intellectual conflict into which practically all educated and intelligent men were drawn. The cobbler at his bench studied the popular expositions of evolution and boldly assailed the crude and brutal theology of the time. The pulpit, with few exceptions, assailed the new science as blasphemous and fatal to religion. The preachers and theologians made the not unnatural mistake of confusing their crude dogmas and creeds with religion itself. On the other hand, the believers in the new scientific theories, likewise confusing dogma and religion, exultantly proclaimed the overthrow of religion.

It was both natural and inevitable that the

¹ Cf. JOHN SPARGO, *The Spiritual Significance of Modern Socialism*.

pioneers of the modern Socialist movement should ally themselves with the new science, and that they should thoroughly accept the rationalistic criticisms of religion to which the new science gave birth. Although one might well believe in every Marxian principle, in the materialistic conception of history, the doctrine of the class struggle, in the surplus-value theory and the inevitability of Socialism, and, at the same time, accept the fundamentals of religious belief, the early Marxists rarely perceived the fact, simply because they were equally hostile to capitalism and to religion, equally pledged to Socialism and to rationalism. That these separate interests were blended in their propaganda writings and speeches is not strange; it would be strange, indeed, if it were otherwise. The fact remains, however, that the Atheism was not logically derived from the Socialist philosophy, but was a product of the general intellectual movement of the time.

A phenomenal revolution in religious and theological thought has resulted from the general acceptance of the principle of evolution. Science has won its way. Evolution is now preached in those churches wherein Darwin, Huxley and Spencer were denounced a generation ago as foes of God and destroyers of religion. Science is less dogmatic, too. Scientists like Lord Kelvin and Sir Oliver Lodge — the latter a Socialist — recon-

cile science and religion, and accept the facts of evolution together with a belief in a Divine Intelligence and the Immortality of the Soul. In the words of Professor Sombart: "There is no earnest representative of science anywhere who to-day dares to assert that science means Atheism and excludes religion."¹

Many of the things which Ingersoll was so bitterly assailed for saying have become the common-places of the orthodox Christian pulpit, at least in the Protestant churches. The bitterness of the old conflict has passed away. Science is no longer a synonym for Atheism in the mind of the average educated man. The Socialist movement naturally reflects the new intellectual spirit and temper, with the result that there is much greater tolerance for religious belief than formerly. As Professor Sombart truly says: "At the present day fundamentally hostile views about religion are to be heard only in the circles of half-educated Socialists."² This is true, notwithstanding the fact that an overwhelming majority of the intellectual leaders of the movement in all lands are avowed agnostics. Dogmatic Atheism is an obsolete phase of Socialist thought and propaganda.

¹ WERNER SOMBART, *Socialism and the Social Movement in the XIX Century*, pp. 160-161. Edition of 1898.

² Quoted by STODDART, *The New Socialism*, p. 27, from p. 101 of SOMBART'S *Socialismus und Sozial Bewegung*, Edition of 1908.

At the Erfurt Congress of the German Social Democracy, in October, 1891, a new party programme and declaration of principles was adopted. The old Gotha Programme had contained the following as Article VI in the practical demands of the party: "Universal and equal popular education by the State. Universal compulsory education. Free instruction in all forms of art. Declaration that religion is a private matter." The Erfurt Congress separated the subject of religion from that of education and adopted as Article VI of the party programme the following: "Declaration that religion is a private matter. Abolition of all expenditure from public funds upon ecclesiastical and religious objects. Ecclesiastical and religious bodies are to be regarded as private associations, which order their affairs independently." Nearly all the great national Socialist parties have based their policy upon the Erfurt Programme.

Now, the statement "religion is a private matter" has been condemned as evasive by a great many anti-Socialist writers, as well as by some Socialists. Thus, we find the author of a recent book¹ gleefully quoting the statement of a delegate to the convention of the Socialist party of the United States, in 1908, that: "Religion is a sociological question, an anthropological question, a

¹ C. BERTRAND THOMPSON, *The Church and the Wage Earners*, p. 129n.

question of chronology, of economics, of theosophy [? philosophy]. There are few forms of modern thought that do not directly affect the question of religion, and when you say that it is merely a question of the private conscience, you fly in the face of the science and learning of your day.”¹ Clearly what is meant by the declaration that religion is a “private matter” is that the party first of all imposes no religious tests; that it does not limit the religious beliefs of its members; and that the State has no right to interfere with the religious convictions of its citizens.

If we analyze the statement of the position of the International Socialist Movement contained in the Erfurt Programme, we shall find that it involves nothing to which any loyal American can take exception without attacking the very basis of our government. It involves the following principles: (1) the freedom of the individual in matters of religious belief, the State to impose no religious tests upon its citizens; (2) the complete separation of Church and State; (3) prohibition of the expenditure of public funds upon ecclesiastical and religious subjects; (4) freedom of religious associations independent of the State.²

¹ Cf. *Proceedings*, National Convention Socialist Party, pp. 191-192.

² It need hardly be said that the State could not permit dangerous practices subversive of public order and morality, even though these might masquerade as “religious exercises.” Hu-

It is undeniably true that the separation of Church and State is a cardinal tenet of Socialist policy. The Jesuit writer, Victor Cathrein, says: "This doctrine is directly antagonistic to the teachings of the Catholic Church, which has always condemned as injurious and untenable the principle of absolute separation of Church and State."¹ Even in Europe, there are many loyal Catholics who believe that the Church and the State should be completely separated, and who would deplore any attempt to restore the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, just as there are many thousands of communicants of the Church of England who believe in the Disestablishment and Disendowment of the Church as whole-heartedly as the most aggressive Nonconformist. It is probable that a great majority of the Catholics of America who consider the subject at all, believe that their Church is at least as well-off in this country, with its constitutional separation of Church and State, as it would be if there was a close alliance of the two and the maintenance of the Church depended upon the public treasury. The attacks upon the Catholic

man sacrifice, mutilations of the body, obscene exhibitions and sexual perversion are all forms which have been assumed by religious fanaticism, and which no civilized society could tolerate.

¹ VICTOR CATHREIN, S. J., *Socialism, Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Application*. Revised and Enlarged by VICTOR F. GETTLEMAN, S. J., p. 211.

Church in France, Spain, Portugal, and even China, in recent years have been directed against the Church as a political force, rather than as a religious organization.

The aim of the Socialist, then, is not the suppression of religious organizations. On the contrary, freedom of religious association is one of the principles of the Socialist movement. No other interpretation is possible. A number of years ago a Socialist wrote to the *Appeal to Reason* asking what would become of the churches under Socialism. In reply he was told that Socialism would abolish religion, and that all churches and other religious edifices would be socialized and turned into public lecture halls. When a similar question was asked a year or so ago in the same Socialist paper by the same writer, the reply was that under Socialism there would be entire freedom in matters of religion; that any number of citizens will be free to form a religious organization and to maintain a place of worship and a minister, if they so desire, at their own expense. The "molting" process is not confined to German Socialists!

There can be no doubt that the later attitude of the *Appeal to Reason* reflects the present position of the international movement upon this question. Perhaps the best and most comprehensive statement of the whole question is contained in the

remarkable address which Wilhelm Liebknecht delivered at the Erfurt Congress expounding the new programme, which, following Liebknecht's speech, was unanimously adopted. That address with its fine tolerance affords a striking contrast to the bitter hostility toward religion which Liebknecht had expressed in the *Volkstaat* in 1875. Upon the subject of religion, according to the official report of the Congress, Liebknecht said:

"The two following paragraphs of the programme have given us much trouble in their formulation.¹ To meet the difficulty it was moved to accept the democratic demands as found in the Eisenacher programme: 'Separation of the church from the school and from the State.' That was quite right in its time, but at present it does not comprehend all that we would and must say. In the earlier formulation the church is regarded as an institution equal in rank with the State. This is not our idea. We go much further; according to our view, in the free community for which we strive *the church is simply a private association, which is controlled by its own laws, as all other private associations are.* That is the meaning of the absolute equality to which we have here given expression. Therefore, we say: 'The ecclesiastical and religious bodies are to be regarded as private associations.' *And in order that the Catholics may not be able to say that we wish to offer them*

¹ LIEBKNECHT refers here to Article VI, Quoted on p. 319, which deals with religion and religious bodies, and Article VII, which deals with the subject of education and demands; "Secularization of education. Compulsory attendance at public national schools. Free education, free supply of educational apparatus and free maintenance to children in schools and to such pupils, male and female, in higher educational institutions, as are judged to be fitted for further education."

violence we have added: 'Associations which order their affairs independently.'

"In connection with this passage concerning the church we demand 'Secularization of education.' This means that the church, that religion, should have nothing to do with the school. We are bound by principle to demand this and the point is so clear that explanation seems unnecessary. However, it is worth while to meet beforehand all misunderstandings and intentional or unintentional misinterpretations to which such a demand in our platform could give occasion. It is well known how stubbornly the ecclesiastical bodies carry on the struggle concerning the school whenever that question comes to the front. One recognizes how much it means to them, Catholics, Protestants and others, to hold and make their control firm over the intellect. You know how the Social Democracy is represented as a red specter, how the ecclesiastical associations say of us that we are a party of Atheists, and that the Social Democrats would forcibly take religion from everyone and violently crush the church. *In order to take the foundation from and to break the point of these demagogical slanders and pious falsehoods, we state here that the regulation of religious matters lies with each individual, and we declare religion to be a private matter.* I admit that I struggled for some time against taking up these practical considerations, since their meaning seemed so self-evident in the declaration of the programme. But in looking back over the systematic calumny of our position in regard to religion it appears necessary that they be stated. *The Social Democracy as such has absolutely nothing to do with religion.* Every man has a right to think and believe what he will, and no one has the right to molest or limit another in his thoughts or beliefs, or to allow anyone's opinions to be a disadvantage to him in any way. Opinions and beliefs can only be proceeded against when they become converted into pernicious and unlawful acts, as for example, with certain bigoted sects. But the opinions and beliefs in themselves must be free, perfectly free. We as Social Democrats must respect them, *and those Social Democrats who respect the genuineness and worth of their fellow men will also avoid scoffing at their*

beliefs. Above all, scoffing at a prejudice is foolish and impolitic, since it but strengthens it. Only education can be of help here. But if it were our duty to state that we will not rob anyone of his religion or hinder him in the exercise thereof, we dare not offer the church any handle by means of which it can come into the schools, and, therefore, we say, 'Compulsory attendance at public national schools.' Every child must be sent by its parents or relatives to these secular schools, in which no religion is taught, but by virtue of the fundamental statement, that religion is a private matter, *it remains to the parents themselves to teach their children, or allow them to be taught, in the religion which they choose.* At first we thought to expressly state this in the programme, but we found that such a practical commentary did not belong there.

"We demand further that expenditures from the public funds not only to ecclesiastical but to religious objects be abolished. We have added the word 'religious' because there are associations of a religious nature that are not ecclesiastical, and also there shall be no expenditure from the public funds, *just because religion is a private matter.*"¹

Little or nothing need be added to this fine declaration by Liebknecht, greatest of the political leaders of Marxian Socialism. The Socialist State will not attempt to abolish religion or to suppress it. On the contrary, it will set religion free — free from the entanglements of political power, and free from the domination of a ruling class. Above all, it will make possible the realization of the great social ideals which are the vital forces in all religions — universal peace, social justice and the brotherhood of man.

¹ Italics mine. J. S.

APPENDIX

PROGRAMME OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

THE economic development of bourgeois society leads by natural necessity to the downfall of the small industry, whose foundation is formed by the workers' private ownership of his means of production. It separates the worker from his means of production, and converts him into a property-less proletarian, while the means of production become the monopoly of a relatively small number of capitalists and large landowners.

Hand in hand with this monopolization of the means of production goes the displacement of the dispersed small industries by colossal great industries, the development of the tool into the machine, and a gigantic growth in the productivity of human labor. But all the advantages of this transformation are monopolized by capitalists and large landowners. For the proletariat and the declining intermediate classes — petty bourgeoisie and peasants — it means a growing augmentation of the

insecurity of their existence, of misery, oppression, enslavement, debasement, and exploitation.

Ever greater grows the number of proletarians, ever more enormous the army of surplus workers, ever sharper the opposition between exploiters and exploited, ever bitterer the class war between bourgeoisie and proletariat, which divides modern society into two hostile camps, and is the common hall-mark of all industrial countries.

The gulf between the propertied and the property-less is further widened through the crises, founded in the essence of the capitalistic method of production, which constantly become more comprehensive and more devastating, which elevate general insecurity to the normal condition of society, and which prove that the powers of production of contemporary society have grown beyond measure, and that private ownership of the means of production has become incompatible with their application to their objects and their full development.

Private ownership of the means of production, which was formerly the means of securing to the producer the ownership of his product, has to-day become the means of expropriating peasants, manual workers, and small traders, and enabling the non-workers — capitalists and large landowners — to own the product of the workers. Only the transformation of capitalistic private ownership of

the means of production — the soil, mines, raw materials, tools, machines, and means of transport — into social ownership, and the transformation of production of goods for sale into Socialistic production managed for and through society, can bring it about, that the great industry and the steadily growing productive capacity of social labor shall for the hitherto exploited classes be changed from a source of misery and oppression to a source of the highest welfare and of all-round harmonious perfection.

This social transformation means the emancipation not only of the proletariat, but of the whole human race which suffers under the conditions of to-day. But it can only be the work of the working class, because all the other classes, in spite of mutually conflicting interests, take their stand on the basis of private ownership of the means of production, and have as their common object the preservation of the principles of contemporary society.

The battle of the working class against capitalistic exploitation is necessarily a political battle. The working class cannot carry on its economic battles or develop its economic organization without political rights. It cannot effect the passing of the means of production into the ownership of the community without acquiring political power.

To shape this battle of the working class into a

conscious and united effort, and to show its naturally necessary end, is the object of the Social Democratic party.

The interests of the working class are the same in all lands with capitalistic methods of production. With the expansion of world transport and production for the world market the state of the workers in any one country becomes constantly more dependent on the state of the workers in other countries. The emancipation of the working class is thus a task in which the workers of all civilized countries are concerned in a like degree. Conscious of this, the Social Democratic party of Germany feels and declares itself *one* with the class-conscious workers of all other lands.

The Social Democratic party of Germany fights thus not for new class privileges and exceptional rights, but for the abolition of class domination and of the classes themselves, and for the equal rights and equal obligations of all, without distinction of sex and parentage. Setting out from these views, it combats in contemporary society not merely the exploitation and oppression of the wage-workers, but of every kind of exploitation and oppression, whether directed against a class, a party, a sex, or a race.

Setting out from these principles, the Social Democratic party of Germany demands immediately:

1. Universal equal direct suffrage and franchise with direct ballot, for all members of the Empire over twenty years of age, without distinction of sex, for all elections and acts of voting. Proportional representation; and until this is introduced, redivision of the constituencies by law according to the numbers of population. A new Legislature every two years. Fixing of elections and acts of voting for a legal holiday. Indemnity for elected representatives. Removal of every curtailment of political rights except in case of tutelage.

2. Direct legislation by the people by means of the initiative and referendum. Self-determination and self-government of the people in empire, state, province, and commune. Authorities to be elected by the people; to be responsible and bound. Taxes to be voted annually.

3. Education of all to be capable of bearing arms. Armed nation instead of standing army. Decision of war and peace by the representative of the people. Settlement of all international disputes by the method of arbitration.

4. Abolition of all laws which curtail or suppress the free expression of opinion and the right of association and assembly.

5. Abolition of all laws which are prejudicial to women in their relations to men in public or private law.

6. Declaration that religion is a private matter. Abolition of all contributions from public funds to ecclesiastical and religious objects. Ecclesiastical and religious bodies are to be treated as private associations, which manage their affairs quite independently.

7. Secularization of education. Compulsory attendance of public primary schools. No charges to be made for instruction, school requisites, and maintenance, in the public primary schools; nor in the higher educational institutions for those students, male or female, who in virtue of their capacities are considered fit for further training.

8. No charges to be made for the administration of the law, or for legal assistance. Judgment by popularly elected judges. Appeal in criminal cases. Indemnification of innocent persons prosecuted, arrested, or condemned. Abolition of the death penalty.

9. No charges to be made for medical attendance, including midwifery and medicine. No charges to be made for death certificates.

10. Graduated taxes on income and property to meet all public expenses as far as these are to be covered by taxation. Obligatory self-assessment. A tax on inheritance, graduated according to the size of the inheritance and the degree of kinship. Abolition of all indirect taxes, customs, and other politico-economic measures which sacrifice the inter-

ests of the whole community to the interests of a favored minority.

For the protection of the working class the Social Democratic party of Germany demands immediately:

1. An effective national and international legislation for the protection of workmen on the following basis:

(a) Fixing of a normal working day with a maximum of eight hours.

(b) Prohibition of industrial work for children under fourteen years.

(c) Prohibition of night work, except for such branches of industry as, in accordance with their nature, require night work, for technical reasons, or reasons of public welfare.

(d) An uninterrupted rest of at least thirty-six hours in every week for every worker.

(e) Prohibition of the truck system.

2. Inspection of all industrial businesses, investigation and regulation of labor relations in town and country by an Imperial Department of Labor, district labor departments, and chambers of labor. Thorough industrial hygiene.

3. Legal equalization of agricultural laborers and domestic servants with industrial workers; removal of the special regulations affecting servants.

4. Assurance of the right of combination.

5. Workmen's insurance to be taken over bodily by the Empire; and the workers to have an influential share in its administration.

6. Separation of the Church and State.

(a) Suppression of the grant for public worship.

(b) Philosophic or religious associations to be civil persons at law.

7. Revisions of sections in the Civil Code concerning marriage and the paternal authority.


(a) Civil equality of the sexes, and of children, whether natural or legitimate.


(b) Revision of the divorce laws, maintaining the husband's liability to support the wife or the children.

(c) Inquiry into paternity to be legalized.

(d) Protective measures in favor of children materially or morally abandoned.


THE END







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